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ABSTRACT
In recent years, there has been a wide range of studies on the role of social and distributed
networks in various disciplinary areas. In particular, availability of large amounts of data
from online social networks and advances in control of distributed systems have drawn the
attention of many researchers to exploit the connection between evolutionary behaviors in
social, communication and distributed networks. In this thesis, we first revisit several well-
known types of social and distributed networks and review some relevant results from the
literature. Building on this, we present a set of new results related to four different types
of problems, and identify several directions for future research. The study undertaken and
the approaches adopted allow us to analyze the evolution of certain types of social and
distributed networks and also to identify local and global patterns of their dynamics using
some novel potential-theoretic techniques.
Following the introduction and preliminaries, we focus on analyzing a specific type of
distributed algorithm for quantized consensus known as an unbiased quantized algorithm
where a set of agents interact locally in a network in order to reach a consensus. We provide
tight expressions for the expected convergence time of such dynamics over general static and
time-varying networks. Following this, we introduce new protocols using a special class of
Markov chains known as Metropolis chains and obtain the fastest (as of today) randomized
quantized consensus protocol. The bounds provided here considerably improve the state of
the art over static and dynamic networks.
We make a bridge between two classes of problems, namely distributed control prob-
lems and game problems. We analyze a class of distributed averaging dynamics known as
Hegselmann-Krause opinion dynamics. Modeling such dynamics as a non-cooperative game
problem, we elaborate on some of the evolutionary properties of such dynamics. In par-
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ticular, we answer an open question related to the termination time of such dynamics by
connecting the convergence time to the spectral gap of the adjacency matrices of underly-
ing dynamics. This not only allows us to improve the best known upper bound, but also
removes the dependency of termination time from the dimension of the ambient space. The
approach adopted here can also be leveraged to connect the rate of increase of a so-called
kinetic-s-energy associated with multi-agent systems to the spectral gap of their underlying
dynamics.
We describe a richer class of distributed systems where the agents involved in the network
act in a more strategic manner. More specifically, we consider a class of resource alloca-
tion games over networks and study their evolution to some final outcomes such as Nash
equilibria. We devise some simple distributed algorithms which drive the entire network to
a Nash equilibrium in polynomial time for dense and hierarchical networks. In particular,
we show that such games benefit from having low price of anarchy, and hence, can be used
to model allocation systems which suffer from lack of coordination. This fact allows us to
devise a distributed approximation algorithm within a constant gap of any pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium over general networks.
Subsequently we turn our attention to an important problem related to competition over
social networks. We establish a hardness result for searching an equilibrium over a class
of games known as competitive diffusion games, and provide some necessary conditions for
existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in such games. In particular, we provide some
concentration results related to the expected utility of the players over random graphs.
Finally, we discuss some future directions by identifying several interesting problems and
justify the importance of the underlying problems.
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Social and distributed networks constitute an important research area which has attracted a
lot of attention in the past few years. Such social structures are used to study the relation-
ships between individuals, groups and organizations when they act as members of a society,
and have emerged in a variety of fields such as economics, engineering, psychology, sociology
and statistics. In particular, with the appearance of game theory and distributed control
from one side and myriads of online social networks and availability of huge data sets on the
other, modeling different phenomena under social and distributed networks has become an
important research topic in recent years.
Traditionally, a common way of modeling different phenomena is to approximate such
events with some known linear or static models in order to facilitate the analysis and to utilize
a rich collection of results available for such models. Although such simplified models provide
ample intuition on understanding the more complex nature of events, in many applications
their failure to describe different phenomena has motivated researchers to consider models
with nonlinear structures. In fact, the failure of such simplified linear or static models is
more pronounced in the study of social networks where the individuals’ actions may depend
on many factors in the society. However, analyzing such nonlinear models can be much more
complicated than analyzing linear ones. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between complexity of
a proposed model and the precision of the model to explain a specific phenomenon. This issue
has motivated considerable recent research devoted to developing some effective nonlinear
models which not only can explain different events with high precision, but also have high
tractability capabilities.
Due to the complex nature of social events which might be woven with rational decisions,
the existing results related to social and distributed networks are very much case dependent.
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However, there are still some basic questions that one can ask in this area, and one of them
is whether there is any common approach to analyze a broader class of such networks. In
other words, one might be interested in some common aspects of the networks which will
be preserved as long as the social interactions continue. This line of thinking has emerged
in the literature under the framework of potential theory. In this thesis, we address the
above question for several important classes of social and distributed networks, but before
we proceed we first review some of the important previous results which effectively model
several important phenomena such as diffusion and formation of opinions in social networks,
quantized consensus in distributed networks and resource allocation in economic networks.
1.1 Motivation and Past Works
In this section we introduce each of the problems that we consider in the thesis and motivate
some of its real world applications. In particular, we provide a comprehensive literature
review regarding to each problem.
Quantized Consensus
There has been much recent interest in the design of control protocols for distributed systems,
motivated in part by the need to develop protocols for networks of autonomous agents
characterized by unavailability of centralized information and time-varying connectivity. A
canonical problem in this area is the so-called average consensus problem, wherein a group
of agents must agree on the average of their initial values while interacting with neighbors
in a (possibly time-varying) network. Protocols for consensus problems must be distributed,
relying only on local information at each node, and must be robust to unexpected changes
in topology.
It is well understood by now that protocols for consensus play an important role in a
number of more sophisticated multi-agent tasks. We mention here distributed optimization
[1, 2], coverage control [3], formation control [4, 5], cooperative statistical inference [6, 7],
power control [8], load balancing [9], and epidemic routing [10] as examples of control and
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coordination problems with proposed solutions relying crucially on consensus.
Simplicity and efficiency are two complementary goals in the design of distributed protocols
for consensus and other multi-agent problems. On the one hand, one would like to design
a simple protocol which is easy to implement and which has little or no reliance on global
knowledge about the system. On the other hand, one typically wants to achieve a global
goal quickly and efficiently. Interestingly, there often appears to be a tradeoff between
convergence speed and locality and simplicity of the algorithm, see [11, 12, 13, 14].
Our work is motivated by the realization that often working with real-valued variables in
multi-agent control is neither necessary nor efficient. Indeed, limited memory and storage at
each agent often forces the variables kept by each agent to lie in a discrete set. We therefore
consider the quantized consensus problem, a variation on the consensus problem where the
values at the disposal of each agent are constrained to be integers lying within a certain
range. Previous literature on this problem includes [15, 16, 17, 18, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. As
some of the real-world applications of this problem, one can consider information fusion in
sensor networks [7], e. g., when every sensor in a sensor network has a different measurement
of the temperature and the sensors’ goal is to compute the average temperature (Figure 1.1);
multi-agent coordination [21], e. g., when a set of robots coordinate in order to move to the
same location; and load balancing in processor networks, which have various applications in
computer science [9].
Figure 1.1: Every sensor measures the room temperature at a different location, and the
sensors’ goal is to compute the average temperature as quickly as possible.
We note that the quantized consensus problem restricts both transmissions to neighbors as
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well as the values stored by the nodes to be integers. This is related to, but mathematically
different from, the related problem of “consensus with finite data rate” wherein nodes store
real numbers but transmissions are quantized. We refer the reader to [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]
for literature on this related problem.
There has been a considerable amount of work on quantized consensus since its introduc-
tion in [15], and we make no attempt to provide here a complete survey of the literature.
Rather, we summarize the literature which focuses on worst-case convergence times in terms
of the number of nodes n.
The original paper [15] contained upper bounds for a natural quantized consensus protocol
on a variety of common graphs. Later, the work of [18] proposed a quantized consensus
protocol with an upper bound of O(n5) on the expected convergence time on any fixed
graph. For dynamic graphs, [18] obtained a convergence time scaling of O(n9). The paper
[23] obtained an upper bound of O(n3), but only for complete graphs. A faster upper bound
on convergence time and only for static networks was given in the [22], where a protocol
was provided whose expected convergence time in general static networks is O(n3 log n). As
of the writing of this thesis, the upper bounds of O(n3 log n) and O(n9), respectively, are
the fastest-known protocols for randomized quantized consensus over static and dynamic
networks [18], [22]. It is worth noting that the convergence speed of a protocol is measured
by the maximum over all initial inputs of the expected time that the given protocol will run
until reaching consensus. Therefore, a faster algorithm will have to have a smaller worst
case expected convergence time. We also note that a deterministic version of the quantized-
consensus algorithm was introduced in [30], where the authors showed a convergence time
of O(n2) for such dynamics over static networks. However, unlike the randomized quantized
consensus protocols considered here as well as in [22, 16, 31], adopting the protocols from
[30] to time-varying graphs appears not to be possible.
Hegselmann-Krause Opinion Dynamics
Opinion formation in social networks is an important area of research that has attracted a
lot of attention in recent years in a wide range of disciplines, such as psychology, economics,
4
political science, and electrical and computer engineering. A natural question that commonly
arises in all those areas is the extent to which one can predict the outcome of the opinion
formation of entities under some complex interaction process running among these social
actors. As we discussed earlier, the consensus problem is one such attempt to capture the
behavioral patterns where the opinions eventually converge to the same value [32, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37]. However, there are many situations in which there is neither a desire for consensus
nor any tendency for the underlying process to approach a common outcome. In fact,
such situations frequently emerge in the context of political elections, product marketing,
and capital investment (Figure 1.2) when there are multiple candidates, product choices,
or investment locations among which to select. Those facts have motivated researchers to
study disagreement along with consensus.
Figure 1.2: The opinion of where to invest is formed by interaction of capital investors with
their friends such that in the long term it determines the concentration of capital in
different geographical locations.
One of the first studies that considers disagreement beside consensus was undertaken by
Friedkin and Johnsen [38], whose model was later extended by Hegselmann and Krause in
[39], in the sense that [39] relaxes the assumption of time-invariant influence weights among
the agents. More precisely, the Hegselmann-Krause dynamics allow the influence weights
to be functions of not only time, but also the states. It is worth noting that although
such extensions make the analysis of Hegselmann-Krause dynamics mathematically much
more complicated, but interesting, one may argue that the assumption of influence weights
depending on the evolving opinion distance (which is the case in the Hegselmann-Krause
dynamics) is questionable from a practical point of view, given the literature in experimental
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social psychology, e.g., see [40, 41], where social psychologists have long been intrigued
by the hypothesis that opinion differences reliably predict direct relations of interpersonal
influence. Still, a rigorous analysis of the Hegselmann-Krasue dynamics is both theoretically
and practically important. The theoretical aspect is that it allows us to develop novel tools
useful to study more complex time and state dependent evolutionary dynamics and elaborate
on their connections with other fields. The practical aspect is that, other than applications
in the modeling of opinion dynamics, the model has applications in the robotics rendezvous
problem in plane and space [42]. Accordingly, we consider in this thesis the Hegselmann-
Krause model in Rd, where d ≥ 1.
In the Hegselmann-Krause model, a finite number of agents frequently update their opin-
ions based on the possible interactions among them. The opinion of each agent in this model
is captured by a scalar quantity in one dimension or a vector in Euclidean space Rd>1 in
higher dimensions. In fact, because of the conservative nature of social entities, each agent
in this model communicates only with those whose opinions are closer to him and lie within
a certain level of his confidence (bound of confidence), where the distance between agents’
opinions is measured by the Euclidian norm in the ambient space. Depending on whether
the bound of confidence is the same for all the agents or not, one can distinguish between two
different types of dynamics, known as homogeneous and heterogeneous, respectively. More-
over, the updating process of the agents may be synchronous, meaning that all the agents
update simultaneously, or asynchronous, where the agents update in turn. Although at first
glance the differences among these four types of dynamics may seem insignificant, in fact,
their outcomes are substantially different, such that most of the results from one cannot
be carried over to the others [43, 44, 45]. In particular, because of the extra freedom for
the agents’ movements in higher dimensions, analyzing such dynamics for dimensions higher
than one is considerably more complex than for the case of one dimension [46, 47, 48].
It is known that synchronous homogeneous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics will terminate
after finitely many steps [39, 43]. The existing studies on the behavior of the Hegselmann-
Krause model in one dimension where the agents’ opinions are scalars can be found in [49].
It was shown in [42] that the termination time of the Hegselmann-Krause dynamics in one
dimension is at least O(n), where n is the number of agents, and at most O(n3) [47, 50].
6
Moreover, the stability and the termination time of such dynamics in higher dimensions
were studied in [51, 46], and the work in [46] bounds the termination time of such dynamics
using the number of isolated agents through the evolution of the dynamics. In a recent
work of Bhattacharyya et al. [47], a polynomial upper bound of O(n10d2) was given for
such dynamics in higher dimensions, but leaving the dependency and improvement of such
a bound on the dimension of ambient space as an open problem.
The asynchronous homogeneous Hegselmann-Krause model was considered in [52], where
the authors were able to establish stability of this model using a proper quadratic compar-
ison function when the probability of updating for each agent is uniformly bounded from
below by some positive constant p > 0. In this thesis, we model the evolution of such
dynamics as a sequence of best response updates in a potential game and provide a poly-
nomial upper bound for the maximum expected switching topologies and the expected time
it takes for the dynamics to reach an arbitrarily small neighborhood of its steady state pro-
vided that the agents update uniformly at random. We refer the reader to [53] and [54]
for some of the possible connections between control of distributed systems and potential
games. Furthermore, the synchronous heterogeneous Hegselmann-Krause model was stud-
ied in [44], as well as in [45], where the authors conjecture that the number of switching
topologies throughout the dynamics must be finite. In fact, our analysis for an asynchronous
homogeneous Hegselmann-Krause model here is a step toward more detailed analysis of the
heterogeneous model using an appropriate potential function over directed graphs [55, 21].
Furthermore, numerous simulation results have been conducted to study and explore the
evolutionary properties of the Hegselmann-Krause dynamics under various settings. For
more information, we refer the reader to [43, 44, 39, 56].
Resource Allocation Games
Failures in modeling various events using linear models is more pronounced when there is a
sort of competition or rational decision making in the network. This calls for introduction
of game theoretic tools, and an investigation of how they can be used in formulating and
addressing such problems. In this context, we consider in this thesis a class of problems
7
known as resource allocation problems. In general, distributed network storage games or
resource allocation games are characterized by a set of agents who compete for the same
set of resources [57, 58], and arise in a wide variety of contexts such as congestion games
[59, 60, 61, 62], load balancing [9, 63], peer-to-peer systems [64, 65, 66], web-caches [67],
content management [64], auctioning and mechanism design [68, 69], and market sharing
games [70]. Among many problems that arise in such a context, one that stands out is
distributed replication, which not only improves the availability of resources for users, but
also increases the reliability of the entire network with respect to customer requests [71, 72].
However, one of the main challenges in modeling resource allocation problems using game-
theoretic tools is to answer the question of to what extent such models can predict the
desired optimal allocations over a given network. Modeling a system as a game, ideally
one would like for the set of Nash equilibria of the game to be as close as possible to some
target states that one is seeking in the system [73, 74]. In fact, the price of anarchy (PoA)
[75] is one of the metrics in game theory that measures efficiency and the extent to which a
system degrades due to selfish behavior of its agents; it has been widely used in the literature
[64, 70, 76, 71].
Distributed replication games with servers that have access to all the resources and are
accessible at some cost by users have been studied in [66]. Moreover, the uncapacitated selfish
replication game where the agents have access to the set of all resources was studied in [71],
where the authors were able to characterize the set of equilibrium points in terms of the
parameters of the problem. However, unlike the uncapacitated case, there is no comparable
characterization of equilibrium points in capacitated selfish replication (CSR) games. In
fact, when the agents have limited capacity, the situation could be much more complicated
as the constraint couples the actions of agents much more than in the uncapacitated case or
in replication games with servers.
Typically, CSR games are defined in terms of a set of available resources for each player,
where the players are allowed to communicate through an undirected communication graph.
Such a communication graph identifies the access cost among the players, and the goal for
each player is to satisfy his/her customers’ needs with minimum cost (Figure 1.3). Ideally,
and in order to avoid any additional cost, each player only wants to use his/her own set
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of resources. However, due to capacity limitations, the players cannot have immediate
access to all the resources they may need, and hence, they will have to borrow some of the
resources which are not available in their own caches from others in order to meet their
customers’ demands, and such a transaction incurs cost. In fact, the motivation behind
introducing the CSR game is driven by three facts which may arise in most of the resource
allocation problems: myopic behavior of the agents aligned with their individual benefit,
higher access cost to the resources which are farther away, and budget constraint on the
number of resources that each agent can replicate [77, 78]. The problem of finding an
equilibrium for CSR games in the case of hierarchical networks was studied in [67]. In this
thesis we consider CSR games with binary preferences, where “binary preferences” captures
the behavioral pattern where each player has a set of objects he or she is equally interested
in and has no interest in any of the remaining ones.
Figure 1.3: Users frequently refer to servers (computers) which are connected through a
communication network and request some data. If the servers have the requested data in
their cache, they simply provide it to the customers; otherwise, they incur cost by
requesting and obtaining data from other servers in the network in order to satisfy their
customers’ needs.
Diffusion Game Over Social Networks
An important model which is being widely used in order to study competition and rational
decision making in social and economic networks is the diffusion model, where the goal is
to propagate a certain type of product or behavior in a desired way through a network
[79, 80, 81, 82]. Other than applications in online advertising for companies’ products, such
a model has applications in epidemics and immunization vs. virus spreading [83, 84].
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In many of the applications in social networks, it is natural to have more than one party
that wants to spread information on his own products. This imposes a sort of competition
among the providers who are competing for the same set of resources and their goal is to
diffuse information on their own product in a desired way across the society [79, 85, 86]. As
an example, one can consider a competition between cell-phone companies where each of
them is trying to attract the most customers to its own products. Therefore, the question
of where such companies can advertise their products and what group of people should
they target, who would have more influence in the society, is an important issue. This
scenario has been illustrated in Figure 1.4, where the customers of each of these companies
are distinguished by a different color. Such a competition can be modeled within a game
theoretic framework, and hence, a natural question one can ask is the characterization of
the set of equilibria of such a game. Several papers in the literature have in fact addressed
this question in different settings, with some representative ones being [79, 85, 86, 87, 88].
Figure 1.4: Each cell-phone company is trying to maximize the number of its customers by
propagating and advertising its products through the most influencial group of people in
the social network. The set of final customers for each type of product is distinguished by a
different color.
Here, we note that due to the complex nature of social events, one can find various models
aimed at capturing the idea of competition over social networks. One of the models that
describe such a competitive behavior in networks is known as the competitive diffusion game
[89]. This model can be seen as capturing a competition between two or more parties (types)
who initially select a subset of nodes (seeds) to invest, and the goal for each party is to attract
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as many social entities to his or her own type as possible. It was shown earlier [89] that in
general such games do not admit pure-strategy Nash equilibria. It has also been shown in
[90] that even on graphs of small diameter such games may not have a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium, but for some special cases they may. In fact, the authors in [90] have shown
that for graphs of diameter 2 and under some additional assumptions on the topology of
the network, the competitive diffusion game admits a general potential function and hence
an equilibrium. However, checking these conditions at the outset for graphs of diameter at
most 2 does not seem to be realistic.
In fact, studying the best response of each player is one of the main challenges in general
diffusion games. This can be viewed as the best seed placement problem which was exten-
sively studied for different processes [91, 92, 93, 94]. However, one of the advantages of the
competitive diffusion game model is that it captures the simple fact that being closer to a
player’s initial seeds will result in adopting that specific player’s type. In particular, the
adoption rule which is involved in the competitive diffusion game is quite simple such that it
enables each player to compute its best response quite fast with respect to others, given that
all the other players have fixed their actions. On the other hand, as we will see in this thesis,
what makes the analysis of such games more complicated is the behavior of nodes which
are equally distanced from the players’ seeds. Although there were some recent attempts
to characterize these boundary points and show the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium of the diffusion game over different types of networks [95, 96, 89], in the thesis we will
address this issue in a more general form, and show that finding an equilibrium for diffusion
games is an NP-hard problem over general networks. Therefore, unless P=NP, this strongly
suggests that in general the complexity of analyzing such games is a hard task despite its
simple adoption rule. It requires additional relaxations in the structure of the game in order
to make it more tractable. As one possible approach one may consider a probabilistic version
of the diffusion game using some techniques from Markov chains or optimization of harmonic
influence centrality [97, 98, 99]. We will discuss one such possible relaxation in Appendix C.
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1.2 Overview and Contributions
As indicated earlier, this thesis research is devoted to the study of evolutionary behavior of
social, communication, and distributed networks, their complexity and convergence rates.
Here we provide highlights of the main contributions of the work.
In Chapter 3, we consider an important class of distributed algorithms over networks
known as unbiased quantized consensus algorithms, and obtain some strong results on ex-
pected time to convergence. In particular, we provide a tight expression for the expected
convergence time of unbiased quantized consensus over both general fixed and time-varying
networks. We show, using the theory of harmonic functions for reversible Markov chains,
that the expected convergence time of such dynamics over static networks lies within a con-
stant factor of the maximum hitting time of an appropriate lazy random walk. This fully
characterizes the expected convergence time of unbiased quantized protocol and shows that
one cannot obtain a faster convergence rate unless he/she modifies the underlying protocols.
We return to this issue again in Chapter 4. Following this, and using the electric resistance
analogy of reversible Markov chains, we provide an upper bound of O(nmD log n) for the
expected convergence time to consensus over static networks, where n, m and D, denote,
respectively, the number of nodes, the number of edges, and the diameter of the network.
Moreover, we show that this upper bound is tight up to a factor of log n for some simple
graphs such as line graph and cycle. Finally, we extend the results to bound the expected
convergence time of the underlying dynamics in time-varying networks. Modeling such dy-
namics as the evolution of a time inhomogeneous Markov chain, we derive an upper bound of
O(n2mmaxDmax log
2 n) for the expected convergence time of the dynamics using the spectral
representation of the networks.
Our main contribution in Chapter 4 with regard to the earlier existing results on quantized
consensus problems is to design a protocol wherein nodes cooperate to perform updates on
edges connecting them at so-called Metropolis rates. In particular, we are able to improve
the existing results on the convergence rate of earlier quantized consensus protocols [18,
22, 31]. More specifically, on fixed graphs, our essentially quadratic convergence time is an
improvement on the essentially cubic convergence time of [22] by a factor of n. Over dynamic
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graphs, we improve the best known convergence time given in [31] by a factor of n2. In fact,
our quadratic bounds of O(n2 log n) and O(n2 log2 n) given in this chapter for, respectively,
static and dynamic networks are better than all previous convergence times for randomized
quantized consensus.
In Chapter 5, we consider the Hegselmann-Krause model for opinion dynamics and study
the evolution of the system under various settings. We first analyze the termination time
of the synchronous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics in arbitrary finite dimensions and show
that the termination time in general only depends on the number of agents involved in the
dynamics. To the best of our knowledge, this is the sharpest bound for the termination
time of such dynamics that removes dependency of the termination time from the dimension
of the ambient space, and connects the convergence speed of the dynamics to the eigenval-
ues of the adjacency matrix of the connectivity graph in the Hegselmann-Krause dynamics.
This answers an open question in [47]: how to obtain a tighter upper bound for the ter-
mination time. Furthermore, we study the asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause model from a
novel game-theoretic approach and show that the evolution of an asynchronous Hegselmann-
Krause model is equivalent to a sequence of best response updates in a well-designed potential
game. We then provide a polynomial upper bound for the expected time and expected num-
ber of switching topologies until the dynamics reach an arbitrarily small neighborhood of
the equilibrium points, provided that the agents update uniformly at random. Finally, we
consider the heterogeneous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics and provide a necessary condition
for finite termination time of such dynamics.
In Chapter 6, we consider a capacitated selfish replication (CSR) game with binary prefer-
ences. Unlike the earlier results on this problem, which in general provide only exponential
time search algorithms for finding a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) unless the number
of resources is 2 [67], we show that when the number of resources is less than 5 or the edge
density of the network is high enough with respect to the number of resources, there exists
an exact polynomial time algorithm which can find a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In
particular, we consider such games over general undirected networks and devise a quasi-
polynomial algorithm which drives the system to an allocation profile whose total cost as
well as individual costs lie within a constant factor of that in any pure-strategy NE. We
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study the price of anarchy of such games over general networks, and show that it is bounded
above by 3. We further show that when the underlying network has a tree structure, every
globally optimal allocation is an NE, which can be reached in only linear time. We formulate
the optimal solutions and NE points of the CSR game using integer linear programs, and
provide an upper bound for the minimum social cost of the game using a probabilistic argu-
ment. Finally, we introduce the LCSR game as a localized version of the CSR game, wherein
the actions of the players are restricted to only their close neighborhoods, and extend all the
above results to CSR games with different capacities.
In Chapter 7, we consider the competitive diffusion game, and study the existence of its
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when defined over general undirected networks. We first
determine the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for two special but well-known classes of
networks, namely the lattice and the hypercube. Characterizing the utility of the players in
terms of graphical distances of their initial seed placements to other nodes in the network, we
show that in general networks the decision process on the existence of pure-strategy NE is an
NP-hard problem. Following this, we provide some necessary conditions for a given profile
to be an NE. Furthermore, we study players’ utilities in the competitive diffusion game over
Erdos-Renyi random graphs and show that as the size of the network grows, the utilities of
the players are highly concentrated around their expected values, and are bounded below
by some threshold based on the parameters of the network. We obtain a lower bound on
the maximum social welfare of the game with two players, and study sub-modularity of the
players’ utilities. Moreover, we provide in Appendix C an electric circuit formulation of the
diffusion game on general networks. This model allows us to analyze the diffusion game in





In this chapter, we first introduce the notations that will be used throughout the thesis.
After that, we discuss and state some known results, as background material relevant to our
future development.
2.1 Notation
The notations used in this thesis are picked to be as intuitive as possible. Readers may skip
this section in a first reading, and then come back to it as needed.
2.1.1 Sets, Vectors and Matrices
We let N, Z, and R denote, respectively, the sets of positive integers, integers, and real
numbers. Given an integer k > 0, we denote the set of all k-tuples of integers by Zk. For a
vector v ∈ Rn, we let vi be the ith entry of v, and vT (occasionally v′) be the transpose of v.
Similarly, for a matrix A, we let A(i, j) (occasionally Aij) be the ijth entry of A. We use ‖v‖
to denote the Euclidean norm of a vector v. For any two vectors u, v ∈ Zk, we let u⊕ v be
their sum vector in mod 2, i.e., (u⊕v)i = (ui+vi) mod 2, for all i = 1, . . . , k. We let ei denote
the standard ith unit Euclidean vector in Rn (with 1 in ith location and 0’s elsewhere). For
a positive integer n, we let [n] := {1, . . . , n}. We let 1 be a column vector with all entries
equal to 1. We say that a vector v is stochastic if vi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n] and
∑n
i=1 vi = 1.
Similarly, we say that a matrix A is stochastic if each row of A is a stochastic vector, and
we let min+A = mini,j{Aij|Aij > 0}. If both A and AT are stochastic, we say that A is
doubly stochastic. A scrambling matrix is a stochastic matrix with the additional property
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that the inner product of each pair of its rows is positive. For a vector y we use conv(y) to
denote the convex hull of its components and diam(conv(y)) = maxp,q∈conv(y) ‖p − q‖. We
define the distance between two sets P,Q ⊆ Rn to be dist(P,Q) = infp∈P,q∈Q ‖p− q‖. For a
vector (s1, s2, . . . , sn), we sometimes write (si, s−i), where s−i is the set of all entries except
the ith one. For a real number a we let bac be the largest integer less than or equal to a.
Similarly, we denote the smallest integer greater than or equal to a by dae. Finally, we use
|S| to denote the cardinality of a finite set S.
2.1.2 Markov Chains and Electric Circuits
For a random walk Z with transition probability matrix P , we let the random variable τaz
denote the first time that the random walk initiated from a hits the state z. Also, we let
HZ(a, z) denote the expected time that the random walk Z initiated at a hits z for the
first time, i.e., HZ(a, z) = E[τaz ]. We take Gτaz (x) to be the expected number of visits to x
before τaz when the random walk has been initiated from a. Similarly, for two random walks
moving based on some joint distribution, we let the random variable τ(x, y) be the first time
until the random walks meet, and we refer to its expected value as the expected meeting
time, given that the chains have been originated from x and y. We let R(x ↔ y) be the
effective resistance between two nodes x and y in an electric network when every edge has
resistance equal to 1. We denote by V(·) the voltage function over an electric circuit for two
distinguished nodes a and z as terminal nodes such that V(a) = 0 and V(z) = 1, and let
Vxy = V(x)− V(y).
2.1.3 Graph Theory
We use G = (V , E) for an undirected network with a node set V and an edge set E . For
an undirected graph G = (V , E), we let N(x) (occasionally Nx) be the set of neighbors of x
and d(x) = |N(x)| (occasionally dx) be the degree of node x. For any two nodes i, j ∈ V ,
we let dG(i, j) be the graphical distance between them, that is, the length of the shortest
path which connects i and j. The diameter of the graph, denoted by D, is the maximum
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distance between any pair of vertices, that is, D = maxu,v∈V(G) dG(u, v). Moreover, for an
arbitrary node i ∈ V and an integer r ≥ 0, we define a ball of radius r and center i to be
the set of all the nodes in the graph G whose graphical distance is at most r to the node
i, i.e. BG(i, r) = {x ∈ V|dG(i, x) ≤ r}. Also, for a set of vertices S ⊆ V and a vertex x,
we let dG(x, S) = miny∈S{dG(x, y)}. We let G × G = (V × V , E ′) be the Cartesian product
of G with itself, i.e. {(x, y), (r, s)} ∈ E ′ if and only if x = r, s ∈ N(y) or y = s, r ∈ N(x).
For a graph G, we let AG be its adjacency matrix, i.e. AG(i, j) = 1 if and only if (i, j) ∈ E
and AG(i, j) = 0, otherwise. We also let DG be a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are
equal to the degree of the nodes in the graph. Moreover, we denote the Laplacian of this
graph by LG = DG −AG.
2.2 Relevant Results on Markov Chains
In this section, we discuss some relevant useful results from the theory of Markov chains
which will be used to prove some of our main results in the future chapters. We start our
discussion by defining some additional notation that will be used throughout the thesis.
A simple random walk on a graph G is a Markov chain with transition probabilities




, if y ∈ N(x)
0, otherwise,
where d(x) denotes the degree of a node x in the graph G. Note that a simple random walk
is a special case of a weighted random walk when the weights of all edges in G are equal
to 1. It is well known that every reversible Markov chain is a weighted random walk on a
network. Suppose P is a transition matrix on a finite set S, which is reversible with respect
to a probability distribution pi(·). Define conductance on edges by c(x, y) = pi(x)P (x, y) and
introduce c(x) :=
∑
y: y∈N(x) c(x, y). Also, the resistance of each edge e is defined to be the






is equal to the induced voltage between x and z, i.e. Vxz when we define
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the terminal voltages to be Vzz = 0,Vaz =
Gτaz (a)
d(a)
. Moreover, for all x we have
1
2
[R(a↔ z) +R(z ↔ x)−R(a↔ x)] = Gτaz (x)
d(x)
= Vxz.
Proof. This is the result of Corollary 3 in [100]. Q.E.D.
By taking summation over the above equality and noting that
∑
xGτaz (x) is equal to the







[R(a↔ z) +R(z ↔ x)−R(a↔ x)], (2.1)
where H(·, ·) is the expected hitting time function of the simple random walk.
Lemma 2.2. [Random Target Lemma] For an irreducible Markov chain with state space







1− αk(P ) , ∀i ∈ Ω
where 1 = α1(P ) > α2(P ) ≥ α3(P ) ≥ . . . ,≥ αn(P ) denote the eigenvalues of P in a
non-increasing order and HP(·, ·) is the expected hitting time function of the chain.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to find a recursion matrix equality for the expected hitting
time of a chain with transition probability matrix P and interpreting the solution of this
equation based on the eigenvalues of P . A complete proof can be found in [101] and also
[102]. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.3. [Chapter 2, [103]] Let τ(x, y) denote the first time until two continuous-time
random walks moving based on some joint distribution meet each other, given that the walks
started from x and y. Then we have,
P
(
τ(x, y) > t
) ≤ e−b teM c,
where M = maxr,s E[τ(r, s)] is the maximum expected meeting time of the process.
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Definition 1. A function h : Ω → R is called harmonic at a vertex x ∈ Ω for a Markov
chain with transition probability matrix P , if h(x) =
∑
y∈Ω P (x, y)h(y).
Lemma 2.4. Let {Xt} be a Markov chain with an irreducible transition matrix P , let B ⊂
Ω, and hB : B → R be a function defined on B. The function h : Ω → R defined by
h(x) := E[hB(XτxB)] is the unique extension of hB such that h(x) = hB(x) for all x ∈ B and
h is harmonic for P at all x ∈ Ω \B.
Proof. The proof can be found in [104]. Q.E.D.
Remark 1. Given a nonempty subset B ⊂ Ω and a Markov chain with an irreducible
transition matrix P , every harmonic function h(·) : Ω → R over Ω \ B which satisfies
h(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ B (respectively, h(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ B), must be identical to zero (respectively,
must be nonnegative) over the entire Ω [104].
2.3 Relevant Results on Spectral Graph Theory
In this section, we briefly discuss some relevant useful results from spectral graph theory.
Lemma 2.5. (Perron-Frobenius for Laplacians [105]): Let L be a matrix with non-positive
off-diagonal entries such that the graph of the non-zero off-diagonal entries is connected.
Then the smallest eigenvalue has multiplicity 1, and the corresponding eigenvector is strictly
positive.
Next, we state Cheeger’s inequality, which relates the spectral gap of the Laplacian matrix
to the expansion of its corresponding graph.
Lemma 2.6 (Cheeger’s Inequality [106]). Let G = (V , E) be an undirected graph with Lapla-
cian matrix L. Moreover, for a subset of vertices S ⊆ V, let e(S, Sc) denote the number
of edges with one vertex in S and one vertex in its complement Sc. Defining the cut ratio
Φ(S) = e(S,S
c)
|S||Sc| and isoperimetric number of G by Φ = minS⊂V Φ(S), we have
Φ2
2dmax
≤ λ2(L) ≤ 2Φ,
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where dmax denotes the maximum degree of the graph G and λ2(L) is the second smallest
eigenvalue of the Laplacian L.
Lemma 2.7. (Courant-Fischer Formula [107]) Let A be an n × n symmetric matrix with
eigenvalues λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ . . . ,≤ λn and corresponding eigenvectors v1, . . . , vn. Moreover, for
1 ≤ k ≤ n, let Sk denote the span of v1, . . . , vk (with S0 = {0}), and let S⊥k denote the
orthogonal complement of Sk, i.e., S
⊥




Corollary 2.1 (Rayleigh-Quotient [107]). Let G = (V , E) be a graph and L be the Laplacian
of G. We already know from the Perron-Frobenius lemma (Lemma 2.5) that the smallest




Lemma 2.8 (Laplacian Spectrum of a Graph Product [108]). If LG has eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λn
and LH has eigenvalues µ1, . . . , µn, then LG×H has eigenvalues λi + µj, i, j = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, let us assume that LG has eigenvalues λi with corresponding
eigenvectors X(i) and LH has eigenvalues µi with corresponding eigenvectors Y (i). Then,
a simple multiplication shows that LG×H has for all i, j ∈ [n], an eigenvector Z(i,j) of size
n2 × 1 corresponding to an eigenvalue λi + µj (Z(i,j) has one entry for each possible pair of
(u, v) ∈ [n] × [n]), and such that its (u, v)th entry equals to X(i)u Y (i)v , i.e., Z(i,j)(u,v) = X(i)u Y (i)v .
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.9. Suppose C is a stochastic matrix and y = Cx; then
diam(conv(y)) ≤ (1− µ(C))diam(conv(x)),
where µ(C) = mini 6=j(
∑n
k=1 min(cik, cjk)). In particular, when C is a scrambling matrix with
min+C ≥ δ, then we can say that µ(C) ≥ δ, or diam(conv(y)) ≤ (1− δ)diam(conv(x)).
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Proof. A short proof of the above lemma can be found in [109]. Q.E.D.
2.4 Relevant Results on Game Theory
In this section, we briefly review some background material from game theory.
Definition 2. Given an n-player game Γ, a strategies profile n-tuple S = (σ∗1, σ
∗
2, . . . , σ
∗
n) is





−i) ≥ Ui(σi, σ∗−i), ∀i ∈ [n], σi ∈ Σi,
where Σi and Ui(·) denote, respectively, the (possibly mixed) strategy set and utility 1 function
of the ith player.
In other words, an n-tuple of strategies is said to be in equilibrium if no player has any
positive incentive for changing his strategy, assuming that none of the other players is going
to change its strategy. Next, we introduce a class of games known as potential games which
can be considered as a subclass of games strategically equivalent to team problems [110].
Definition 3. Given an n-player game Γ, let A = A1× . . .×An be the set of action profiles
of the players. The game Γ is an ordinal potential game if there is a function Φ : A → R
such that ∀a−i ∈ A−i, ∀aˆi, a˜i ∈ Ai we have
Ui(aˆi, a−i)− Ui(a˜i, a−i) > 0⇔ Φ(aˆi, a−i)− Φ(a˜i, a−i) > 0.
Intuitively, a game is said to be an ordinal potential game if the incentive of all players to
change (improve) their strategy can be captured through a single global function called the
potential function.
Theorem 2.1. [111] Every finite ordinal potential game possesses a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium.
1In this definition, we consider the players as maximizers whose goals are to maximize their individual
utility functions. Analogously, one can consider the players as minimizers whose goals are to minimize their
individual cost functions Ci(·). In such a case σ∗ is said to be an NE if Ci(σ∗i , σ∗−i)≤Ci(σi, σ∗−i),∀i∈ [n], σi∈
Σi.
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Note that a pure-strategy equilibrium is an equilibrium over the action profiles of the
players.
Definition 4. Given an n-player game with at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium over
the finite action space A = A1 × . . . × An, let Ci(·) denote player i’s cost function, and
C : A → R be a social cost function defined by C(a) = ∑ni=1Ci(a). Then, the price of





where NE denotes the set of all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game.
In fact, price of anarchy is a concept in game theory that measures how the efficiency of
a system degrades due to selfish behavior of its agents [75].
Definition 5. Given a set Ω, a set function f : 2Ω → R is called a sub-modular function if
for any two subsets A,B ⊆ Ω with A ⊆ B and any x ∈ Ω \B, we have
f(A ∪ {x})− f(A) ≥ f(B ∪ {x})− f(B).
Sub-modular functions feature a natural diminishing returns property. In other words,
the marginal return when a single element is added to an input set decreases as the size of
the input set increases. An equivalent form of the above definition is to say that for any two
sets A,B ⊆ Ω, we have f(A) + f(B) ≥ f(A ∪B) + f(A ∩B).
2.5 Relevant Results on Probability Theory
In this section, we briefly review some background material from probability theory.
Definition 6. A martingale is a sequence X0, X1, . . . , Xm of random variables, where for
0 ≤ i < m, we have E[Xi+1|Xi, Xi−1, . . . , X0] = Xi.
From the above definition it is easy to see that if X0, X1, . . . , Xm is a martingale, then
E[Xi] = E[X0], for all i = 1, 2 . . . ,m.
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Lemma 2.10. [Azuma’s Inequality [112]] Let X0, X1, . . . , Xm be a martingale with µ :=
E[X0] and |Xi+1 −Xi| ≤ 1 for all 0 ≤ i < m. Then
P
(







Lemma 2.11. [Chernoff Bound [112]] Suppose X1, . . . , Xn are independent random variables
taking values in {0, 1}. Let X denote their sum and let µ = E[X] denote the sum’s expected
value. Then for any δ > 0,
P(X > (1 + δ)µ) ≤ e− δ
2µ
3






In this chapter, we describe the discrete-time unbiased quantized consensus model and the
associated algorithm as introduced in [15]. More precisely, we will consider a set of n “agents”
or “nodes”, each beginning with an integer value in a certain range [l, L]. These nodes can
communicate with their neighbors in a certain undirected, connected communication graph
(which may be time-varying). The typical goal of computing the average must now be revised
since the average may not be an integer. Thus we define a collection of integer values to
belong to the “consensus set” if any two integers are at most one apart. We would like to
design a protocol which brings the collection of integers at the nodes to the consensus set as
fast as possible.
3.1 Problem Formulation
In this section, we provide a formal definition of the unbiased quantized consensus model
for a fixed network as introduced in [15].
• There is a set of n agents, V = {1, 2, . . . , n}, which are connected on some undirected
graph G(V , E).
• Each agent has an initial value xi(0) ∈ [l, L], which is a positive integer.
• At each time instant t = 1, 2, . . ., one edge is chosen uniformly at random among the
set of all the edges E , and the incident nodes on the sides of this edge (let us call them
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i and j) update their values according to:
xi(t+ 1) =

xi(t)− 1, if xi(t) > xj(t)
xi(t) + 1, if xi(t) < xj(t)
xi(t), if xi(t) = xj(t),
(3.1)
and the same holds for agent j. We refer to xi(t) as the opinion of agent i at time t
and x(t) as the opinion profile at time t.
3.1.1 Relevant Existing Results
First we note that, since the updating rules given in (3.1) preserve the average value, we




does not change with
time and equals x¯(0) for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, it has been shown earlier in [15] that such
dynamics will converge with probability 1 to the consensus set,
C =
{




= x¯(0), i ∈ [n]
}
,








will decrease by at least 2 after each nontrivial update. By nontrivial update we mean that
the values of the incident nodes of the chosen edge (i, j) at time instant t differ by at least
2, i.e. |xi(t) − xj(t)| ≥ 2. It was also shown in [15] (Lemmas 4 and 5) that, after at most
(L−l)2
8
n nontrivial updates, the dynamics will terminate, where L and l denote, respectively,
the maximum and minimum opinions at the beginning of the process. Thus a key part of the
analysis of such protocols involves bounding the maximum expected time until a nontrivial
update happens.
For this purpose, let us define T as the maximum expected time such that a nontrivial
update takes place over all possible configuration of integers. Note that in this maximization
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we exclude the configurations that are already in the consensus set, as otherwise our goal,
i.e., reaching to the consensus, is achieved (no other nontrivial update can occur). To be
more precise, let us introduce some notation for this quantity: for integers j1, . . . , jn define
T (j1, . . . , jn) to be the expected time until a nontrivial update takes place when node i begins
with integer value ji. Then T is the largest possible T (j1, . . . , jn) for any configuration of




T (j1, . . . , jn).
3.1.2 Random Walk Interpretation
In the above setting, we now assume that all the agents on the graph G have value 1 except
two of them which are 0 and 2. At each time instant t, one edge will be selected with equal
probability 1
m
where m is the number of edges, and the incident nodes update their values
based on (3.1). Therefore, we can interpret this problem in an alternative way. Consider
two walkers, let us call them 0 and 2, who start a random walk on the vertices of the graph
G whenever the selected edge is incident to at least one of them. To see this more clearly,
let us consider a network of n nodes such that all of the nodes have value 1 except two of
them which have values 0 and 2. Therefore, in the next update of the protocol (3.1), either
the selected edge is incident to neither of the nodes with values 0 or 2, in which case there
will not be any change, or the selected edge is incident to the node with value 0 and one of
the nodes with value 1 (similarly to node with value 2 and one of the nodes with value 1).
In this case 0 and 1 on the sides of the selected edge will be swapped (analogously, 2 and
1 on the sides of the selected edge will be swapped). This can be viewed as a random walk
that the nodes with values 0 and 2 take to their next positions. Therefore, in this scenario
T is equal to the maximum of the expected time it takes for these two walkers to meet.
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3.2 Expected Convergence Time Over Static Networks
In this section we start our expected convergence time analysis over static networks. But
before we proceed, and based on the random walk interpretation we provided earlier, we
consider the following definition.
Definition 7. Denoting the current locations of the walkers by x and y, if the selected edge
at the next time instant is incident to one of the walkers, e.g., {x, xi} for some xi ∈ N(x),
we will move that walker from node x to node xi, otherwise the walkers will not change their
positions. We refer to such a random walk process as the original process, and denote its
expected meeting time by Mo(x, y).
Proposition 3.1. T = maxx,y∈V Mo(x, y).
Proof. Let S denote the set of all the vectors of size n in which one entry is 0, one entry is 2,
and the remaining entries are 1. It is immediate that T ≥ max(j1,...,jn)∈S T (j1, . . . , jn), since
S is a subset of all the possible configurations. On the other hand, for any configuration of
integer values (j1, j2, . . . , jn) /∈ C on the vertices of the graph G, let us denote the maximum
and minimum of these values by jmax and jmin, respectively. Now let us consider a new
configuration associated with (j1, j2, . . . , jn) such that maps one of nodes with value jmin to 0,
one of the nodes with value jmax to 2, and any other node to 1. Clearly the new configuration
belongs to S such that if an update is a trivial update in configuration (j1, j2, . . . , jn) it will be
a trivial update for the new configuration as well, but not necessarily vice versa. This shows
that for any possible configuration (j1, j2, . . . , jn) there exists at least one correspondence in
S such that the expected time for a non-trivial update in the corresponding configuration is
at least as large as that in (j1, j2, . . . , jn). Therefore, we have T ≤ max(j1,...,jn)∈S T (j1, . . . , jn),
which together with the first inequality shows that T = max(j1,...,jn)∈S T (j1, . . . , jn). Now
consider any configuration in which all the agents on the graph G have value 1 except two
of them which are 0 and 2. Focusing on the nodes which have a 0 and a 2, we see that they
perform a random walk according to the original process, and a non-trivial update occurs
at precisely the meeting time. Q.E.D.
One important fact is that both of the walkers in the original process have the same source
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of randomness, which selects an edge at each time instant. Therefore, these random walks
are jointly correlated. In fact, in this section, we find an explicit form for T for a general
fixed network. Now, let us consider the original process for two walkers on a finite graph. In
order to compute T , we introduce another process, called virtual process, to facilitate our
analysis.
Definition 8. We define the virtual process to be the same as the original process until the
time when the walkers become each other’s neighbors, i.e. x ∈ N(y), for some x, y ∈ V . At
this time we count the connecting edge in the virtual process twice in our edge probability dis-
tribution. Moreover, we denote the meeting time function of the virtual process by Mv(x, y)
for every two initial states x and y.
Note that, in the virtual process, as long as the walkers are not each other’s neighbors,
one edge of the network is picked, with probability 1
m
and the movement of the walkers will
be precisely as in the original process. But if the walkers are each other’s neighbors, i.e.
x ∈ N(y), the edge selection probability slightly changes. In this case, the probability of





, if e = {x, y}
1
m
, if e is incident to either x or y
m−d(x)−d(y)
m(m+1−d(x)−d(y)) , if e is incident to neither x nor y,
and the walkers move depending on whether the selected edge is incident to them or not.
Remark 2. In order to have valid transition probabilities for the virtual process, we must
have d(x)+d(y) ≤ m,∀(x, y) ∈ E(G). This condition naturally holds for all connected graphs
except the star graph and double-star graph, i.e., two star graphs whose centers are connected
to each other (Figure A.1). In these cases we have max{d(x)+d(y)| (x, y) ∈ E(G)} = m+1.
However, the maximum expected meeting time of these two special cases can be computed
precisely and directly without using a virtual process (Lemma A.1). Therefore, henceforth
we assume that d(x) + d(y) ≤ m,∀(x, y) ∈ E(G).
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Given a graph G, we choose an edge at random and uniformly among all the set of edges
at each time instance. Let Z be the lazy random walk which is generated based on marginal
distribution of the original process. In other words, the walker will move towards one of his
neighbors with equal probability if he is located at one of the incident vertices. It is not





, if y = x
1
m
, if y ∈ N(x)
0, else.
(3.3)




, . . . , 1
n
)T is its stationary
distribution. This results in piiP (i, j) = pijP (j, i) ∀i, j ∈ 1, . . . , n, and hence Z is a reversible
Markov chain.
We already know [113] that every reversible Markov chain has a hidden vertex w such
that the hitting time from w to every state is less than or equal to the hitting time from
that particular node to state w, i.e., w is a hidden vertex for Z if HZ(w, x) ≤ HZ(x,w) ∀x.
Definition 9. Assume that w is a hidden vertex for the reversible Markov chain Z. As in
[113] and [22], we define the potential function Φ(·, ·) : V × V → R to be
Φ(x, y) = HZ(x, y) +HZ(y, w)−HZ(w, y).
We are now in a position to start our analysis. First, we briefly describe the stages that
we will go through toward proving the result for general static networks. As discussed
earlier, T is equal to the maximum expected meeting time of the original process. Since,
due to the coupling between the random walks, computing the expected meeting time of the
original process is difficult, we consider a virtual process which closely follows the original
process until the time when the walkers are at certain locations (more precisely when they
are each other’s neighbors). In fact, one can think of the virtual process as an approximated
process for the original one. However, the virtual process is itself a jointly correlated random
walk. Therefore, to characterize its expected meeting time function, i.e., Mv(x, y), we will
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show that Mv(x, y) follows almost the same recursion formula as Φ(x, y). This allows us
to construct a harmonic function (Lemma 3.1) using Φ(x, y) and Mv(x, y). We show that
such a harmonic function is zero at some boundary point, and hence, must be identical to
zero. This allows us to characterize Mv(x, y) based on Φ(x, y) (Theorem 3.2). Furthermore,
since Φ(x, y) is a function of the expected hitting time of a single lazy random walk Z, we
can find an expression for Mv(x, y) based on only the expected hitting time functions of
the lazy random walk Z. Moreover, since such an expression does not involve any coupling
term, it is easy to compute it for different networks. Finally, we show in Theorem 3.3 that
the expected meeting time function of the virtual process Mv(x, y), and that in the original
process Mo(x, y), lie within a constant factor of each other. This establishes our tight bound
for T . We now start the stages of our proof, with the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. A function f : V×V → R defined by f(x, y) = 1
2
Φ(x, y)−Mv(x, y) is harmonic




Q((x, y), (r, s))f(r, s),
where Q is the transition matrix of the simple random walk on G × G, i.e.




, if (r, s) ∈ NG×G(x, y)
0, else.
Proof. By the transitivity property of reversible Markov chains, we note that Φ(x, y) is
symmetric, i.e. for any hidden vertex w,
Φ(x, y) = HZ(x, y) +HZ(y, w)−HZ(w, y)
= HZ(y, x) +HZ(x,w)−HZ(w, x) = Φ(y, x).
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Also, from the definition of Φ(·, ·), we have Φ(j, y) = HZ(j, y)+HZ(y, w)−HZ(w, y), ∀j ∈






















































On the other hand, we note that regardless of whether y /∈ N(x) or y ∈ N(x), the meeting
time of the virtual process is equal to
Mv(x, y) =
(



































Let S(x, y) = Φ(x,y)
2














We consider the simple random walk Q on the Cartesian product graph G × G. The cover
time and hitting time of such graphs have been extensively studied in [114], [115] and [116].
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We show that the function f(x, y) = S(x, y)−Mv(x, y) is harmonic on G×G for the transition


























Q((x, y), (r, s))f(r, s).
This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Now we are ready to characterize the expected meeting time of the virtual process based
on the expected hitting times of the single lazy random walk Z and effective resistances of
an appropriate network.








HZ(x, y) +HZ(y, w)−HZ(w, y)
]
.
Proof. Let g : V ×V → R be the zero function, i.e., g ≡ 0. Clearly, g is a harmonic function
over G × G. On the other hand, we have







= 0 = g(w,w).
Since f and g are both harmonic functions for the transition matrix Q and also they have
the same value at the node (w,w), using Lemma 2.4 they must be equal. Thus f ≡ 0, which
shows that Mv(x, y) = 1
2
Φ(x, y),∀x, y. Q.E.D.
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Theorem 3.3. Consider a network G = (V , E). Then,
max
x,y
Mv(x, y) ≤ T ≤ 2 max
x,y
Mv(x, y).
Proof. Initiating from arbitrary nodes x and y, we note that both the virtual process and
the original process follow the same joint distribution until they are each other’s neighbor.
However, when the walkers are each other’s neighbor, with higher probability they are going
to meet in the virtual process than in the original process. Therefore, Mv(x, y) ≤ T for all
x, y. Since by definition T is independent of the initial states of walkers, maxx,yM
v(x, y) ≤ T .
For the upper bound, we use the same argument as in [22]. Again, as mentioned earlier, the
virtual process and the original process remain the same until the two walkers become each
other’s neighbors, i.e. for some x, y with x ∈ N(y). At this time, the probability that two
walkers meet in the next transition in the original process is 1
m
, while this probability for the
virtual process is 2
m
. Since the former is half of the latter, this immediately implies that the
meeting time of the former is within a constant factor of the latter. In fact, at each time that
the walkers in the virtual process meet, with probability 1
2
the walkers in the original process
meet as well. However, if the walkers in the virtual process meet, but they do not meet in
the original process (which happens with probability 1
2
), then in the original process we may
assume that the positions of the walkers have not changed, and in the virtual process we
may assume that they just switch their positions (from x, y to y, x). Therefore, in this case
we may assume that a new original process which is followed by its corresponding virtual
process has just been initiated from nodes x and y. Since each of these collisions of walkers
during different time intervals happens independently and with probability 1
2









Mv(x, y) = 2 max
x,y
Mv(x, y),
where in the above summation the term (1
2
)k corresponds to the probability that the walkers
in the virtual process meet k times while they do not meet in the original process, and the
term kmaxx,yM
v(x, y) is an upper bound for the expected time that the walkers in the
virtual process meet k times. Q.E.D.
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Next, we will proceed by computing HZ(x, y). Note that if at the time instant t the
walker is at the node Z(t), then the probability of staying in that state is 1− d(Z(t))
m
, where
d(Z(t)) denotes the degree of the node Z(t) where the walker at time t is located. Because
of the Markov property of the random walk, the probability of moving out from each state
follows the geometric distribution. Therefore, the expected time that the walker waits in
state Z(t) is m
d(Z(t)) . However, when the walker moves to the next state, he will see all of his
neighbors with the same probability. Therefore, the random walk Z(t) can be viewed as a
simple random walk where the waiting time between its consecutive transitions given that
the walk is at node Z(t) is equal to m
d(Z(t)) . Since every sample path of the random walk Z
is equivalent to those of a simple random walk except that it has the expected waiting time
of m
d(Z(t)) between its consecutive transitions (note that this waiting time for simple random
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[R(x↔ y)+R(y ↔ i)−R(x↔ i)], (3.13)
where the last equality is due to Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 3.2. Consider a connected network G with n nodes and m edges and diameter D.
Then, for unbiased quantized consensus, we have
1
2
HZ ≤ T ≤ 2HZ ≤ 2nmD,
where, HZ = maxx,yHZ(x, y).
Proof. Since w was a hidden vertex, we get HZ(y, w) − HZ(w, y) ≥ 0, ∀y. Applying this





HZ(x, y) ≤Mv(x, y) ≤ HZ ,∀x, y. (3.14)
Using (3.14) and Theorem 3.3, we can see that 1
2








[R(x↔ y)+R(y ↔ i)−R(x↔ i)]} ≤ 2nmD, (3.15)
where, in the second inequality, we have used the fact that the effective resistance between
any two nodes cannot exceed the length of the shortest path between those nodes [104] which
is upper bounded by the diameter of G. Q.E.D.
We are now ready to state our upper and lower bounds for the expected convergence time
of the unbiased quantized consensus over static networks.
Theorem 3.4. The expected time until the unbiased quantized dynamics reach a consensus
set is O(nmD log n).
Proof. Consider the time it takes for the Lyapunov function V (t) = maxi xi(t) −mini xi(t)
to shrink by at least 1 starting from any non-consensus configuration. We will next argue
that this time is O(nmD log n), which will prove the statement of the theorem.
Indeed, let Smax(t) = arg maxi xi(t), Smin(t) = arg mini xi(t). Now let us consider the event
that V (t′) = V (t) for t′ > t. We claim that there must exist i ∈ Smax(t), j ∈ Smin(t) such
that two random walkers in the original process starting from nodes i and j have not yet met
during the time interval [t, t′]. To see this, we note that during the executions of the unbiased
quantized dynamics no new values maxi xi(t) and mini xi(t) will be created; these values only
travel from one node to the other over the network based on the random walks induced by
the original process. Now given that at time t′ we have V (t′) = V (t), there must exist two
nodes i′, j′ such that xi′(t′) = maxi xi(t) and xj′(t′) = mini xi(t). By tracking back the origin
of the random walks which bring the values maxi xi(t) and mini xi(t) at time t to the nodes
i′ and j′ at time t′, one can see that these walks never meet (otherwise, they participate in
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a non-trivial update at some intermediate time and the values change to maxi xi(t)− 1 and
mini xi(t) + 1), and they must be originated from some nodes i ∈ Smax(t), j ∈ Smin(t). This
shows that the probability that V (t′) = V (t) for t′ > t is upper bounded by the probability
that there exist some i ∈ Smax(t), j ∈ Smin(t) such that two random walkers in the original
process starting from nodes i and j have not yet met.
Thus letting C be the time elapsed until V (t) shrinks by 1, and denoting τ o(x, y) as the
meeting time of two random walkers in the original process starting from x and y, we have
T = maxx,yM



































= O (nmD log n) , (3.16)
where the second inequality is due to Lemma 2.3 and upper bounding the sum with integral,











which holds when A ≥ 1, and is from [103], Ch. 5.3.2. Q.E.D.
3.2.1 Simulation Results
In this section we present some simulation results to provide a comparison between the
maximum expected meeting time T and the proposed upper and lower bounds given above.
We consider four different types of graphs with n nodes: line graph, star graph, lollipop
graph, and semi-regular graph. In lollipop graph each of its side clusters has [n
4
] nodes and
they are connected with a single path. Also, for the semi-regular graph we consider a graph
with n nodes arranged around a circle, such that each node is linked to its next four nodes




each graph. It can be seen that this ratio for the line graph converges asymptotically to a
constant as n goes to infinity. Moreover, using the transition probabilities given in (3.3) for
the star graph, a simple calculation shows that HZ =
n(n−1)
2







, which is consistent with the ratio given in Figure 3.1. Finally, for
lollipop and semi-regular graphs, although the ratio T
mnD
is oscillating, it is clearly bounded
from above by 1, which confirms the upper bound provided in Lemma 3.2.








Figure 3.1: Comparison between the maximum meeting time of the original process T and
given upper bound mnD four different types of graphs.
3.3 Expected Convergence Time Over Time-Varying Networks
In this section we extend the results of the previous section to time-varying networks.
3.3.1 Unbiased Quantized Model Over Time-Varying Networks
Let us consider a sequence of connected networks G(t) = (V , E(t)), t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., over a set of
n vertices, V = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We assume that such a sequence is selected a priori arbitrarily,
and then fixed at the beginning of the process. In particular, the future sequences of the
graphs do not depend on the current states of the quantized consensus protocol which we
will define later. We denote the number of edges and the degree of vertex x in G(t) by mt and
dt(x), respectively. Here, we assume that all the networks are connected, as otherwise we
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may not reach consensus through the dynamics. For example if the networks are allowed to
be disconnected, one can easily find a sequence of networks such that the quantized algorithm
does not converge to any specific outcome. Moreover, as in the case of static networks, and in
order to be able to define a virtual process (Remark 2), we invoke the following assumption.
Assumption 1. G(t) = (V , E(t)) are connected graphs such that dt(u)+dt(v) ≤ mt, ∀(u, v) ∈
E(t),∀t = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
Note that the above assumption is a very mild one and simply states that the sequence
of graphs can be arbitrarily chosen from the set of all connected graphs except star and
double-star graphs. Under this assumption we analyze the expected convergence time of the
dynamics.
3.3.2 Preliminary Definitions and Relevant Results
Let us define a sequence of lazy random walks {Zt}t≥0 corresponding to each network with





, if y = x
1
mt
, if y ∈ Nt(x)
0, else,
(3.17)
where Nt(x) denotes the set of neighbors of node x in G(t). Note that since all the probability
matrices Pt, t ≥ 0 are doubly stochastic, any arbitrary product is also doubly stochastic, and




, . . . , 1
n
). Now based on
the above setting and very naturally, one can extend the unbiased quantized protocol over
the sequences of time-varying graphs. To be more precise, we consider similar dynamics
over these sequences of networks as follows. At each time step t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., we choose
an edge uniformly at random from G(t) and update its incident nodes as in the static case.
We note that since such dynamics preserve the average of the opinions over time-varying
networks, the function given in (3.2) is a valid Lyapunov function for the dynamics over
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time-varying networks. In particular, the value of this function will decrease by at least
2 after every nontrivial update. Consequently, finding an upper bound on the maximum
expected convergence time of the dynamics over time-varying networks reduces to that of
finding the maximum expected time it takes for a nontrivial update to take place, which by
an abuse of notation we denote by T .
Next, we consider two random walkers who move jointly over these sequences of time-
varying networks based on whether the selected edge is incident to them or not. In other
words, if the chosen edge at some time instant is incident to one of the walkers, we will then
move it, otherwise the walkers will not change their positions. Through some manipulation
as in the case of static network analysis, one can argue that T is equal to the maximum
expected time it takes for these two walkers to meet. Therefore, very similar to the static
case, we have the following definitions.
Definition 10. Denoting the locations of the walkers at time instant t by x, y ∈ V(G(t)),
if the selected edge at this time is incident to one of the walkers, e. g., {x, xi} for some
xi ∈ Nt(x), we will move it from node x to node xi, otherwise the walkers will not change
their positions. We refer to such a random walk over the sequence of G(t), t = 0, 1, 2, . . . as
the original process.
Definition 11. In a time-varying network, a virtual process is the same as the original
process until when the walkers are each other’s neighbors at some time instant t, i.e. x ∈
Nt(y), for some x, y ∈ V(G(t)). At this time the connecting edge {x, y} ∈ E(t) in the virtual





, if e = {x, y}
1
mt
, if e is incident to either x or y on G(t)
mt−dt(x)−dt(y)
mt(mt+1−dt(x)−dt(y)) , if e is incident to neither x nor y on G(t),
and the walkers move depending on whether the selected edge is incident them or not.
Remark 3. Due to the time-varying nature of the networks, there is no dependency between
the location of the walkers and the next graph in the sequence. In other words, the next
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graph in the sequence cannot be determined based on the current locations of the walkers,
as otherwise, one can simply construct a sequence of connected time-varying networks which
depends on the location of the walkers, such that the walkers never meet each other. We
will see later that due to some laziness that exists in the joint transition probability of these
random walks, the expected time until they meet is finite.
3.3.3 Expected Convergence Time Over Time-Varying Networks
Let us consider the virtual process and denote its transition probabilities described on the
network G(t) × G(t) by a matrix K(t). In fact, K(t) is an n2 × n2 dimensional matrix
whose rows and columns are labeled as all the possible pairs of vertices, and the entry
((x1, y1), (x2, y2)) of K(t) is the conditional probability that the walkers in the virtual process
are at the nodes (x2, y2) given that they were at (x1, y1) at the previous time step. Based
on this construction, the meeting time of the virtual process that started at (a, b) is equal
to the expected time that a time inhomogeneous Markov chain with transition matrices
K(t), t = 0, 1, 2, . . . started from (a, b) hits one of the states S = {(1, 1), (2, 2), . . . , (n, n)}
for the first time. In fact, since we are interested in an upper bound on the expected hitting
time of such a random walk on {G(t)×G(t)}t≥0 (and hence an upper bound on the expected
meeting time of the virtual process), we can manipulate some of the entries of the matrices
{K(t)}t≥0 as long as we make sure that the expected hitting time to S does not decrease
throughout the process. Therefore, we upper bound the expected hitting time of such a
modified process whose transition matrix at time t we denote by K¯(t). Following this idea
and in order to have a symmetric modified chain, for all t ≥ 0 we define K(t) to be the same
as K¯(t) in all but the following cases:
• We note that in the virtual process when two walkers are each other’s neighbors
(x ∈ Nt(y)), the probability that the connecting edge between them is chosen is 2mt .
Therefore, in the modified chain matrix K¯(t) by assigning probabilities 1
mt
for moving
from (x, y) to (x, x) and also moving from (x, y) to (y, y) (similarly moving from (y, x)
to (x, x) and also moving from (y, x) to (y, y)), the expected hitting time to S will not
change.
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• Since all the vertices (x, x) ∈ S are absorbing states in the virtual process, we have
K(t)((x, x), (x, x)) = 1,∀x ∈ V . In this case, by modifying the row (x, x) of the
matrix K(t) to K¯(t)((x, x), (x, x)) = 1− 2dt(x)
mt
and K¯(t)((x, x), (x′, y′)) = 1
mt
,∀(x′, y′) ∈
NG(t)×G(t)(x, x) we will get a chain whose expected hitting time to S is again the same
as the expected hitting time of the chain {K(t)}t≥0.
By these modifications, the modified chains {K¯(t)}t≥0 and {K(t)}t≥0 will have the same
expected hitting times to S. Moreover, by the definition of the transition probabilities of the
virtual process matrices (K(t)) and the above modifications, we observe that the transition
matrix K¯(t) must satisfy K¯(t) = I − 1
mt
LG(t)×G(t) for all t ≥ 0, where LG(t)×G(t) is the
Laplacian of the Cartesian product graph G(t) × G(t) and I denotes the identity matrix of
proper size. On the other side by a close look at the matrix Pt it is not hard to see that
Pt = I − 1mtLG(t).
We are now in a position to study the expected convergence time of the dynamics. But,
before we proceed, we first provide a summary of the steps involved in the proof. Based on the
above discussion, in order to determine the expected meeting time function of the virtual
process over {G(t)}∞t=0, we can equivalently concentrate on finding the expected hitting
time to the absorbing states S of an inhomogeneous Markov chain with transition matrices
{K(t)}∞t=0 which are defined over {G(t)× G(t)}∞t=0. As discussed above, the hitting time to
the absorbing states of this chain is equal to that in the modified chain {K¯(t)}∞t=0. Since
the matrices {K¯(t)}∞t=0 are symmetric, and hence, doubly stochastic, we can find a precise
expression for the second largest eigenvalue and the smallest eigenvalue of K¯(t) based on
those of the matrix Pt. This allows us to find tight bounds on the spectral gap of the matrices
K¯(t), t = 0, 1, . . ..
Since all matrices in the inhomogeneous Markov chain {K¯(t)}∞t=0 are doubly stochas-
tic, starting from any initial distribution p(0), and after sufficiently long period of time t′
(which will be determined by the spectral gap of such matrices), the probability of being
in different states p(t′) will be very close to the stationary distribution of the chain, i.e.,




, . . . , 1
n2
)′. In particular, the probability of being absorbed by S after time t′ will
be large enough and bounded away from 0. This allows us to find an upper bound on how
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long it takes for the chain {K¯(t)}∞t=0 starting from an arbitrary initial distribution p(0) to
hit at least one of the absorbing states. Equivalently, this provides an upper bound on the
expected hitting time of the chain {K(t)}∞t=0 to the set S, and hence, an upper bound on
the expected meeting time of the virtual process. Finally, by the same line of argument as
in the case of static networks, we can show that the maximum expected meeting time of
the original process is within a constant factor of that in the virtual process. Keeping these
main steps in mind and toward a complete proof, we first consider the following lemma.
Now let us denote the second largest eigenvalue and the second smallest eigenvalue of a



















where the third equality is valid because by the Perron-Frobenius theorem the smallest
eigenvalue of the Laplacian of a connected graph is zero with multiplicity 1, which, in view
of Lemma 2.8, shows that the second smallest eigenvalues of LG(t) and LG(t)×G(t) must be the
same, i.e., αn2−1(LG(t)) = αn2−1(LG(t)×G(t)).
Let us now denote the largest eigenvalue and the smallest eigenvalue of a k × k matrix A
by α1(A) and αk(A), respectively. Similarly, from Lemma 2.8 one can see that the largest
eigenvalue of LG(t)×G(t) is twice that of in LG(t), i.e., α1(LG(t)×G(t)) = 2α1(LG(t)), for t ≥ 0.
Thus we can write
αn2(K¯(t)) = αn2(I − 1
mt
LG(t)×G(t)) = 1− 1
mt
α1(LG(t)×G(t)) = 1− 2
mt
α1(LG(t)). (3.19)
In what follows, our goal is to find an upper bound for the second largest eigenvalue and a
lower bound for the smallest eigenvalue of the matrix K¯(t).
First, we note that by relation (3.18), the second largest eigenvalue of the matrix K¯(t) is
equal to the second largest eigenvalue of the matrix Pt. In order to bound the second largest
eigenvalue of the matrix Pt we look for a relationship between its eigenvalues and the hitting
times of a random walk with transition probability matrix Pt. In fact, the random target
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Lemma (Lemma 2.2) provides us with such a relationship.
Next, in order to obtain a lower bound for the smallest eigenvalue of the matrix K¯(t) and
in view of relation (3.19), we find an upper bound for the largest eigenvalue of the Laplacian
of G(t), i.e., α1(LG(t)). In fact, the following lemma provides us with a desired upper bound.
Lemma 3.3. The largest eigenvalue of the Laplacian of any graph with m edges, satisfying
Assumption 1, is bounded from above by m− 1
2
.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix A. Q.E.D.
Finally, based on Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 3.3 we can state the main result of this section,
which is an upper bound for the expected convergence time of unbiased quantized consensus
over time-varying networks.
Theorem 3.5. Let mmax = maxt≥0mt and Dmax = maxt≥0Dt. Then, the expected conver-
gence time of unbiased quantized consensus over time-varying graphs satisfying Assumption
1 is bounded from above by O(n2mmaxDmax log2(n)).
Proof. Since, for all t ≥ 0, the matrix Pt is doubly stochastic, ( 1n , 1n , . . . , 1n) is its stationary














(n× nmtDt) = nmtDt,
where the last inequality is due to the relation (3.15) for the maximum hitting time that we
computed in the case of the fixed graph. Therefore, we get
α2(Pt) ≤ 1− 1
nmtDt
,∀t ≥ 0. (3.20)
Moreover, using relation (3.19) and Lemma 3.3, we can write
αn2(K¯(t)) = 1− 2
mt




) = −1 + 1
mt
, ∀t ≥ 0. (3.21)
Let the vector p(t) =
(
p(1,1)(t), p(1,2)(t), . . . , p(n,n)(t)
)′
denote the probability at time t of
being at different states of a random walk with transition matrix K¯(t). Since K¯(t) is a
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, . . . , 1
n2
),∀t ≥ 0 is its stationary distribution
and the average is preserved throughout the dynamics. Now, we note that since K¯(t) is
a real-valued and symmetric matrix, it has an orthogonal set of eigenvectors 1, v2, . . . , vn2 ,
corresponding to the eigenvalues 1 > α2(K¯(t)) ≥ . . . ≥ αn2(K¯(t)). Since (p(t) − pi)′1 = 0,
p(t) − pi can be written as ∑n2k=2 rkvk for some coefficients rk, k = 2, . . . , n2. In particular,
since vk, k = 2, . . . , n












































} ‖p(t)− pi‖22 .
Therefore, for every probability vector p(t), we have
∥∥K¯(t)p(t)− pi∥∥
2
≤ max{|α2(K¯(t))|, |αn2(K¯(t))|} ‖p(t)− pi‖2
= max
{|α2(Pt)|, |αn2(K¯(t))|} ‖p(t)− pi‖2 , (3.22)

















‖p(t)− pi‖2 . (3.23)
Since the above argument works for every time instant t ≥ 0, and for each of the transition
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matrices Pt and K¯(t), using relation (3.23) recursively we get
‖p(t)− pi‖2 =






























where p(0) denotes the initial probability, which is 1 in one entry and zero everywhere else.








means ‖p(t) − pi‖2 ≤ 12n2 . In other words, for all t ≥ 2nmmaxDmax(1 + log(n)), we must
have p(i,j)(t) ∈ [ 12n2 , 32n2 ], ∀i, j. In particular,
∑n
i=1 p(i,i)(t) ≥ n× 12n2 = 12n . This means that
after at most 2nmmaxDmax(1 + log(n)) steps the probability of hitting at least one of the
states in S = {(i, i), i = 1 . . . , n} is larger than or equal to 1
2n
. Now, by applying Proposition
4.1 in [18], we conclude that the expected hitting time of a random walk with transition
probabilities K¯(t)t≥0 is less than or equal to 4n × 2nmmaxDmax(1 + log(n)). This result
can be also viewed as a corollary of Lemma 13 in [116]. Therefore, since {K¯(t)}t≥0 and
{K(t)}t≥0 have the same expected hitting times to the states of S, we conclude that the
expected meeting time of the virtual process started from any time step t ≥ 0, which we
denote by Mvt , is bounded from above by M
v
t ≤ 8n2mmaxDmax(1 + log(n)).
Now, as in the case of static graphs, we argue that the virtual process and the original
process are the same until the two walkers are each other’s neighbors, i.e. for some x, y and
t ≥ 0, with x ∈ Nt(y). At this time, the probability that two walkers in the original process
meet each other at the next time step is at least half of that in the virtual process. In other
words, more than half of the times when two walkers are each other’s neighbors and they
meet in the virtual process, they will meet in the original process as well. Since each of these
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)kk × 8n2mmaxDmax(1 + log(n))
= 16n2mmaxDmax(1 + log(n)). (3.24)
Finally, similar to the proof of Theorem 3.4, one can see that after an expected time of at
most O(T × log(n)), the Lyapunov function V (t) = maxi xi(t)−mini xi(t) will decrease by
at least 1 through the trajectory of the dynamics over time-varying networks. This, in view
of the relation (3.24) completes the proof. Q.E.D.
In fact, Theorem 3.5 improves significantly some of the existing upper bounds for the
expected convergence time of quantized consensus over time-varying networks [18]. Finally,
we would like to emphasize that as in the analysis of static networks and using direct analysis
for the two special cases of star graph and double-star graph (Lemma A.1), one may be able
to generalize Theorem 3.5 to such graphs.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied the unbiased quantized consensus problem under the as-
sumption that the underlying network G is connected. We provided tight upper and lower
bounds (up to a constant factor) for the maximum expected convergence time of the model
based on the effective resistances of the underlying network. We observed that the given
bounds for static networks agree with the simulation results for some particular choices of
undirected connected networks. Finally, we extended our results to time-varying networks
under the assumption of connectivity over the sequence of networks, and provided an upper
bound which significantly improves the best known bound for the randomized quantized




In this chapter we modify the unbiased quantized consensus algorithm introduced in Chapter
3 using Metropolis chains in order to devise a protocol with fast convergence time to the
set of consensus points. Specifically, we show that when the edges of a static network
are activated based on Poisson processes with Metropolis rates, the expected convergence
time to the set of consensus points over static networks is at most O(n2 log n), where n is
the number of nodes in the network. Subsequently, we extend our results to time-varying
networks and establish an upper bound of O(n2 log2 n) for the expected convergence time of
our protocol. In turns out that these bounds are better than all previous convergence times
in the literature for randomized quantized consensus [117].
4.1 Problem Formulation
In this section, we assume we are given a fixed, undirected, connected graph G = (V , E)
without self-loops. We adopt the convention of using n for the number of nodes in this
graph, i.e., n = |V|. The Metropolis Markov chain on this graph is then defined as follows.




max{d(i),d(j)} , if i 6= j, j ∈ N(i)
1−∑j∈N(i)Mij, if i = j
0 otherwise.
(4.1)
Note that M is symmetric, nonnegative, and doubly stochastic. We refer to the Markov
chain which transitions according to M as the Metropolis chain. Moreover, given nodes
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x, y ∈ V , the hitting time Hm(x, y) is the expected time until the Metropolis chain with
initial position at node x reaches node y (quantities associated with the Metropolis chain
will generally be denoted with an “m” superscript). For future use and convenience, we
adopt the notation λij = 1/max(d(i), d(j)) whenever {i, j} ∈ E and λij = 0 otherwise.
4.1.1 Quantized Metropolis Dynamics
We next introduce a continuous time quantized process based on Metropolis weights, whose
behavior will turn out to be related to the Metropolis chain. For each link {i, j} ∈ E of
the graph G, we consider a Poisson process of rate λij. Each node i begins with an integer
value xi(0) which lies in the range [l, L]. Each time the process corresponding to an edge





xi(t)− 1, if xi(t) > xj(t)
xi(t) + 1, if xi(t) < xj(t)
xi(t), if xi(t) = xj(t),
(4.2)
and likewise for node j. In other words, each xi(t) is an integer-valued jump process whose
jumps occur whenever an arrival occurs at any edge incident on i.
Note that the above update rule allows for the possibility that xi(t
+) = xi(t). In this
case, we will say that the update at time t was trivial. Furthermore, observe that if |xi(t)−
xj(t)| = 1, then the update of Eq. (4.2) will cause nodes i and j to swap values, i.e.,
xi(t
+) = xj(t), xj(t
+) = xi(t). In this case, we will also say that the update was trivial. If
neither of these two cases has occurred during an update, we will say that the update was
non-trivial. Simply speaking, a non-trivial update refers to the case where the incident nodes
of an activated edge have integer values which differ by at least 2. Finally, the objective of
quantized metropolis protocol is to reach to the consensus set, i.e.,
C =
{








In fact, using Metropolis chains in the structure of our devised protocol has several ad-
vantages: it allows us to implement the protocol in a totally distributed manner. Moreover,
the inherited symmetry of the Metropolis chains simplifies the convergence time analysis
and makes the dynamics more tractable. Furthermore, such chains benefit from having a
small expected hitting time over general networks, which is a key factor for establishing a
quadratic upper bound for the expected convergence time of our designed protocol. Here,
we note that since
∑
j∈N(i) λij ≤ 1, we have that
∑
{i,j}∈E λij = O(n), and so the Metropolis
quantized consensus protocol performs O(n) updates per unit time.
4.2 Expected Convergence Time Over Static Networks
We now begin the analysis of the convergence time of the quantized Metropolis algorithm
over a fixed graph G. Following similar arguments as in section 3.1.1, one can see that a key
step in analysis of the expected convergence time of the quantized metropolis protocol is to
bound the expected time until the first nontrivial update takes place. For this purpose, and
similar as before, we let T be the maximum expected time such that a nontrivial update
takes place over all possible configurations of integers. Note that in this maximization we
exclude the configurations that are already in the consensus set, as otherwise our goal, i.e.,
reaching to the consensus, is achieved (no other nontrivial update can occur). Next, similar
to what we have done in chapter 3, we define original and virtual processes in order to
facilitate our analysis.
Definition 12. Consider two random walkers moving based on whether the activated edge
in the quantized Metropolis dynamics is incident to them. That is, if one of the walkers is
at node x, and if the next edge to register an arrival is incident to x, i.e., if it is {x, y} for
some y ∈ N(x), then the random walker moves from x to y. We refer to such a process as
the original process.
We denote by Mo(x, y) the expected “meeting time” of this process, defined to be the
expected time until an edge incident to both walkers registers an arrival provided the two
walkers started at nodes x, y with x 6= y (in general, we will denote quantities associated
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with this process with an “o” superscript). By convention, we set Mo(x, x) = 0 for all
x ∈ V.
Proposition 4.1. T = maxx,y∈V Mo(x, y).
Proof. Proof follows exactly within the same lines of augments as in Proposition 3.1. Q.E.D.
Based on the above proposition, our next step is to bound maxx,y∈VMo(x, y). We will
actually find it easier to instead bound a meeting time associated with a slightly different
process, which we call the virtual process, defined next.
Definition 13. The virtual process is identical to the original process until the two walkers
x, y become each other’s neighbors in G. At that time, the edge connecting them registers
arrivals according to a Poisson process of rate 2λxy (i.e., twice the rate in the original
process). The meeting time Mv(x, y) is defined to be the expected time until an edge incident
on both random walkers ticks provided the walkers start at positions x, y with x 6= y (in
general, we will denote quantities associated with this process with a “v” superscript). By
convention we set Mv(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ V.
Example 1. Let us consider a line graph with three vertices V = {1, 2, 3}. We denote the
position of the two walkers by a pair (x, y), where x and y refers to position of the walker
0 and walker 2, respectively. For instance, (2, 3) means that the walker 0 is at node 2 and
walker 2 is at node 3. Note that the states (1, 1), (2, 2) and (3, 3) denote the situation where
the walkers meet (i.e., a non-trivial update takes place). In this case the dynamics of the
original and virtual processes can be completely determined by the corresponding transition
probabilities of these processes given on the left and right side of the Figure 4.1. In fact, the
virtual process slightly increases the probabilities of being absorbed by the states (1, 1), (2, 2)
and (3, 3). In other words, the walkers have more chance to meet in the virtual process
than in the original process. However, this increase is small enough such that it keeps the
virtual process as a good approximation for the original process. On the other hand, a useful
fact about the virtual process is that it benefits from a more symmetric structure than the
original process such that it facilitates our analysis of the hitting time and meeting time.
As an example in Figure 4.1 it can be seen that a transition from one state to its outgoing
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neighbors happens with equal probability for the virtual process while this property does not
hold for the original process.
Figure 4.1: Illustration of the transition probabilities in Example 1.
Definition 14. A vertex θ is called a hidden vertex of the Metropolis chainM if Hm(θ, x) ≤
Hm(x, θ),∀x ∈ V.
Remark 4. It is a known fact that the hitting times of a reversible Markov chain satisfy the
following transitivity property:
Hm(x, y) +Hm(y, z) +Hm(z, x)=Hm(x, z) +Hm(z, y) +Hm(y, x),
(see [103] for a proof). It can be shown that a consequence of this is that every reversible
Markov chain has at least one hidden vertex [113].
Our first goal is to bound the expected meeting time of the virtual process, which we do
in the following lemma. For this, we rely heavily on the techniques used in Chapter 3. The
main idea is to argue that the expected meeting time function of the virtual process Mv(x, y)
satisfies essentially the same recursion as the function Φm(·, ·) : V × V → R defined by
Φm(x, y) = Hm(x, y) +Hm(y, θ)−Hm(θ, y), (4.3)
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where θ denotes a fixed hidden vertex of the Metropolis chain.
Lemma 4.1. For all x, y ∈ V, we have Mv(x, y) ≤ 6n2.




λxxi , Λy =
∑
yi∈N(y)
λyyi , Λxy = Λx + Λy.
An immediate consequence of Remark 4 is the symmetry of Φm(·, ·):
Φm(u, v) = Φm(v, u), ∀ u, v ∈ V .











[Hm(x, y) +Hm(y, θ)−Hm(θ, y)] + Λy
Λxy



















































Hm(y, θ)−Hm(θ, y))+ Λy
Λxy
(
Hm(x, θ)−Hm(θ, x)). (4.4)
Now, using the definition of Φm(·, ·), we have that for each neighbor xi ∈ N(x),




Multiplying this relation by
λxxi
Λxy














Hm(y, θ)−Hm(θ, y)]. (4.5)
By the same argument, since for any yi ∈ N(y),
Φm(x, yi) = Φ

















Hm(x, θ)−Hm(θ, x)]. (4.6)































Note that the above equation holds regardless of whether x and y are neighbors, and this
fact is the very reason for our introduction of the virtual process.
We therefore see that 1
2
Φm(x, y) and Mv(x, y) follow the same recursion formula when
x 6= y. Thus defining f(x, y) = 1
2













Defining V ′ = V × V and V ′′ = V ′ \ {(x, x) | x ∈ V}, we have that the matrix Q defined as




, if s = y, r ∈ N(x)
λyw
Λxy
, if r = x, w ∈ N(y)
0, Else
is a stochastic irreducible matrix in RV ′×V ′ . Furthermore, we have that f(x, y) is harmonic
over V ′′ and, since θ is a hidden vertex, we have that for all x ∈ V , f(x, x) = 1
2
(Hm(x, θ)−
Hm(θ, x)) ≥ 0. Therefore, using Remark 1, we immediately get f(x, y) ≥ 0 for all x, y ∈ V ,
and therefore Mv(x, y) ≤ 1
2
Φm(x, y). Finally, it was shown in [118] that Hm(x, y) ≤ 6n2 for
all x, y ∈ V , which now immediately implies the current lemma. Q.E.D.
Our next step is to argue that the bound we have just derived on maxx,yM
v(x, y) in the
previous lemma holds for maxx,yM
o(x, y) with an additional multiplicative factor of 2. The
main idea is that, by definition, the virtual process and the original process are identical
until the two random walkers are each other’s neighbors, and that when that happens, the
probability of meeting at the next transition is λxy




the virtual process. Since the former is at least half of the latter, this shows that at least
half of the times when the walkers in the virtual process meet, they will meet in the original
process as well. This immediately implies that the meeting time of the original process lies
within a constant factor of that in the virtual process which by Lemma 4.1 is at most O(n2).
To provide a formal proof, we state the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. T := maxx,yM
o(x, y) ≤ 12n2.
Proof. Fix x, y with x 6= y and initialize both an original process and a virtual process with
initial positions of the walkers being x and y. Furthermore, let us couple these processes
to move identically until the first time when the walkers are each other’s neighbors; clearly,
this has no effect on the distribution of either process. When the walkers are each other’s
neighbors for the first time, say at nodes u and w, let us split the edge connecting them of
rate 2λuw in the virtual process into two distinct edges of rate λuw (Figure 4.2). We will
make the first of these (the bottom black edge in the right side of Figure 4.2), as well as the
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edges going from u and w to their neighbors, register arrivals in the virtual process exactly
when the corresponding edges in the original process register arrivals. Again, this has no
effect on the distribution of either process.
Figure 4.2: Interpretation of the virtual process using the original process and an extra
edge.
Now, for these coupled processes, let us denote by τv(x, y) a random variable denoting
the first time when the random walkers in the virtual processes meet (recall this means that
an edge incident on both of them registers an arrival) and τ o(x, y) the first time when the
random walkers in the original process meet, given that the processes are initialized from
x and y. We have that τ o(x, y) = τv(x, y) if the first edge of rate λuw registers an arrival
before the second edge of rate λuw. This happens with probability 1/2. If this does not
happen, τ o(x, y) is τv(x, y) plus another random variable which is a meeting time in the
original process starting from u and w, i.e., τ o(u,w). In other words,
τ o(x, y) =
τ
v(x, y), w.p. 1
2
(black edge ticks)




Thus, by taking expectation from both sides of relation (4.9) we get





(Mv(x, y) + max
u,w
Mo(u,w))
which implies that maxx,yM
o(x, y) ≤ 2 maxx,yMv(x, y) ≤ 12n2, where the last step made
use of Lemma 4.1. Q.E.D.
Remark 5. Let τ o(x, y) be the meeting time of two random walkers in the original process,
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who start at x and y. In view of the Lemma 2.3, we immediately have that
P(τ o(x, y) > t) ≤ e−b t12en2 c. (4.10)
Indeed, this follows by dividing the time interval of length t into 12en2 intervals and applying
Markov’s inequality in each one. For a rigorous justification, see Chapter 2.4.3 of [103] whose
argument applies verbatim here.
Now we are in a position to state the main result of this section, which is an upper bound
for the expected convergence time of the quantized Metropolis protocol.
Theorem 4.2. The expected time until the quantized Metropolis dynamics reach a consensus
set is O(n2 log n).
Proof. The proof is quite similar to that in Theorem 3.4. Basically, the idea is to consider the
time it takes for the Lyapunov function V (t) = maxi xi(t)−mini xi(t) to shrink by at least
1 starting from any non-consensus configuration, and showing that this time is O(n2 log n),
which will prove the statement of the theorem. Q.E.D.
4.3 Expected Convergence Time Over Time-Varying Networks
In this section we analyze the expected convergence time of the quantized Metropolis dynam-
ics over time-varying networks. Toward this aim, let us consider a sequence of connected
undirected networks G(t) = (V , E(t)), t ≥ 0, over the same set of vertices V which may
change at discrete time instances, i.e., G(t) = G(btc),∀t ≥ 0. Thus our notation for the
set of neighbors of x will now be Nx(t), which depends on t. In contrast to the previous
section, we will now assume that each node always possesses a self-loop, i.e., x ∈ Nx(t) for
all x ∈ V , t ≥ 0. We thus introduce the notation N ′x(t) to denote the neighbors of node x
excluding itself: N ′x(t) = Nx(t)\{x}. The degree of a node x, which we will denote by dx(t),
will refer to the cardinality of N ′x(t).
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4.3.1 Quantized Metropolis Model Over Time-Varying Networks
Given a network G(t) at time t ≥ 0, we associate a Poisson process with each edge {i, j}
of G(t) with a rate of λij(t) = 1/max(di(t), dj(t)), i.e., the Metropolis weight corresponding
to that edge at time t. When an edge {i, j} ∈ E(t) registers an arrival, we let the incident
nodes update their values based on (4.2). Moreover, for each node x and time t, the self-loop
(x, x) registers arrivals according to a Poisson process with rate of





Note that λxx(t) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ V , t ≥ 0, and the sum of the rates of the edges of G(t) is
always equal to |V | = n. When a self-loop registers an arrival, no update is made.
4.3.2 Preliminary Definitions and Relevant Results
We next introduce the notions of the “original” and “virtual” processes over the time-varying
graph sequence {G(t)}.
Definition 15. Consider two random walkers moving based on whether the activated edge in
the quantized Metropolis location is incident to them or not. That is, if a random walker is
at node i at time t when the edge {i, j} ∈ G(t) registers an arrival, the walker moves to node
j. As before, we will refer to this as the original process, but note that the graph sequence
is now time-varying. The meeting time Mot (x, y) for x 6= y is the expected time until two
random walkers, starting at locations x and y at time t, are both incident on an edge which
registers an arrival. By convention we set Mot (x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ V , t ≥ 0.
Definition 16. We define the virtual process to be identical to the original process except
when the two walkers in the original process are each other’s neighbors at nodes u and w for
some t ≥ 0, i.e., u ∈ Nw(t). At this time in the virtual process we let the edges {r, s} ∈ E(t)
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register arrivals at rates µrs(t) defined as follows:
µrs(t) =

2λuw(t), if {r, s} = {u,w}
λuu(t)− λuw(t)2 , if {r, s} = {u, u}
λww(t)− λuw(t)2 , if {r, s} = {w,w}
λrs(t), if else.
(4.12)
Note that µrs(t) ≥ 0 for all r, s ∈ V , t ≥ 0. We refer to the meeting time of the virtual process
starting from x and y at time t as τvt (x, y) and its expectation M
v
t (x, y). By convention, we
set Mvt (x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ V , t ≥ 0.
In words, the rate of the edge {u,w} is doubled, while the rate of the self-loops is decreased
to make sure that all rates still sum up to n.
4.3.3 Convergence Rate Over Time-Varying Networks
In this part, we state our main results for the quantized Metropolis dynamics over time-







λyyi(t) = 2 (2− λxx(t)− λyy(t)) . (4.13)
Fix t and let T1 be the first time after t that an edge registers an arrival in the virtual
process. We then have

















Note that this equation holds regardless of whether x and y are neighbors, and this fact is
why we introduced the virtual process in the first place. Next in the following lemma we
show that T1 follows an exponential distribution with parameter n.
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Lemma 4.3. Let us consider a process obtained by restarting a Poisson process of rate n at
every discrete time instant k = 0, 1, 2, . . .. The first time arrival T1 of the new process thus
generated will follow an exponential distribution with parameter n.
Proof. We show that P(T1 ≤ t) = 1−e−nt,∀t ≥ 0. For 0 ≤ t < 1 the claim is trivial since the
first time arrival of a single Poisson process follows an exponential distribution. Now given
that for t ∈ [0, k) we have P(T1 ≤ t) = 1− e−nt, we will compute P(T1 ≤ t) for t ∈ [k, k+ 1).
In fact, for t ∈ [k, k + 1) we can write
P(T1 ≤ t) = P(T1 ≤ k) + P(k ≤ T1 ≤ t) = (1− e−nk) + P(k ≤ T1 ≤ t). (4.15)
Since k ≤ T1 ≤ t if and only if there is no arrival in any of the past k intervals [0, 1), [1, 2), ..., [k−
1, k) and the first arrival must occur in [k, t) ⊆ [k, k + 1), and since these events are inde-
pendent due to restarting of the Poisson process at the beginning of each interval, we can
write
P(k ≤ T1 ≤ t) =
k−1∏
i=0
P(T1 /∈ [i, i+ 1))× P(k ≤ T1 < t)
= (e−n)k × (1− e−n(t−k)) = e−nk + e−nt. (4.16)
By substituting (4.16) into (4.15) we get P(T1 ≤ t) = 1 − e−nt. This completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Continuing with (4.14) and since T1 is exponential with parameter n, we further have that
Mvt (x, y) =
∫ ∞
t
































Now let us define v(t) to be a column vector of length n(n − 1) whose entries are the
variables Mvt (x, y),∀x 6= y in any order. It follows that we can write the above recursion for







ne−n(t1−t)D (t1) v (t1) dt1, (4.18)






, if s = y, r ∈ Nx(t) \ {x, y}
λsy(t)
n
, if r = x, s ∈ Ny(t) \ {x, y}
1− Λxy(t)
n
, if (r, s) = (x, y)
0, Else.
(4.19)


















We justify this change of variables by appealing to Theorem 263I in [119]. Indeed, the






Here φ(z) = −e−n(z−t) while g(z) = D(t− ln(−z)/n)v(t− ln(−z)/n). Theorem 263I in [119]
allows us to assert this equality subject to (i) g(·) being Lebesgue measurable (ii); and φ(z)
being absolutely continuous on any closed bounded subinterval of I. Item (ii) is clearly
satisfied here. Item (i) follows because D(·) is a piecewise continuous function by definition,
and v(·) is a continuous function (indeed, taking tn → t and conditioning on no transitions
in [tn, t] as well as no meeting occurring in the same interval, we immediately obtain the
continuity of v(t) as a function of t).
Next, we note that it is immediate from Eq. (4.19) that D(t) is a symmetric matrix.
61
Furthermore, it is easy to see that D(t) is sub-stochastic, implying that its eigenvalues are
all real and less than 1 in modulus. Our next step is to upper bound both the largest and
smallest eigenvalues of D(t).
The first step is to extend D(t) to a stochastic matrix P ∈ Rn2×n2 as follows:
P(x,y)(r,s)(t)=

1, if x = y = r = s
λrx(t)
n
, if x 6= y, s = y, r ∈Nx(t)\{x}
λsy(t)
n
, if x 6= y, r = x, s ∈Ny(t)\{y}
1− Λxy(t)
n
, if x 6= y, (r, s) = (x, y),
0, if else.
(4.21)
Note that since P (t) is stochastic, it can be interpreted as the transition matrix of a
Markov chain with absorbing states S = {(x, x) : x ∈ V}. When we adopt the convention






where C(t) and D(t) are, respectively, matrices of sizes (n2−n)×n and (n2−n)× (n2−n).
Example 2. Let us consider a line graph of three nodes, V = {1, 2, 3}, and the set of edges
E = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 1}, {2, 2}, {3, 3}}. In this case we have λ22 = λ12 = λ23 = 12 , and
λ11 = λ33 =
3
4
. If the two random walkers are not each other’s neighbors, these are the rates
at which edges register arrivals. However, if the walkers are each other’s neighbors, then
modifications must be made as we detailed above. For example, suppose x = 1 and y = 2,






, and µ33 =
3
4
(Figure 4.3). In particular, the
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transition probabilities in matrix P for such a network is as follows:

(1,1) (2,2) (3,3) (1,2) (1,3) (2,1) (2,3) (3,1) (3,2)
(1,1) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2,2) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0










0 0 0 0










































where the left-down and right-down blocks represent, respectively, matrices D and C in the
block form representation given in (4.22). As an example, to find P((1,2),(1,3)), one can either





, or to compute the probability of transition
of the virtual process in the right-bottom of Figure 4.3 from state (1, 2) to (1, 3), which is










, which is equal to the probability that the virtual process in the right-bottom














Figure 4.3: Rates of the original and virtual processes in Example 2.
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has the additional property that there is a path starting from any node and ending in the first
k nodes. Furthermore, let us assume that D is symmetric and let us denote its largest eigen-
value by λmax(D). Let Hi denote the expected time until the chain is absorbed in {1, . . . , k}
starting at node i and H = maxiHi. Then λmax(D) ≤ 1− 1H .
Proof. Indeed, 1/(1−λmax(D)) is a positive number which is an eigenvalue of (I−D)−1 and
is consequently upper bounded by ||(I −D)−1||∞. But by [120], Theorem 4.5, we have that
the sum of the entries in the ith row of (I −D)−1 is Hi. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4.5. For all t ≥ 0, we have λmax(D(t)) ≤ 1− 16n3 .
Proof. Fix t and let HP(t)({x, y}) denote the hitting time to S = {{i, i} | i ∈ V } in P (t)
starting from {x, y}. It is immediately apparent that when x 6= y,













Comparing this to Eq. (4.8) and noting that HP (t)({i, i}) = 0 for all i ∈ V , we obtain that
HP (t)({x, y})/n equals the expected meeting time in the virtual process on the graph G(t)
starting from x and y. Appealing to Lemma 4.1, we can conclude that expected hitting time
in P (t) to the first n states is at most 6n3. Appealing to Lemma 4.4 then completes the
proof. Q.E.D.
Observe that the lower bound
λmin(D(t)) ≥ 1− 4
n
(4.23)
follows immediately by Gershgorin circles due to the observation that Λxy(t) ≤ 2 for all
x, y ∈ V , t ≥ 0.
We are now in a position to state and prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.3. The expected time until the quantized Metropolis dynamics over time-varying
connected networks reach the consensus set is O(n2 log2(n)).
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dzk . . . dz1. (4.24)
Now let us use introduce the notation M = supt≥0 ‖v(t)‖∞. Elementary arguments suffice
to establish that M < ∞; recall that v(t) stacks up expected meeting times in the virtual
process starting at time t, and the finiteness of M can follow from the observation that the
probability of intersection in any positive length interval [t, t+a] is positive and bounded away
from zero independently of t. Thus for every  > 0 there exists t∗ such that M− ≤ ‖v(t∗)‖∞.
Since the entries of D(·) and v(·) are always nonnegative, we can take the infinity-norm from
both sides of (4.24) and use triangle inequality to obtain







































































































where in the fourth inequality we have used the fact that the infinity-norm of a matrix is
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always upper bounded by its induced 2-norm times the square root of its dimension, i.e.,
‖D(·)‖∞ ≤
√
n(n− 1)‖D(·)‖2. Moreover, the last inequality is valid due to Lemma 4.5 and
Eq. (4.23).










Appealing to the inequality (1−1/x)x ≤ e−1, we obtain that we may choose k∗ = O(n3 log n)
to accomplish this. Plugging this into the last line of Eq. (4.25), we immediately obtain







Since this holds for any  > 0, it implies that M ≤ 2k∗/n = O(n2 log n).
We have thus obtained an upper bound on O(n2 log n) on the expected meeting time in
the virtual process starting from any pair of nonidentical nodes and any time t. The rest
of the proof directly parallels the arguments we have made in the fixed graph case, and we
only sketch it rather than repeat the relevant sections verbatim. The first step is to argue
that 2M is an upper bound on the meeting time of the original process. The proof proceeds
exactly as in the case of Lemma 4.2 by coupling the two processes and conditioning on the
transition at the last step in the meeting time of the virtual process. The next (and final)
step is to argue that the time it takes V (t) = maxi xi(t)−mini xi(t) to shrink by 1 is upper
bounded by O(n2 log2 n). This follows exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Indeed, we can
argue that if V (t′) = V (t) at some time t′ > t, this means that a pair of nodes performing a
random walk according to the original process have not met between times t and t′. Upper
bounding the latter using the union bound, we once again obtain that the expected time
it takes for V (t) to shrink by 1 is the expected meeting time in the virtual process times a
multiplicative factor of O(log n). Q.E.D.
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4.4 Expected Convergence Time Over Specific Networks
In this section, we provide some improved bounds for the expected convergence time of
the quantized Metropolis protocol on some concrete networks. In several cases we obtain
bounds which are an order-of-magnitude better than the essentially quadratic convergence
times derived in the previous sections.
Our main technical tool will be to rely on the analogy between hitting times and expected
resistances in the network. Indeed, recall that the quadratic bounds obtained in the earlier
section were all consequences of the result from [118] that hitting times in the Metropolis
chain are O(n2) on any graph. To obtain improved bounds, we only need to get improved
upper bounds on hitting times. For example, if we show that the hitting times in a certain
class of graphs are O(n), then repeating our proof of Theorem 4.2 verbatim we would obtain
an O(n log n) bound on the convergence time of the Metropolis quantized consensus protocol
on these graphs. To obtain these improved bounds on hitting times, we will make use of the
analogy between hitting times and electrical resistances, described next.
Suppose Q ∈ Rn×n is the transition matrix of a reversible random walk with stationary
probability pi(·). The conductance c(x, y) is defined as c(x, y) = pi(x)Q(x, y) and c(x) :=∑
y∈N(x) c(x, y). Note that if Q(x, y) = 0, then c(x, y) = 0; furthermore, by reversibility of
Q, we have c(x, y) = c(y, x). Therefore, one may think of c(·) as a function on the “edges”
e = (x, y) of the graph corresponding to Q. The resistance of each edge e is defined to be the
inverse of conductance, i.e. r(e) = 1
c(e)
. We define R(a ↔ b) to be the resistance between
nodes a and b if each edge in the graph has resistance r(e). Finally, HQ(x, y) is defined to
be the hitting time from x to y in the Markov chain corresponding to Q.
Lemma 4.6 (Proposition 10.6, [104]). Under the above assumptions,




For the special case of the Metropolis chain, we can specialize Lemma 4.6 to obtain the
following corollary.
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Corollary 4.1. If Q is the Metropolis matrix on the graph G, i.e., Q =M, then
Hm(a, b) +Hm(b, a) = R(a↔ b),
Proof. Since M is symmetric, it is reversible and we may apply Lemma 4.6. Moreover,













Corollary 4.1 provides us a technique to obtain improved convergence times for Metropolis
consensus on some specific graphs. Indeed, by repeating the proof of Theorem 4.2 verbatim,







where R(a → b) is the resistance between a and b in the graph where the edge (i, j) has
resistance nmax(d(i), d(j)). We next apply this fact to a variety of graphs.
• Line Graph
For the case of line graph, we always have max{d(x), d(y)} = 2,∀{x, y} ∈ E . Therefore,
in Corollary 4.1, the resistance of every edge of the electrical circuit associated with
the Metropolis chain for the line graph is 2n. Hence maxa,b∈V R(a ↔ b) = 2n(n− 1).
In particular, maxa,b∈V Hm(a, b) = O(n(n − 1)). The bound we obtain in this case is
essentially identical to the bound of Theorem 4.2.
• 2-Dimensional Grids
A well-known result for the 2-dimensional grids (Proposition 9.16, [104]) states that
the largest resistance between any pair of nodes of an n× n grid where each edge has
a unit size resistance is bounded from above by 2 log(n). For the case of Metropolis
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chain over 2D grid, max{d(x), d(y)} ≤ 4,∀{x, y} ∈ G. By Corollary 4.1, this allows
us to bound hitting times in the 2D grid as O(n log n). We thus obtain a convergence
time bound of O(n log2(n)) for the quantized Metropolis protocol, which is better than
the bound of Theorem 4.2 by a multiplicative factor of n/ log n.
• 3-Dimensional Grids
For 3-dimensional grids it is known that the largest resistance of an n × n × n grid
with unit resistances on each edge is bounded from above by a universal constant
independent of n. Using the same line of argument as 2D grids, one can see that
max{d(x), d(y)} ≤ 6, which in turn means that the maximum expected hitting time
of the Metropolis chain over 3D grids is at most O(n). We thus obtain a convergence
time bound of O(n log(n)) for the quantized Metropolis protocol, which is better than
the bound of Theorem 4.2 by a multiplicative factor of n.
• Star Graph
For the star graph (a tree with a root and n − 1 leaves), we have max{d(x), d(y)} =
n − 1,∀{x, y} ∈ G. This shows that maxa,b∈V R(a ↔ b) = n(n − 1). This leads to
bounds which are essentially the same as the bounds of Theorem 4.2.
This may appear somewhat counter-intuitive at first glance, since the simple random
walk on the star graph is easily seen to have a linear hitting time. However, the
Metropolis chain attains symmetry (which is crucial for consensus) by putting large
self-loops at the leaves, which leads to a much slower hitting time.
• Lollipop Graph
For the lollipop graph (two clusters of size bn
3
c which are connected by a line graph of
n− 2bn
3
c nodes), one can argue that max{d(x), d(y)} ≤ bn
3
c for the edges belonging to
the clusters and max{d(x), d(y)} ≤ 2 for the edges belonging to the path. This implies
that maxa,b∈V R(a↔ b) = O(n2), once again leading to bounds which are identical to
those of Theorem 4.2.
• Random Geometric Graph
A random geometric graph G(n, r) is a graph which is obtained by distributing n nodes
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uniformly on the unit square and connecting two nodes if and only if the Euclidean
distance between these two nodes is at most r. Such graphs are popular in modeling
wireless ad-hoc and sensor networks [121].
It was shown in [121] (Lemma 2.13 and Sections 2.3-2.5.2) that for c > 1, r2 =
c8 log n is sufficient to guarantee that with high probability G(n, r) is “geo-dense,”
roughly meaning that the geometric graph has almost uniform node density across
the unit square. In particular, for r2 ≥ c8 log n all nodes have degree of O(nr2) with
high probability. Furthermore, for this range of r and by Theorem 2.20 in [121], the
maximum resistance between two nodes of a geometric graph when each node has a
unit resistance is O( 1
nr2
) with high probability. Putting these two results together
and in view of Corollary 4.1, we can see that for a random geometric graph with
r2 ≥ c8 log n, c > 1 we have maxa,bH(a, b) = O(n×nr2× 1nr2 ) = O(n). Therefore, the
expected convergence time of the quantized Metropolis protocol for this range of r is
at most O(n log n) with high probability.
• Erdos-Renyi Graphs
For Erdos-Renyi graphs G(n, p), where each edge appears with probability p inde-
pendent of the other edges, the degree of each vertex is highly concentrated around
its mean, i.e., (n − 1)p. In fact, it can be shown that for p = logn
n
ω(n) where
ω(n) → ∞ arbitrarily slowly, the ratio of degree of each vertex x to its mean ap-
proaches 1, i.e., d(x)
(n−1)p → 1, almost always (Theorem 8.5.1, [112]). This means
that for sufficiently large n, with high probability max{d(x), d(y)} = O((n − 1)p).
Moreover, it is known that for p ∈ ( logn
n
, 1], the diameter of G(n, p) is at most
O(log n) almost always. Putting these two results together and in view of Corol-
lary 4.1, we can see that for the Erdos-Renyi graph with p = logn
n
ω(n) we have
maxa,bH(a, b) = O(n× (n− 1)p× log n) = O((n− 1) log2 n ω(n)) (note that ω(n) can
grow arbitrarily slowly to infinity, e.g., ω(n) := log(log(n))). Therefore, the expected
convergence time of the quantized Metropolis protocol for this range of p = logn
n
ω(n) is
at most O((n− 1) log2 n ω(n))O(log n) = O((n− 1) log3 n ω(n)) with high probability.
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4.5 Simulations
In this section, we report on the results of some simulations on the performance of the
quantized Metropolis method. Since the key bottleneck in performance is the expected time
until a nontrivial update takes place, here we compare this time to the quadratic upper
bounds we have derived for a variety of graphs.
More precisely, we consider the ratio of T
n2
for four simple classes of graphs G, namely,
line, star, lollipop and 3-regular graphs, as well as Erdos-Renyi graphs. We have depicted
our simulation results in Figure 4.4 while we let the number of nodes vary from 1 to 70 for
each of these graphs.
For the case of the Erdos-Renyi graph, we assume that the probability that each edge
appears in the graph is 1
2
and independent of the other edges. As seen in Figure 4.4, the
ratio of T
n2
is bounded from above by 0.5 and vanishes very fast, corresponding to a sub-
quadratic convergence time. For the case of the lollipop graph, we consider two cliques,
each of size dn
4
e, which are connected by a path of the remaining nodes. As seen again in
Figure 4.4, the ratio of T
n2
for each of the line graph, lollipop and star graph is bounded from
above by 0.5 and asymptotically converges to a constant, meaning that our quadratic upper
bounds are essentially sharp for these graphs.
Finally, in the case of 3-regular graphs, we consider a cycle of n nodes where each node
is connected to its diagonally opposite node on the cycle (this is possible when n is an even
number, and when n is odd we leave the final node n to be of degree 2). Again, it can be
seen from Figure 4.4 that the quantized Metropolis dynamics display good performance on
such graphs.
Next we consider the expected time for the occurrence of a nontrivial update over various
sequences of time-varying graphs. For this purpose, we consider five different sequences of
time-varying networks, all having the property that graph changes can only occur at discrete
time instances k = 1, 2, . . .. In particular, we consider:
71












Figure 4.4: Comparison between the maximum expected time that a nontrivial update
takes place and the upper bound of n2 for static networks.
• (I) An alternating sequence of line and star networks, i.e.,
G(k) =
line graph, if k is evenstar graph, if k is odd.
• (II) An alternating sequence of line, star and lollipop networks, i.e.,
G(k) =

lollipop graph, if mod(k, 3) = 0
line graph, if mod(k, 3) = 1
star graph, if mod(k, 3) = 2.






star graph, w.p. 1
2
.
• (IV) A sequence of Erdos-Renyi graphs with 1
2
probability of emerging an edge in each
graph.





line graph, w.p. 1
4
lollipop graph, w.p. 1
4
star graph, w.p. 1
4





In each of the above cases we let the number of nodes vary from 1 to 50. We let the length
of the sequence of the time-varying graphs be large enough such that in all the sample paths
we generate, at least one nontrivial update takes place (this ended up resulting in a length
of 5,000). We ran the quantized Metropolis protocol over these sequences of time-varying
networks 20,000 times and took an average of the waiting times for the occurrence of a
nontrivial update. We initialized the process with an initial condition of two nodes having
values 0 and 2, while all the rest have value 1; furthermore, we simulated this for every
possible pair of starting nodes for the values 0 and 2 and take the maximum. The results
are depicted in the Figure 4.5.


















# Sample paths: 20000
Figure 4.5: Comparison between the maximum expected time that a nontrivial update
takes place and the upper bound of n2 for time-varying networks.
In the first three cases (I, II and III), the curve shows a quadratic behavior in the number
of nodes, matching the bounds of Theorem 4.3. For the two other cases (IV, V), the curve
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appears to be linear, once again confirming the fast performance of Metropolis consensus
over Erdos-Renyi graphs.
4.6 Conclusion
We have studied the quantized consensus problem on undirected connected networks in both
static and time-varying settings. Using Metropolis chains within the structure of quantized
consensus protocols, we were able to improve the expected convergence time relative to the
previous works in the literature. In particular, we have proved an upper bound of O(n2 log n)
for the convergence time of quantized Metropolis dynamics over static networks and an upper
bound of O(n2 log2 n) over dynamic networks.
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CHAPTER 5
HEGSELMANN-KRAUSE OPINION DYNAMICS IN
FINITE DIMENSIONS
In this chapter we describe the discrete-time Hegselmann-Krause opinion dynamics model as
introduced in [39], and study its termination time under various scenarios. As was mentioned
earlier, such dynamics have numerous applications in modeling of opinion formation in social
networks.
5.1 Hegselmann-Krause Dynamics
Let us assume that we have a set of n agents [n] = {1, . . . , n} and we want to model the
interactions among their opinions. It is assumed that at each time t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., the opinion
of agent i ∈ [n] can be represented by a vector xi(t) ∈ Rd for some d ≥ 1. According to
that model, the evolution of opinion vectors can be modeled by the following discrete-time
dynamics:
x(t+ 1) = A(t, x(t),~)x(t), (5.1)
where A(t, x(t),~) is an n× n row-stochastic matrix and x(t) is the n× d matrix such that
its ith row contains the opinion of the ith agent at time t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., i.e., it is equal
to xi(t). We refer to x(t) as the opinion profile at time t. The entries of A(t, x(t),~) are
functions of time step t, current profile x(t), confidence vector ~ = (1, 2, . . . , n) > 0 and
an updating scheme. The parameters i, i ∈ [n] are referred to as the confidence bounds .
In the homogeneous case of the dynamics, we assume that i = , ∀i ∈ [n] for some  > 0,
while in the heterogeneous model, different agents may have different bounds of confidence.
Our focus in this chapter is mainly on the homogeneous model, but we also analyze the
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heterogeneous case toward the end, in Section 5.4. For the sake of simplicity of notation and
for a fixed x(0) ∈ Rn×d, we drop the dependency of A(t, x(t),~) on x(t) and  and simply
write A(t). In what follows next, we distinguish two different versions of Hegselmann-Krause
dynamics.
5.1.1 Synchronous Hegselmann-Krause Model
In the synchronous Hegselmann-Krause model, each agent i updates its value at time t =
0, 1, 2, . . ., by averaging its own value and the values of all the other agents that are in its
-neighborhood at time t. To be more specific, given a profile x(t) at time t, define the




|Ni(t)| if j ∈ Ni(t),
0 else,
(5.2)
where Ni(t) is the set of agents in the -neighborhood of agent i, i.e.,
Ni(t) = {j ∈ [n] | ‖xi(t)− xj(t)‖ ≤ }.
5.1.2 Asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause Model
In the asynchronous case and at each time instant t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., only one agent, namely
i∗, updates its value to the average of its neighbors, while the others remain unchanged.
Selection of such an agent may be at random or based on some predefined order. In this
section, we assume that the agents are chosen uniformly at random to update their opinions.





|Ni∗ (t)| if i = i
∗, j ∈ Ni∗(t),
1 if i = j 6= i∗
0 else,
(5.3)
where here we have assumed that agent i∗ updates its opinion at time t.
Remark 6. In the heterogeneous Hegselmann-Krause model, each agent i is able to observe
only its i-neighborhood, and we have
Ni(t, i) = {j ∈ [n] | ‖xi(t)− xj(t)‖ ≤ i}.
Remark 7. There are other types of Hegselmann-Krause dynamics where the evolution of
dynamics is subject to noise or perturbation in the system or when the agents are truth
seekers in the sense that they are attracted by the truth by a positive amount [122, 123].
Moreover, the continuous version of the Hegselmann-Krause model, in which a continuum
of opinions are involved in the dynamics, has been considered in [124, 125, 126].
Remark 8. As can be seen from the above formulations, the Hegselmann-Krause dynamics
do not preserve the opinion average of the agents, and the evolution of the system strongly
depends on the history and the states, which may switch between different topologies. In fact,
it is not possible to determine the topology of the network at the current time, unless one
can observe the state of the system in the previous time step. Those facts make the analysis
of such dynamics much more complicated than analysis of the average-preserving dynamics
with fixed topology.
5.2 Synchronous Multidimensional Hegselmann-Krause Dynamics
In this section we consider the homogeneous synchronous Hegselmann-Krause model as was
introduced in (5.2). In fact, Figure 5.1 shows an example of evolution of such dynamics
in two dimensions when the agents are initially positioned around a unit circle. Similarly,
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Figure 5.2 illustrates another example of evolution of such dynamics in three dimensions
when some of the agents are initially positioned around a unit circle parallel to the X − Y
plane, and the rest of agents are positioned along the Z-axis using a sinc distribution. In
Figure 5.2, the red points in the left and right side represent the location of the agents after
10 and 50 iterations, respectively.
Figure 5.1: d = 2, n = 30. In the left figure  = 0.4, and we run the dynamics t = 50 times,
while in the right figure  = 0.55 and we run the dynamics for only t = 10 iterations.
In fact, one of the fundamental concepts and properties of the synchronous Hegselmann-
Krause dynamics that will be used extensively throughout this chapter is that the dynamics
admit a quadratic Lyapunov function [125, 127, 128].
We start our discussion by introducing some notation that will be used throughout this
section.
Definition 17. We say that a time instance t is a merging time for the dynamics if two
agents with different opinions move to the same place.
Based on that definition, we can see that if two agents i and j merge at time instant t,
then they will have the same opinion at time t+ 1 and onward, while their common opinion
may vary with time. Moreover, prior to the termination time of the dynamics, we cannot
have more than n merging times, since there are n agents in the model. In what follows
next, we define the notions of termination time and communication graphs.
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Figure 5.2: d = 3, n = 60 and  = 0.4. In the left and right figures the dynamics are run for
t = 10 and t = 50 iterations, respectively.
Definition 18. For every set of n ≥ 1 agents we define the termination time Tn of the
synchronous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics to be the maximum number of iterations before
steady state is reached over all the initial profiles.
Definition 19. Given an opinion profile at time t, we associate with that opinion profile
an undirected graph G(t) = ([n], E(t)) where the edge (i, j) ∈ E(t) if and only if i ∈ Nj(t).
We refer to such a graph as the communication graph or communication topology of the
dynamics at time step t. Furthermore, a connected component of the communication graph
is called δ-trivial for some δ > 0, if all the agents in that component lie within a distance of
at most δ from each other.
Remark 9. From Definition 19, it is not hard to see that for any δ < , a δ-trivial component
forms a complete component (clique) in the communication topology of the dynamics. In
particular, if there is such a δ-trivial component at some time t, then in the next time step,
all the agents in that component will merge to the same opinion.
In our earlier work [46], we were able to analyze the termination time of the Hegselmann-
Krause dynamics based on the number of isolated agents throughout the dynamics.
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Theorem 5.1. For the termination time Tn of the synchronous Hegselmann-Krause dynam-







where S0(t) denotes the set of agents (singletons) at time t who do not observe any opinions
other than those inside their neighborhood, i.e., i ∈ S0(t) if and only if Ni(t) = {xi(t)}.
Proof. A proof can be found in [46]. Q.E.D.
As a particular result of Theorem 5.1, if for a particular instance of the dynamics, the
agents maintain the connectivity throughout the dynamics, we conclude that Tn = O(n
6). In
fact, Theorem 5.1 gives us the idea that the termination time of the dynamics greatly depends
on the connectivity of the underlying graph and should be independent of the dimension
of the opinions (d). In this thesis, we resolve that problem and show that indeed, the
termination time is independent of the dimension. That answers one of the open questions
raised in [47] related to the existence of a tighter polynomial upper bound independent of the
dimension of the opinion space. For that purpose, we utilize a quadratic Lyapunov function
that was introduced earlier in [128].
Lemma 5.1. Let V (t) =
∑
i,j∈[n] min{‖xi(t)−xj(t)‖2, 2}. Then V is non-increasing along
the trajectory of the synchronous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics. In particular, we have




Proof. A proof can be found in [128]. Q.E.D.
In the following theorem, we provide a lower bound for the amount of decrease of the above
Lyapunov function as long as there exists one non--trivial component in the dynamics.
This is the first analytic result which connects the convergence speed of such dynamics to
the spectrum of the adjacency matrix of the connectivity graph in the Hegselmann-Krause
dynamics.
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Theorem 5.2. The termination time of the synchronous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics in
arbitrary finite dimensions is independent of the dimension and is bounded from above by
Tn ≤ n8 + n.
Proof. Let us assume that the opinion profile x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t))
′ is not an equi-
librium point of the dynamics and that time t is not a merging time. Therefore, without
loss of generality, we may assume that the communication graph at time t is connected with
a non--trivial component; otherwise, we can restrict ourselves to one of the non--trivial
components. (Note that such a non--trivial component exists, because of Remark 9 and
the fact that t is not a merging time.) By projecting each individual column of x(t) to the
consensus vector 1 we can write
x(t) =
[










, k = 1, . . . , d are column vectors of unit size that are orthogonal to the consensus
vector, i.e., 1′1
⊥(k)
= 0, and ck, c¯k, k = 1, . . . , d are coefficients of projection of the kth column
of x(t) on 1 and 1
⊥(k)
, respectively.







. Otherwise, we show that every two agents xi(t) and
xj(t) must lie within a distance of at most  from each other, which is in contrast with the



































(‖1⊥(k)‖2 + ‖1⊥(k)‖2) = 4 d∑
k=1
c¯2k ≤ 2, (5.5)
where the first equality is due to the decomposition given in (5.4) and the second equality
is valid since the vectors 1
⊥(k)







Next, we notice that x(t + 1) = A(t)x(t), where A(t) is the stochastic matrix defined in
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(5.2). Using (5.4) we can write,
x(t)− x(t+ 1) = (I − A(t))x(t) =
[
c¯1(I − A(t))1⊥(1)| . . . |c¯d(I − A(t))1⊥(d)
]
, (5.6)
























where in the last equality we have used (5.6). Let us assume that Q(t) = (I−A(t))′(I−A(t)).
It is not hard to see that Q(t) is a positive semidefinite matrix. Moreover, 0 is an eigenvalue of
Q with multiplicity one, corresponding to the eigenvector 1. To see that, let us assume that
there exists another vector v, such that Q(t)v = 0. Multiplying that equality from the left
by v′, we get ‖(I −A(t))v‖2 = 0, and hence (I −A(t))v = 0. Since by the Perron-Frobenius
lemma (Lemma 2.5), 1 is the only unit eigenvector of I − A(t) corresponding to eigenvalue
0, we conclude that v = α1 for some α ∈ R. In other words, 1 is the only unit eigenvector of
Q(t) corresponding to eigenvalue 0. Moreover, Q(t) is a symmetric real-valued matrix and,
hence, diagonalizable, where 1 is its only eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue 0. That
shows that the multiplicity of the eigenvalue 0 in Q(t) is exactly one.
Let us use λ2(Q(t)) to denote the second smallest eigenvalue of Q(t). By the above
argument, it must be strictly positive. Using the Courant-Fischer lemma (Lemma 2.7), we
get λ2(Q(t)) = min‖y‖=1,y⊥1 y′Q(t)y. Now for every k = 1, . . . , d, we can write







y′Q(t)y = λ2(Q(t)), (5.8)
where the inequality holds, since 1′1
⊥(k)














Henceforth, we bound λ2(Q(t)) from below based on a function of n. For that purpose,
let us assume that D(t) = diag
(
1 + d1(t), 1 + d2(t), . . . , 1 + dn(t)
)
, i.e., D(t) is a diagonal
matrix with Dkk(t) = 1 + dk(t), k ∈ [n]. Moreover, let L(t) denote the Laplacian matrix of
the communication graph at time step t. By entrywise comparison of both sides, it is not
hard to see that I − A(t) = D(t)−1L(t). Now we can write
λ2(Q(t)) = λ2
(
(D(t)−1L(t))′(D(t)−1L(t))) = λ2 (L(t)D(t)−2L(t)) , (5.10)
where the last equality is due to the fact that L(t) and D(t) are both symmetric matrices.
Next, using the same argument as above, we notice that since L(t)D(t)−2L(t) is a symmetric
and real-valued matrix, it is diagonalizable, and its zero eigenvalue corresponding to eigen-
vector 1 has multiplicity one. To see that, let us assume that there is another vector u such
that L(t)D(t)−2L(t)u = 0; then, we must have








which results in L(t)u = 0, or, equivalently, u is a scalar multiple of the consensus vector 1.

























where the last equality is due to the fact that L is diagonalizable (it is a symmetric and
real-valued matrix) with an eigenvalue 0 of multiplicity 1. Substituting (5.11) in (5.10) we
get λ2(Q(t)) ≥ 1n2λ22
(L(t)). Now, using Cheeger’s inequality (Lemma 2.6) and since L(t) is
the Laplacian of a connected graph, we can bound λ2
(L(t)) from below by 2
n2
, which is due
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to the isoperimetric number of the communication graph for the minimum cut set. Putting







Finally, combining (5.12) with (5.9), we conclude that the amount of decrease in the quadratic
Lyapunov function if there is a non--trivial component is at least 
2
n6
. In other words, if t
is not a merging time, we have V (t) − V (t + 1) ≥ 2
n6
. Since by definition V (·) is always a
nonnegative quantity with V (0) ≤ 2n2 and the number of merging times can be at most n,
we conclude that the termination time is bounded from above by n8 + n. Q.E.D.
Remark 10. The sum of the terms
∑n
`=1 ‖x`(t) − x`(t + 1)‖2 which appear in (5.7) is a
measure of decrease for the Lyapunov function given for the Hegselmann-Krause dynamics.
This quantity, which is known as kinetic-s-energy , is an important measure which may
arise in analysis of various multi-agent systems, see, e. g., [48]. In fact, the above proof pro-
vides an analytic tool to connect the kinetic-s-energy of a multi-agent system to the spectral
gap of its underlying dynamics.
5.3 Asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause Dynamics
In this section, we consider the asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics as introduced
in Section 5.1. We first notice that such dynamics do not necessarily reach their steady
state in finite time. The simplest case one can consider is when there are only two agents
on the real line, separated by a distance less than the confidence bound . In such a case,
no matter what the order of the updating process, the agents will never arrive at the same
opinion or disappear from each other’s neighborhood. The two agents will get closer and
closer and asymptotically converge to some steady state. That justifies asymptotic analysis
of the asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics, which we will consider in this section.
In fact, one can easily show that unless the dynamics start from a steady state, it will
never reach its steady state in finite time for any asynchronous updating scheme. The
reason is that unless the dynamics start from a steady state, at any time instant t, there
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are at least two agents i and j who are connected (j ∈ Ni(t)), and updating any of them
does not bring them to the same opinion. Furthermore, unlike the synchronous case in one
dimension, where the order of agents’ opinions is preserved throughout the dynamics, in the
asynchronous case, the order of the agents’ opinions may or may not change, depending on
the updating scheme. In this section, we consider a uniformly randomized updating scheme
for the agents and analyze the asymptotic convergence of such dynamics to their steady
state. But before we start, we need the following two definitions.
Definition 20. We call an updating process a uniform updating scheme for the asynchronous
Hegselmann-Krause mode if at each time instant t = 0, 1, . . ., only one agent is chosen
independently and with probability 1
n
from the set of all agents [n] and updates its opinion.
Definition 21. Given a δ > 0, we say that an opinion profile x(t) is a δ-equilibrium if the
set of agents partition into different sets (clusters) {C1, C2, . . . , Cm} for some m ∈ N such
that dist
(
conv(Ci), conv(Cj)) > ,∀i 6= j and diam(conv(Ck)) < δ,∀k = 1 . . .m.
In fact, Definition 21 simply states that a profile x(t) is a δ-equilibrium if the opinions of
agents at time t form some small groups of diameter at most δ that are far from each other
by a distance of at least . Next, we introduce a network formation game that can explain
the behavior of the agents in asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics.
5.3.1 Network Formation Game
Let us consider a set of n road constructors (players) in Rd who are funded by the government
to construct roads. The budget that the government allocates to each player at the beginning
is a fixed amount and is equal to $(n − 1)2 ($2 support for each possible road that one






be constructed by the players. To that end and in order to create an incentive for players
to build as many roads as they can, the government will punish each player by $2 if he or
she decides not to construct a road (i.e., the government will take that player’s supporting
$2 back). On the other hand, each player has the ability to construct roads only within an
2-neighborhood of himself or herself. (One can assume that the players do not take risks
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and do not want to spend money beyond the support they received from the government per
road.) In such a game, players act myopically, trying to build roads with those who are most
beneficial to them. If two players who are located at x, y ∈ Rd build a road together, the cost
to them is naturally proportional to their distance from each other and is equal to ‖x− y‖2.
(The farther the players are from each other, the more costly to make a road.) Therefore,
in that setting, the payoff for the ith player, i ∈ [n], at location xi can be formulated as
Ui(xi, x−i) = (n− 1)2 −
n∑
j=1
min{‖xi − xj‖2, 2}, (5.13)
where x−i denotes the actions of all players except the ith one. In such a game, we assume
that agents act rationally and are able to compute and play their best response at time steps
t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Based on the above scenario, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. The sequence of the players’ best responses in the network formation game
under some specific updating scheme is equivalent to the evolution of the asynchronous
Hegselmann-Krause dynamics under the same updating scheme.
Proof. Let us assume that at time step t the ith agent updates his location in order to increase
his payoff. If the current locations of the players are denoted by x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t), the
position of agent i at the next time step would be













That establishes the equivalence between the best response dynamics and the updating
process in the asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause model. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5.3. An action profile (x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n) is a Nash equilibrium of the network
formation game if and only if it is a steady state of the asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause
dynamics.
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Proof. Given an arbitrary Nash equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n), we show that it is a steady state
of the asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics by showing that for all i, j ∈ [n] we either
have x∗i = x
∗
j , or ‖x∗i − x∗j‖ > . To show this by contradiction, let us assume that there are
two players at locations x∗p 6= x∗q such that ‖x∗p−x∗q‖ ≤ . Let L = {x∗p, x∗q, x∗`1 , . . . , x∗`s} denote
the set of all the players’ actions at this equilibrium point which are in the same connected
component as x∗p and x
∗
q in the communication graph. Denoting one of the extreme points
of conv(L) by x∗` and using Lemma 5.2, it is not hard to see that player `’s action is not






6= x∗` , where N∗` = {j : ‖x∗j − x∗`‖ ≤ }. This is in contrast
with the assumption of (x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n) being a Nash equilibrium. To show that every steady
state of the asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics is a Nash equilibrium of the network
formation game is quite straightforward. Q.E.D.
Next we show that the above network formation game is, indeed, a potential game, with
the sum of the utilities as a potential function. A further result (Corollary 5.1) shows directly
that it is strategically equivalent to a team problem.
Theorem 5.4. The network formation game is a potential game with a potential function
of U(x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
∑n
i=1 Ui(xi, x−i). In particular, we have
U(xi, x−i)− U(x′i, x−i) ≤ −2|Ni|‖xi − x′i‖2,






j∈Ni xj, and x−i denotes the actions of all players except the ith one.
Proof. Let Ni and N′i denote the set of neighbors of player i before and after deviating,
respectively. By definition of the payoff function of players (5.13), we can write




Uj(xi, x−i)− Uj(x′i, x−i)
)




















where the first equality is due to the fact that the utility of the players who do not observe
xi or x
′
i does not change.
Next, we compute each of the summands in the above expression. Note that only the
action of player i changes from xi to x
′
i, while all others’ actions remain unchanged (Figure
5.3). We can write
Uj(xi, x−i)− Uj(x′i, x−i) = ‖xj − x′i‖2 − ‖xj − xi‖2, j ∈ Ni ∩ N′i
Uj(xi, x−i)− Uj(x′i, x−i) = 2 − ‖xj − xi‖2, j ∈ Ni \ Ni ∩ N′i
Uj(xi, x−i)− Uj(x′i, x−i) = ‖xj − x′i‖2 − 2, j ∈ N′i \ Ni ∩N′i. (5.15)
Figure 5.3: Deviation of the ith player by updating to his best response x′i.
The reason for the first equality in (5.15) is that after the ith player deviates, every agent
in j ∈ Ni∩N′i still holds his connection with i, and hence, by the definition of the payoff
function (5.13), his payoff is subjected to a change of ‖xj−x′i‖2−‖xj−xi‖2. (Note that all
players except the ith one are kept fixed.) Similarly, every player j ∈ Ni \ Ni∩N′i stays
connected to xi while disconnecting his link with the ith player after i’s deviation (since
agent i gets far from him by moving from xi to x
′
i, and hence they both prefer to stop
building the road and each pay $2 to the government). Therefore, the amount of change in
the jth player’s payoff is equal to 2−‖xj−xi‖2. In a similar way, one can observe that the
third equality in (5.15) holds. By the same line of argument and because of symmetry, one
can easily show that the amount of change in the ith player’s payoff is equal to the sum of
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all the terms in (5.15) over j ∈ Ni ∪ N′i. In fact, we can write
Ui(xi, x−i)− Ui(x′i, x−i) =
∑
j∈Ni∩N′i










(‖xj − x′i‖2 − 2)











‖xj − x′i‖2 −
∑
j∈N′i\Ni∩N′i
‖xj − x′i‖2 +
∑
j∈N′i







‖xj − x′i‖2 −
∑
j∈Ni
‖xj − xi‖2, (5.16)
where in the last inequality we have used the facts that








(Note that ‖xj − x′i‖2 ≥ 2, if j ∈ Ni \ Ni ∩ N′i, and ‖xj − x′i‖2 ≤ 2, if j ∈ N′i \ Ni ∩ N′i.)
Substituting (5.15) and (5.16) in (5.14) and using (5.16), we get








= −2|Ni|‖xi − x′i‖2,




j∈Ni xj because player i deviates
to his best place (Lemma 5.2). Q.E.D.
Corollary 5.1. The network formation game is strategically equivalent to a team problem.
Proof. For any arbitrary player i ∈ [n], let us define:
β(x−i) = (n− 1)(n− 2)2 −
∑
r,s∈[n]\{i}
min{‖xr − xs‖2, 2}.
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Note that β(x−i) depends on the actions of all the players except the ith player. By definition
of U(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑n
k=1 Uk(xk, x−k), we can write
2Ui(xi, x−i) + β(x−i) = U(x1, x2, . . . , xn).
This shows that the network formation game is essentially a team problem, in the sense that
every Nash equilibrium of the game is a person-by-person optimal solution for the team, and
vice versa. More details on such strategic equivalence can be found in [110]. Q.E.D.
Now we are ready to provide an upper bound on the expected number of steps until the
asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics with a uniform updating scheme reach their
δ-equilibrium.
Theorem 5.5. The expected number of steps until the agents in the asynchronous Hegselmann-
Krause dynamics with a uniform updating schedule reach a δ-equilibrium is bounded from
above by 2n9( 
δ
)2.
Proof. We evaluate the expected increase of the potential function given in Theorem 5.4.
Since each player is chosen independently and with probability 1
n
, we have
















‖xi(t)− xi(t+ 1)‖2, (5.17)
where in the first inequality we have used the result of Theorem 5.4.
Now using the result of Theorem 5.1 and by the same argument as in derivation of (5.5),
we know that as long as there is a nontrivial δ component, we must have
∑d






i=1 ‖xi(t) − xi(t + 1)‖2 ≥ δ
2
n6
. Moreover, since U(τ) < n22, we conclude that
the expected number of times that nontrivial components of a diameter larger than δ > 0




In fact, in the case of scalar asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics, one could come
up with a sharper bound which we state in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.6. The expected number of steps until the scalar asynchronous Hegselmann-
Krause dynamics reach an 
n
-equilibrium is bounded from above by n5+2 logn(n+1) + n.
Proof. Consider a particular time instant t, and let x1(t) = mink∈[n] xk(t) and xm(t) =
maxk∈N1(t) xk(t). Also, without loss of generality, let us assume that x1(t) = 0. It is clear
that if xm(t) >

nα
and agent 1 updates, then we will have x1(t + 1) >

n1+α
, where α is a
number to be determined later. In this case, the expected potential function will increase
by at least 2
n
‖x1(t)− x1(t+ 1)‖2 ≥ 22n3+2α . Otherwise, there is no other agent in the interval
[ 
nα
, ]. Now we consider two cases (Figure 5.4):
• Agent xm(t) has a neighbor in the interval (, xm(t) + ]. Assuming that agent m
updates, we will have xm(t+ 1) ≥ xm(t)+n , and hence,
‖xm(t+ 1)− xm(t)‖2 ≥ ‖ 
n





Therefore, in this case and using (5.17), the amount of increase in the expected poten-






• Agent xm(t) does not have any neighbor in the interval (, xm(t) + ]. We note that all
the agents in the interval [0, xm(t)] form a cluster that is separated from other agents
by a distance of at least . Noting that two separate clusters of nodes on a real line will
stay apart from each other in the rest of the dynamics, we can decompose the original
dynamics into two groups and analyze each of them separately.








2, and we can see that either
we have an increase of size 2
2
n3+2 logn(n+1)
in the expected potential function, or the dynamics




and another part. Since the expected
potential function cannot increase more than n5+2 logn(n+1) number of steps (U(·) ≤ n22)
and we cannot have more than n clustering decomposition, the expected number of steps
until the dynamics decompose to clusters whose size is at most 
n
is bounded from above by
n5+2 logn(n+1) + n. Q.E.D.
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Figure 5.4: Illustration of two different cases in the proof of Lemma 5.6.
Remark 11. From the above lemma, after the expected number of n5+2 logn(n+1) + n ≈ n7,
every agent lies within a cluster of diameter at most 
n
, and those always are separated from
each other by a distance of at least . Therefore, each agent in a cluster can observe the
others, and henceforth, the diameter of the convex hull of each of the clusters shrinks very
fast.
In the following, we provide a bound on the expected number of switching topologies
during the evolution of the asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause process.
Theorem 5.7. The expected number of switching topologies of the asynchronous Hegselmann-
Krause dynamics with a uniform updating scheme is bounded from above by 16n9.
Proof. We show that switching topologies substantially increase the expected value of the
potential function. To see that, first assume that the opinion profile at time t − 1, i.e.,
x(t − 1), is 
2
-trivial, and that updating some agent i at this time causes a switch in the
topology of the network. We claim that the next profile, i.e., x(t), is not 
2
-trivial. Note that
since there is a switch at time t and that within each of the 
2
-trivial components each agent
is able to observe the others, the convex hull of such a component shrinks even further after
the updating of any agent in the component. Therefore, the switches must occur between
the 
2
-trivial components and not within them.
Now, let us assume that i ∈ Cp (Cp denotes an 2 -trivial component) and that updating
agent i at time t− 1 makes him visible to another agent j in a different 
2
-trivial component
Cq (Figure 5.5). Since Cp is an

2
-trivial component and the agents in Cp are all the agents
who are visible to agent i at time t− 1, the movement of agent i from xi(t− 1) to xi(t) can
be at most 
2




distance at time t − 1 was larger than . That means that such a switching causes i and j
to make a link with a distance of at least 
2
in the profile x(t).
Figure 5.5: Switching topology at time t from an 
2
-trivial profile x(t− 1).
Now we partition all the possible switching times based on the profile at the previous time
instant:
• Time t is a switching time, and x(t−1) is an 
2
-trivial profile. In this case and based on
the above argument, x(t) is not an 
2
-trivial profile, and using the same argument as in
relation (5.5) and in view of (5.9) and (5.12), we get
∑n




• Time t is a switching time, and x(t − 1) is not an 
2
-trivial profile. In this case and
within a non- 
2
-trivial component, using the same argument as in the first case, we get∑n




Therefore, if t is a switching time, using (5.17) we conclude that there is an increase of
2
16n6
at either time t − 1 or t in the expected potential function. In other words, if t is a
switching time, using (5.17) we can write








Now, given an arbitrary initial profile x(0), let us use pt to denote the probability of
occurrence of a switching at time t = 1, 2, . . .. Therefore, the amount of increase in the





(since we may count each instant twice).
On the other hand, since U(τ) ≤ n22, ∀τ = 1, 2, . . ., we conclude that ∑∞t=0 pt. But ∑∞t=0 pt
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is exactly equal to the expected number of switching topologies. Therefore, the expected
number of switching topologies is bounded from above by 16n9. Q.E.D.
5.4 Heterogeneous Hegselmann-Krause Dynamics
Once again we consider the Hegselmann-Krause model (5.2), but this time we assume that
each agent i has his or her own bound of confidence i, which could be different from the
others. Therefore, Ni(x(t)) = {1 ≤ j ≤ n : ‖xi(t)− xj(t)‖ ≤ i} and A(t), t ≥ 0 will change
correspondingly. That causes an asymmetry for the interactions among the agents. In other
words, there is a possibility that one agent xi(t) observes agent xj(t) but not vice versa. In
fact, we are interested in studying the convergence behavior of such dynamics. In contrast
with the homogeneous Hegselmann-Krause model, which reaches its steady state after finite
time, the following example shows that in the heterogeneous case, steady state may not be
reached in finite time.
Example 3. Consider three agents x1, x2, x3 that are located at −1, 13 , 1, respectively, at the
initial time t = 0. Also, let us assume 1 =
1
2
, 2 = 2, 3 =
1
2
. As can be seen, agent x2







, and since the confidence bounds of x1 and x3 are small, they can see no one
except themselves, and hence they will remain in their own locations. Therefore, at time
t = 1, we will have x1(1) = −1, x2(1) = 132 , x3(1) = 1. With the same line of argument,
it is not hard to see that at any time instant t = 1, 2, . . . the position of agents will be
x1(t) = −1, x2(t) = 13t+1 , x3(t) = 1. That shows that the dynamics will converge to their
steady state (−1, 0, 1), but not in finite time.
In the above example, one of the main reasons that the convergence was not achieved in
finite time was that there were two agents who did not have interaction with others in the
dynamics and remained fixed without any movement forever. We refer to such agents as
silent agents. In the next theorem, we show that if the amount of time an agent sleeps (is
inactive) is finite, then we will have finite time convergence of the dynamics to their steady
state. We note that similar types of such asynchronous analysis under different scenarios
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and settings can be found in [129, 130, 131].
Theorem 5.8. Consider the heterogeneous Hegselmann-Krause model, where the ith agent
i ∈ [n] has a confidence bound of i > 0. Also, assume that there is an integer T ∗ such that
no agent is silent for a period of time longer than T ∗. Then, the dynamics will converge to
their steady state in finite time.
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on the number of agents. For n = 1 the result is
obvious, and the initial time is the termination time. Let us assume that the result holds for
each k ≤ n, and now suppose that we have n+1 agents with different confidence bounds. We
show that there is a finite time T such that the left product of every T consecutive matrices
A(t), t ≥ 0 of the dynamics will generate a matrix with at least one positive column.
Starting from agent 1, let us define
S(t) = {i ∈ [n+ 1]|(A(t)A(t− 1) . . . A(0))i1 > 0},
and Sc(t) = [n+ 1] \ S(t) to be its complement. Since each agent can see itself at each time
instant, if i ∈ S(t) for some time t, then it will be in S(t′) for all t′ ≥ t. In other words,
we have S(0) ⊆ S(1) ⊆ S(2) ⊆ . . .. Now we claim that there must be a finite time T such
that S(T ) = [n + 1]. Otherwise, let us assume that there exists a time instant t0 such that
S(t0) = S(t), ∀t > t0. By the definition of S(t), that means that for t > t0, none of the
agents in Sc(t) can see any agent in S(t) (although it may happen that some agents in S(t)
are still able to see some of the agents in Sc(t)). That means that the agents in the set
Sc(t0) constitute a group of agents whose opinions in the future of the dynamics t ≥ t0 will
not be influenced by any other agent in S(t0). On the other hand, since |Sc(t0)| ≤ n (note
that S(0) = {1}), according to the induction assumption, the agents in Sc(t0) will reach
their steady state after some finite time Tn, where Tn denotes the maximum number of
steps for n agents to reach their steady state, which, by induction assumption, is considered
to be a finite number. However, under the hypothesis of the Theorem, after reaching the
steady state, these agents cannot remain silent for more than T ∗ more steps. Therefore,
after a finite time T ∗ + Tn, at least one more agent will be added to the set S(t0), and the
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cardinality of S(t0) will increase by at least 1. Since the total number of agents is n + 1,
T := (n + 1)(T ∗ + Tn) steps are enough to guarantee S(T ) = [n + 1]. That shows that
A(T ) . . . A(1)A(0) will be a matrix in which the first column will be strictly positive.
On the other hand, since all the positive entries of those matrices are bounded from below
by min+(A(t)) ≥ 1
n+1
, the minimum positive entry of the left product of every T consecutive
such matrices will be larger than ( 1
n+1
)T . Using Lemma 2.9, we can see that after every T
steps, the diameter of the convex hull of the agents’ opinions will shrink by a factor of at
least 1 − ( 1
n+1
)T . Therefore, there exists a finite time Tn+1 < ∞ such that the diameter
of the convex hull of the agents’ opinions at time Tn+1 is smaller than mini∈[n+1] i. That
means that after Tn+1 steps, every agent is able to observe the others in his or her own
neighborhood, and in the next step, the dynamics reach a steady state. Q.E.D.
In fact, the above theorem asserts that if there exists an external input which creates
an incentive for the agents to interact with someone else after some period of time, then
the circulation of information in the society will be sufficient to guarantee the finite time
formation of the opinions.
5.5 Discussion
Inspired by the results given in Section 5.3, we will now discuss some of the possible directions
that could be pursued to analyze the asynchronous heterogeneous Hegselmann-Krause model
in more detail. In fact, because of the different confidence bounds, the symmetry from
which we benefit in the homogeneous case no longer holds. Therefore, the communication
topology in this case can be interpreted as a digraph (directed graph) instead of an undirected
graph. In this case one way of showing the asymptotic convergence of the heterogeneous
Hegselmann-Krause dynamics to a steady state is to design a proper utility function for each
player such that the resulting network formation game changes to a team problem, such
that each player’s update contributes an increase (decrease) to a global function toward an
equilibrium.
A natural idea here is to define the utilities of the players based on functions of their
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own confidence bounds and their relative distances from others such that their best response
dynamics coincide with the evolution of the asynchronous heterogeneous Hegselmann-Krause
dynamics. For example, one may define the utility of the ith player to be Ui(t) = (n−1)2i −∑n
j=1 min{(xi(t) − xj(t))2, 2i }, where i denotes the confidence bound of the ith agent and
x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t)) denotes the opinion profile at time instant t. It turns out
that such utility functions do not make the network formation game a potential game or
lead to a strategically equivalent team problem. However, one can consider 15 different
possibilities for creation or breaking of edges among agents, assuming that only one agent
updates (deviates) to a new position. In that case, one can think of a proper weighting
on the edges in order to distinguish one-sided edges from symmetric (two-sided) edges. For
example, if there is a one-sided edge from player i to player j, one can rescale the utility
of agent i by a fraction of his own confidence bound and his neighbors’ in order to adjust
the influence of other players’ actions on his own utility function. At this point, we are
not aware of any such utility functions, and we leave the full analysis of the heterogeneous
Hegselmann-Krause dynamics as a direction for future research.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the termination time of the Hegselmann-Krause dynamics in
finite dimensions and under various settings: synchronous, asynchronous, homogeneous,
and heterogeneous. We provided a polynomial upper bound for the termination time of the
synchronous homogeneous model independent of the dimension of the ambient space. We
showed that the asynchronous Hegselmann-Krause model can be formulated as a sequence
of best response dynamics of a potential game. Furthermore, we provided an upper bound
for the expected number of steps until the dynamics reach their δ-equilibrium. In particular,
we bounded the expected number of switchings in the topology of the networks during the
evolution of the system. We considered the heterogeneous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics,
and we obtained a necessary condition for finite time convergence of such dynamics. Finally,
we discussed some of the possible future directions that could be pursued to enable analysis





In this chapter we introduce the class of capacitated selfish replication games with binary
preferences as was introduced in [67]; for simplicity we will refer to them as CSR games.
Typically, CSR games are defined in terms of a set of available resources for each player,
where the players are allowed to communicate through an undirected communication graph.
Such a communication graph identifies the access cost among the players, and the goal for
each player is to satisfy his/her customers’ needs with minimum cost. Ideally, and in order
to avoid any additional cost, each player only wants to use his/her own set of resources.
However, due to capacity limitations, the players cannot store and have immediate access
to all the resources they may need, and hence, they will have to search in the network and
borrow some of the resources which are not available in their own caches from others in order
to meet their customers’ demands, and such a transaction incurs cost. In the following we
first provide a formal definition of CSR games.
6.1 CSR Game Model
We start with a set of [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} nodes (players) which are connected by an undi-
rected graph G = ([n], E). We denote the set of all resources by O = {o1, o2, . . . , ok}. For
simplicity, but without much loss of generality, we assume that each node can hold only one
resource in its cache. All the results can in fact be extended quite readily to CSR games
with different capacities (see later Remark 13). Moreover, we assume that each node has
access to all the resources. For a particular allocation P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn), we define the
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dG(i, σi(P, o)), (6.1)
where σi(P, o) is i’s nearest node holding o in P . Further, given an allocation profile P , we
define the radius of agent i, denoted by ri(P ), to be the distance between node i and the
nearest node other than her holding the same resource as i, i.e., ri(P ) = minj 6=i,Pj=Pi dG(i, j).
If there exists no such a node, we simply define ri(P ) = D, where D is the diameter of the
network. We suppress the dependence of ri(P ) on P whenever there is no ambiguity. In
Figure 6.1 we have illustrated the CSR game for n = 11 players and |O| = 3 resources. In
particular, the associated costs and radii for two players i = 1, 8 for some allocation profile
P have been given.
Figure 6.1: CSR game with n = 11 players and O = {o1, o2, o3} resources.
Remark 12. If some resource o is missing in an allocation profile P , we define the cost of
each player for that specific resource to be dG(i, σi(P, o)) = D + 1,∀i ∈ [n]. Therefore, for
n ≥ |O|, this incentivizes at least one of the players to allocate the missing resources in the
network. In the case where n < |O|, all the players will allocate different resources and the
game becomes trivial; hence, we can simply assume that n ≥ |O|.
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Remark 13. Actually all the results and proofs in this chapter can be carried over to games
with varying capacities. This can be done by constructing a new network which transfers
games with different cache sizes to one with unit size caches; see section 6.10.
Remark 14. Given two allocation profiles P and P˜ , which only differ in the ith coordinate,
using (6.1) and the definition of radius, one can easily see that Ci(P )−Ci(P˜ ) = ri(P˜ )−ri(P ).
This establishes an equivalence between decrease in cost and increase in radius for player i,
when the actions of the remaining players are fixed.
In this chapter, one of our goals is to study the convergence of some particular updating
dynamics to NE of the CSR game. Toward that end, we let Pi(t) be the allocated resource
for node i at some generic time t = 1, 2, . . ., and P (t) = (P1(t), P2(t), . . . , Pn(t)) be the
allocation vector at that time. We suppress the dependence on time t whenever there is
no ambiguity. Note that there is an important difference between an equilibrium and the
dynamics that lead to that equilibrium. In fact, at an equilibrium each node has only one
resource such that the entire profile satisfies the inequalities in Definition 2. But in the
process of finding an equilibrium, players frequently replace their resources with others from
O = {o1, . . . , ok} until there is no incentive for any individual to deviate. Note that when a
player swaps its resource by another one at some time t, it does not restrict the actions of the
other players, nor the total set of resources accessible to others. Another useful way to think
about this process is to consider resources as different colors such that each node chooses a
color and incurs some cost depending on the colors of the other nodes. Therefore, at every
stage one player changes his color in order to minimize its own cost, and this continues until
no other player wants to deviate.
In our analysis of the dynamics, we assume that updates take place one at a time, and
no two updates take place simultaneously. In fact, it is not hard to see that a simultaneous
update may result in some cyclic behavior in the state of the game. As an example, given two
players which are connected by an edge, and two possible resources {o1, o2}, let us assume
that at the beginning both players have resource o1 in their own cache. Then if we allow the
players to update simultaneously, in the next time step both of them will choose o2. Hence,
such simultaneous updates will never reach to an NE, i.e., the situation where one node has
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resource o1 and the other one has resource o2.
6.2 Global Optimality vs Pure Nash Equilibrium Over Trees
In this section we study the connection between global optimal allocation and pure Nash
equilibrium points of the CSR game when the underlying network is restricted to be a tree.
Toward this goal, we first consider the following two definitions.
Definition 22. We say that an allocation profile P o = (P o1 , . . . , P
o
n) is an optimal allocation
for the CSR game if P o ∈ argminP∈P
∑n
i=1Ci(P ), where P denotes the collection of all the
possible allocations.
Definition 23. Given an undirected network G, and an arbitrary node i, we let τ iG ∈ N be
such that
|BG(i, τ iG − 1)| < |O| ≤ |BG(i, τ iG)|.
In other words, τ iG is the smallest positive integer such that a graphical ball of radius τ
i
G around
node i contains at least |O| nodes. For simplicity and whenever there is no ambiguity, we
suppress the subscripts G from the notations.
The following theorem states that when the underlying network has a tree structure, then
every globally optimal allocation is an NE for the CSR game.
Theorem 6.1. Assume that the network in the CSR game is a tree T of n nodes. Then every
optimal allocation P o must be an NE. Furthermore, there is an algorithm which reaches an
optimal allocation in only n steps.
Proof. Let us start from an arbitrary node of T as a root and label it by 1. We define `th
level to be the set of all nodes in T which are at distance ` from node 1. At the ith step of
the algorithm, we choose an agent at the highest level who has not been chosen before; we
label it by i, and let her allocate one resource based on her best response with respect to all
the agents who have updated before, i.e., 1, 2, . . . , i− 1. Ties are broken arbitrarily.
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Proof of the Claim: We establish the claim by induction on the number of nodes. For
n = |O| the claim trivially holds, since the algorithm returns a profile wherein every resource
appears exactly once. Such a profile is clearly an optimal allocation which satisfies the claim.
Assuming that the above claim holds for the outcome of the algorithm over all trees of n
nodes, let Tn+1 be a tree of n + 1 nodes. Based on the updating scheme, node n + 1 is the
last node that acts, which immediately implies that n + 1 must be a leaf in the last level
(with respect to the reference node 1) of the tree Tn+1. Removing this node and its adjacent
edge from Tn+1, the remaining part is a tree of n nodes Tn = Tn+1 \ {n + 1}. Now let us
denote the profile obtained at the end of the algorithm over Tn+1 by (P1, P2, . . . , Pn, Pn+1).
Because of the updating rule, it is clear that the first n steps of the algorithm over Tn+1
exactly coincide with those given that we were running the algorithm over Tn. Therefore, by
the induction hypothesis (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) is an optimal allocation for Tn such that for i ∈ [n]










Next we show that when node n + 1 plays its best response Pn+1 with respect to the
allocated resources (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) on Tn, the claim still holds. To see this, let us consider an
arbitrary i ∈ [n]. Clearly if d
Tn+1
























− 1) are all
different. Now we consider two cases:
Case I: If d
Tn+1
(i, n + 1) ≤ τ i
Tn




− 1) will be a subset of the closest
|O|−1 vertices to node n+1 except itself (Figure 6.2, left side). Therefore, when node n+1










− 1)| ≤ |O| − 1, the chosen resource by player n + 1, i.e., Pn+1,

















− 1)∪ {n+ 1} are different, after
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contain all the resources. Therefore overall we have shown that in Case I when player n+ 1
updates, the conditions of the claim still hold for players i and n+ 1.
Figure 6.2: Illustration of two different cases in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Case II: If d
Tn+1
(i, n+1) = τ i
Tn






(i, n+1) (Figure 6.2, right
































) contains all the resources. On the other hand, to show that the claim
conditions hold for player n + 1, let j be the closest node to n + 1. Using the induction
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hypothesis node j in Tn also satisfies the conditions of the claim. Now if τ
j
Tn
≥ 2, then since
1 = d
Tn+1
(j, n + 1) ≤ τ j
Tn
− 1 = 1, using Case I we conclude that B
Tn+1
(n + 1, τn+1
Tn+1
− 1)
includes only different resources while B
Tn+1
(n + 1, τn+1
Tn+1
) contains all the resources. But if
τ j
Tn
= 1, we have τn+1
Tn
≤ 2, and hence, the resource that node n + 1 updates to is different
from j, i.e., Pj 6= Pn+1. Since BTn+1 (n+ 1, τn+1Tn+1 − 1) ⊆ {Pj, Pn+1}, it only contains different
resources, while B
Tn+1
(n + 1, τn+1
Tn+1
) contains all the resources (note that all the resources
appear at least once in B
Tn
(j, 1) and n+ 1 is adjacent to node j). This again shows that in
Case II when player n + 1 updates, the conditions of the claim still hold for players i and
n+ 1. This completes the induction process.










means that at the end of the algorithm the cost of each player equals its minimum possible.
This immediately implies that the final allocation profile has minimum total cost such that
no player can decrease his own cost even further; hence, it must be an NE. Q.E.D.
6.3 Pure Nash Equilibrium Over General Networks
As we saw in the previous section, when the underlying network is a tree, the CSR game
has a pure Nash equilibrium which can be obtained in linear time. It turns out a pure Nash
equilibrium always exists in the CSR game independent of the network structure. However,
finding such an equilibrium in “efficient time” over general networks can be much more
complicated, which is the subject of the rest of this chapter. In fact, it was first shown in
[67] that the CSR game has an associated ordinal potential function, and hence, it has at
least one pure NE. In the following and for the sake of completeness we state and prove a
slightly different version of an ordinal potential function for CSR game which will be more
beneficial to establish our later results. Toward this end, and for a given profile of allocations
P (t) = (P1(t), . . . , Pn(t)) at time t, we let nr(t) be the number of players whose radii are
r, for r = 1, 2, . . . , D. In fact, the following theorem states that the vector n(t) defined by
n(t) := (n1(t), n2(t), . . . , nD(t)) will decrease lexicographically following every sequence of
better responses of the players. More precisely, [132]:
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Theorem 6.2. In the CSR game with binary preferences, assume that at time step t an
agent i whose radius is r updates her resource based on her best response that minimizes
(6.1). Then n(t + 1) =
(




Proof. Let Nr(t) be the set of all agents at time t whose radius is r, and assume that agent i
wants to deviate at time t and Pi(t) = {a}. Moreover, let us assume that agent i will deviate
to some {b} at the next time step in order to increase her radius, that is Pi(t + 1) = {b}.
Without any loss of generality, we may assume i ∈ Nr(t) for some r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D−1}. After
updating, agent i will leave the set Nr(t) to another set Nr′(t+ 1) at the next time step by
increasing her radius to some r′ > r. Now we show that Nk(t) = Nk(t+1),∀k = 1, . . . , r−1,
and Nr(t + 1) ≤ Nr(t) − 1. Toward this aim, first let us assume that j ∈ Nk(t) for some
1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1. This means that the radius of j which we denote by rj(t) is less than r. We
consider three cases:
• Pj(t) /∈ {a, b}: In this case updating i does not affect the radius of j and agent j will
remain in her own set at the next time step, i.e. j ∈ Nk(t+ 1).
• Pj(t) = {a}: In this case since rj(t) = k < r, then the radius of j is determined by
another agent except i. Therefore updating i from {a} to {b} does not affect the radius
of j and agent j will remain in her own set, i.e. j ∈ Nk(t+ 1).
• Pj(t) = {b}: In this case we can similarly argue that the radius of agent j is determined
by another agent who has some radius k < r. But since after updating i from {a} to
{b}, agent i’s radius will increase to r′ > r, and since Pj(t) = {b}, we conclude that
the graphical distance between j and i must be at least r′. Since we already know
k < r < r′, this shows that updating i cannot affect the radius of j, i.e. j ∈ Nk(t+ 1).
From all the above cases we observe that if the radius of an agent is less than r before
updating agent i, then it will remain the same at the next time step, i.e. Nk(t + 1) ⊆
Nk(t), 1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1. Next we show that if the radius of an agent ` is greater than r, i.e.
` ∈ Ns(t) for some s > r, then after updating i, it cannot reduce to something less than or
equal to r at the next time step. Again, we consider three cases:
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• P`(t) /∈ {a, b}: In this case updating i does not affect the radius of ` and thus ` will
remain in her own set at the next time step, i.e. ` ∈ Ns(t+ 1).
• P`(t) = {a}: In this case and after updating i from {a} to {b} the radius of ` not only
does not decrease but also it may increase. In other words, not only will j not move to
one of the sets with smaller radius, but also she may move to another set with larger
radius.
• P`(t) = {b}: In this case the graphical distance between ` and i must be at least r′
as otherwise, updating i from {a} to {b} will not increase i’s radius to r′. This shows
that updating i cannot reduce r` to r or less.
Based on the above argument one can see that n(t+ 1) has the form given in the Lemma’s
statement. Q.E.D.
From Theorem 6.2 we can conclude that the binary CSR game is a potential game as
was discussed in [67]. In fact, the radius vector corresponding to the game will decrease
lexicographically after each best response update. Thus, as a naive upper bound for the
convergence time, one can note that since
∑D
p=1 np(t) = n for all t, the maximum number
of updating steps before reaching an equilibrium can be upper bounded by the number of
non-negative integer solutions of
X1 +X2 + . . .+XD = n,





where D is the diameter of the graph G. As has been pointed out
in [89] and [133], a random graph with n vertices where each edge appears with probability




for c > 2. In particular
by taking p = 1
2
almost all graphs over n vertices have diameter at most 2. Finally, social
networks typically have a very small diameter. Therefore, the convergence of best response
dynamics for the CSR game over social networks with low diameter is fast.
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6.4 Least Best Response Dynamics
In fact, a closer look at the proof of Theorem 6.2 tells us something more about the changes
in the radius vector. Assuming that agent i updates from radius r to r′ > r at some time t,
the radius of all the other agents with radius larger than r′ cannot decrease below r′. In other
words, r′ is a threshold that agents’ radii cannot fall below after updating i. Moreover, from
Theorem 6.2 one can see that the speed of convergence is highly dependent on the radius of
the updating agent at each time instant. In other words, the lower the radius of updating,
the more the contribution to the speed of convergence to an equilibrium. Based on this
observation we introduce an updating algorithm as follows:
Least Best Response Algorithm 1 : Given a CSR game, at each time t = 1, 2, . . .,
and from all the agents who want to update, we select an agent with the least radius (utility)
and let her update be based on her best response. Ties are broken arbitrarily.
Based on the above algorithm we can prove the following lemma for the least best response
dynamics.
Lemma 6.1. Let |O| denote the number of resources in the CSR game. Then, in the least
best response dynamics, we have r(t) ≤ |O| − 1,∀t, where r(t) is the radius of the updating
agent at time step t.
Proof. In order to reach a contradiction, suppose that there exists a time instant t such that
r(t) ≥ |O|. Based on the least best response dynamics, this can happen if all the agents
with radii smaller than r(t) are playing their best response. Now assume that an agent i
has radius r(t) ≥ |O| and she wants to update her resource. We claim that every two nodes
in the shortest path between i and the closest agent to him who has the same resource
(j = σi(P (t), Pi(t))) must have different resources (Figure 6.3). Otherwise, if ` and `
′ have
the same resource {x}, then the radius of ` denoted by r` will be smaller than r(t). Since all
the agents who have distance at most r` to ` will have distance smaller than r(t) to i, none of
them can have {a} as their resource. This means that ` can improve her radius by allocating
{a}, which is in contradiction with the fact that all the agents with radii smaller than r(t)
are playing their best response. Therefore, none of the agents on the shortest path between
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i and j (except i and j) and the node in which i wants to update to its resource can have
the same resource. Since the total number of resources is |O|, we must have r(t) + 1 ≤ |O|.
Figure 6.3: Maximum radius of updates.
Q.E.D.
Corollary 6.1. As a result of Lemma 6.1 and Theorem 6.2, we have T ≤ n|O|−1.
We now have another lemma which will be useful in the proof of our main result in this
section.
Lemma 6.2. In the least best response dynamics, suppose that an agent i ∈ Nr(t) updates
from {a} to {b} and thus increases her radius to r′ > r. If there exists an agent ` ∈ ∪r−1j=1Nj(t)
who is playing her best response but has an incentive to deviate after updating i, then |O| ≥ 5.
Proof. Without any loss of generality we may assume ` ∈ Nk(t) for some 1 ≤ k < r.
Also, let `′ be the nearest node to ` with the same resource, i.e. `′ = σ`(P (t), P`(t)) and
P`(t) = P`′(t) = {c} for some resource {c}. Note that in order for player i’s deviation to
affect `, she must be within a graphical distance of at most k from `, i.e. dG(i, `) ≤ k. Also,
note that dG(i, `)+k ≥ r′, since otherwise, ` would be able to deviate to {b} and increase her
radius even before updating i. But based on the least best response dynamics, this means
that ` should have updated instead of i. Now combining these two relations we can write
k ≥ r′
2
. Gathering all together, we can write




Since k is an integer, we conclude that k ≥ 2.
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Next we note that c /∈ {a, b}. For if c = b, then there is no incentive for i to deviate from
a to b. Moreover, if c = a, then r ≤ dG(i, `) which is in contradiction with (6.2). Moreover,
since we know that agent ` was playing her best response before updating i, it means that all
the resources have appeared at least once in BG(`, k). In addition, since updating i from {a}
to {b} creates this incentive for ` to deviate, the only way is that ` evicts {c} and inserts {a}.
Furthermore, since this will lead to an increase in her radius from k to something larger, it
is not hard to see that the minimum number of resources for a such situation to arise with
dG(i, `) = k = 2, r = 3, r′ = 4 is with at least 5 different resources, which is shown in Figure
6.4. Thus |O| ≥ 5 and this proves the Lemma. Q.E.D.
Figure 6.4: Realization of Lemma 6.2 with minimum number of resources.
Theorem 6.3. In the binary CSR game with n agents and |O| < 5, the least best response
dynamics will converge to a pure Nash equilibrium in no longer than nmin{|O|−1, D} steps,
where D is the diameter of the graph.
Proof. Suppose that at time t an agent i ∈ Nr(t) updates its resource from {a} to {b} and
therefore moves to Nr′(t + 1) for some r′ > r. Based on the least best response, i is an
unsatisfied agent who has the least radius. It means that all the elements in ∪r−1k=1Nr(t) are
playing their best response with respect to P (t). We claim that all the elements in ∪r−1k=1Nr(t)
will still play their best response with respect to P (t+ 1). To show that, let us assume that
` ∈ ∪r−1k=1Nr(t). Without any loss of generality we may assume that ` ∈ Nk(t) = Nk(t+1) for
some k < r, where the equality is because of Theorem 6.2. We observe that after updating
i from {a} to {b} the only reason why ` would not be playing her best response in P (t+ 1)
anymore is that either one of the following two situations occurs:
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• (1): P`(t + 1) = {b} and after updating i from {a} to {b}, player ` thinks that either
her radius has been decreased or she can increase it by allocating some other resource.
• (2): (bad case) ` wants to deviate from her current state (P`(t+1)) to {a} because she
thinks that after updating i from {a} to {b} she might be able to increase her radius
from k to something larger by allocating {a}. Such case is illustrated in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5: Illustration of the bad case.
We first show that (1) cannot happen. Toward that end, note that dG(`, i) > k as otherwise
after updating i to resource {b} her radius would be less than or equal to dG(`, i) which is
less than r. This is in contradiction with the fact that agent i’s radius will increase after
her update. Now we know that there are fewer of resources {b} in profile P (t) than P (t+ 1)
(Pi(t) = {a}, Pi(t+ 1) = {b}). Since agent `’s best response was to choose {b} in P (t) with
corresponding radius k and dG(`, i) > k, her best response will be the same as before at the
next time step, i.e. P`(t+ 1) = {b}. This shows that case (1) cannot happen. Finally, using
Lemma 6.2, and since |O| < 5, we can see that the second case cannot happen either.
What we have shown so far is that under the least best response dynamics if at some time
t the minimum updating radius is r then all the agents who have radii less than r will still
play their best responses. Moreover, using Theorem 6.2, we can see that when the radius of
updating at time t is r, after at most nr(t) steps the radius of updating will increase by at
least 1 (because all the agents with radii less than r will stay with their best response and
they will not move away from their own radius sets). Since r can be at most min{|O|−1, D}
and nr(t) ≤ n for all t, by Lemma 6.1 we conclude that after at most nmin{|O| − 1, D}
steps we will reach an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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As a corollary of the above theorem we can see that in the case of two resources, the
least best response dynamics converges in no longer than n steps, which is faster than the
algorithm proposed in [67] by a factor of at least n2. Also, we note that the only reason
why the result of the above theorem may not extend to |O| ≥ 5 is that case (2) (bad case)
can still occur. Indeed if the number of occurrences of bad cases is bounded from above by
B, then the least best response dynamics will converge to an equilibrium in no longer than
nBmin{|O| − 1, D} time steps.
The following theorem now says that the least best response dynamics converge fast on
relatively dense graphs.
Theorem 6.4. In the binary CSR game with n agents and with dmin ≥ |O|, the least best
response dynamics will converge to a pure Nash equilibrium in no longer than n3 min{|O| −
1, D} steps, where dmin denotes the minimum degree in the graph G.
Proof. We show that if dmin ≥ |O|, then the number of bad cases that can happen during
the dynamics is at most 3n2. Also, as in the case of Theorem 6.3 we argue that since the gap
between any two consecutive occurrences of bad cases can be at most nmin{|O|−1, D}, the
overall the dynamics will terminate at an equilibrium in no longer than n2 × nmin{|O| −
1, D} = n3 min{|O| − 1, D} steps. First using Theorem 6.2 we observe that the number of
bad updates with r(t) = k = 2 cannot be greater than n2. Except that, all the other updates
will have radii greater than or equal to 3. It then remains to show that when r(t) ≥ 3 for
some t, this update cannot be a bad update. In fact when dmin ≥ |O|, at least two of the
neighbors of `, say j and j′, will have the same resources and hence their radii will be at
most 2. Therefore, j can increase her radius by updating to {a}. But we know that the
updating radius at time t is r(t) ≥ 3 while j is an agent with a smaller radius who wants
to deviate. This is in contradiction with the least best response dynamics. Therefore after
at most n2 windows of time, each of length at most nmin{|O| − 1, D}, which may possibly
include some bad cases, no other bad case can happen and the dynamics will terminate at
an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
In fact, one can slightly generalize the result of Theorem 6.4 to the case where |O|
dmin
≤ c for
some constant c, and obtain a polynomial time algorithm for finding a pure Nash equilibrium
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using least best response dynamics.
Theorem 6.5. The least best response dynamics reach an equilibrium in no longer than
n
9|O|
dmin steps, where dmin denote minimum degree of the network.
Proof. Let us consider a node x0 with Px0 = {a} who wants to update his radius from r
to something larger at some instance of the least best response dynamics. We claim that
all the players who have graphical distance less than or equal r
3
to node x0 must allocate
different resources. Otherwise, if nodes j and k are such that Pj = Pk = {b}, b 6= a, and
dG(j, x0) ≤ r3 , dG(k, x0) ≤ r3 , then player j or k can increase her radius by updating her
resource from {b} to {a}. However, since both j and k have graphical distance of at most r
3




is in contrast with the updating rule in the least best response dynamics.
Now let us consider the shortest path starting from node x0 and ending at the closest
node who has the same resource as node i, namely xr, by x0, x1, x2, x3, . . . , xr. It is clear
that none of the nodes x3`, ` = 0, 1, . . . , b r3c have the same neighbor, as otherwise one can
find a shorter path between x0 and xr. In particular, all the nodes x0, x3, . . . , xb r
9
c and their
neighbors are different and lie in a graphical distance of at most r
3
from node x0. However,




who have graphical distance at most r
3
from node x0. Since all such nodes must allocate
different resources, thus r
9
dmin ≤ |O|. This shows r ≤ 9|O|dmin . This in view of Theorem 6.2
shows that every least best response update must affect the first r < 9|O|
dmin
coordinates of the
radius vector n(t) and strictly decreases it in a lexicographical order. Since the total number
of such changes is at most nr, thus the least best response dynamics reaches an equilibrium
after at most n
9|O|
dmin steps. Q.E.D.
According to Theorems 6.5 and 6.3, the least best response algorithm can provide polyno-
mial time search for finding a pure Nash equilibrium in the CSR game when the number of
resources is limited or when the underlying network is dense with respect to the number of
resources; however, in general, the number of best responses to reach an equilibrium can be
exponentially large (O(nD)). To address this issue, in the next sections, we first study the
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price of anarchy of the CSR game over general networks, and then provide a constant ap-
proximation algorithm which works in quasi-polynomial time over general networks, without
any additional assumption on the structure of the network. Roughly speaking, this algo-
rithm reduces the time complexity of being close to an equilibrium from the naive search of
O(nD) to O(nlnD).
6.5 Price of Anarchy for the CSR Game
In this section, we show that all the equilibrium points of the CSR game are almost as good
as the global optimal allocation, i.e., an allocation profile which minimizes the total sum of
the costs of the players.
Theorem 6.6. The price of anarchy in the CSR game is bounded from above by 3.
Proof. For an arbitrary equilibrium P ∗ and a specific node i with equilibrium radius r∗i , i.e.,
r∗i = dG(i, σi(P
∗, P ∗i )), we note that all the resources must appear at least once in BG(i, r
∗
i ).
In fact, if a specific resource is missing in BG(i, r∗i ), then node i can increase its radius by
updating its current resource to that specific resource, thereby decreasing its cost (Remark
14). But this is in contradiction with P ∗ being an equilibrium (Figure 6.6). Now, given the
equilibrium profile P ∗, let us define rˆi to be the smallest integer such that BG(i, rˆi) contains
at least two resources of the same type, i.e.,
rˆi = min
{
r ∈ N : ∀j, k ∈ BG(i, r−1), P ∗j 6= P ∗k , and ∃j0, k0 ∈ BG(i, r), P ∗j0 = P ∗k0
}
.
Now we claim that all the resources must appear at least once in BG(i, 3rˆi). To see this
and by the above definition, let j0 6= k0 ∈ BG(i, rˆi) be such that P ∗j0 = P ∗k0 . This means that
the equilibrium radius of node j0, i.e., r
∗
j0
in P ∗, is at most dG(j0, i) +dG(i, k0) ≤ 2rˆi. On the
other hand, by the argument at the beginning of the proof, all the resources must appear at
least once in BG(j0, 2rˆi). But since BG(j0, 2rˆi) ⊆ BG(i, 3rˆi), this shows that BG(i, 3rˆi) must
include all the resources at least once.
Next, let us denote an optimal allocation profile by P o, and the cost of node i in the
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Figure 6.6: Illustration of resource allocation in NE P ∗. Note that r∗j0 denotes the radius of
node j0 at equilibrium P
∗, i.e., the graphical distance between node j0 and the closest node
to her which has the same resource. Thus r∗j0 is upper bounded by the distance between j0
and k0. The ball BG(i, rˆi − 1) contains only resources of different types.
optimal allocation and at NE by Ci(P
o) and Ci(P
∗), respectively. Now for the equilibrium
P ∗, and since by the definition of rˆi there are no two similar resources in BG(i, rˆi−1), and





dG(i, σi(P ∗, o)) ≤
∑
j∈BG(i,rˆi−1)
dG(i, j)+3rˆi(|O|−1−|BG(i, rˆi−1)|). (6.3)





dG(i, σi(P o, o)) ≥
∑
j∈BG(i,rˆi−1)
dG(i, j)+rˆi(|O|−1−|BG(i, rˆi−1)|), (6.4)
where the inequality holds since node i has to pay at least
∑
j∈BG(i,rˆi−1) dG(i, j) for the first
|BG(i, rˆi−1)| closest resources, and to pay at least rˆi for the remaining (|O|−1−|BG(i, rˆi−1)|)





j∈BG(i,rˆi−1) dG(i, j) + 3rˆi (|O| − 1− |BG(i, rˆi − 1)|)∑
j∈BG(i,rˆi−1) dG(i, j) + rˆi (|O| − 1− |BG(i, rˆi − 1)|)
,
which is bounded from above by 3. Since node i and the equilibrium P ∗ were chosen
arbitrarily, for every equilibrium P ∗ and for all i ∈ [n], we have Ci(P ∗) ≤ 3Ci(P o). Summing
both sides of this inequality over all i ∈ [n], we get C(P ∗) = ∑iCi(P ∗) ≤ 3∑iCi(P o) =
3C(P o). Since we have this inequality for all possible Nash equilibria, and using the definition
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of the price of anarchy, we have
PoA =




Next, in the following example, we provide an illustration of the fact that the price of
anarchy of the CSR game can actually be arbitrarily close to 2 for some networks.
Example 4. Given arbitrary positive integers m, and with |O| ≥ 2, let us consider a network
of n := (m + 1)(|O| − 1) nodes as shown in Figure 6.7. The bottom part of the network
is composed of a clique of |O| − 1 nodes, and the top part forms an independent set of
m(|O| − 1) nodes which are all connected to the bottom part. As can be seen in Figure
6.7, the top figure constitutes a pure NE for the CSR game with a total cost of C(P ∗) =
m(|O|−1)(2|O|−3)+(|O|−1)2. Further, it can easily be seen that the bottom figure illustrates
an optimal allocation, where the cost of each node is |O|−1, and hence the total optimal cost








that for large m and |O|, the price of anarchy of the CSR game over such networks can be
arbitrarily close to 2.
Figure 6.7: Illustration of the resource allocation for an NE (top figure), and an optimal
allocation (bottom figure) in Example 4.
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6.6 Approximation Algorithm for the CSR Game
In this section we show that for the CSR game over general networks one can reach an
allocation profile with total cost lying within a constant factor of that in an optimal allocation
in only quasi-polynomial time. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 6.3. Given a real number  > 1, at every time instant there exists an agent i who
can increase its radius by a constant factor of at least  by playing its best response, i.e.,





Proof. Let us denote the radii of the players at time step t by r1(t), . . . , rn(t). Given that at
time step t player i with Pi(t) = o1 wants to change to Pi(t+ 1) = o2, it means that at time


















are equal to 1
klog n
. Moreover, one can easily see that R(·) is a nonnegative function which
is upper bounded by n. We will show that after each time of running the dynamics, the
value of the potential function given in (6.5) decreases by at least 1
n‖{rmax(t)}‖log n∞
, where
‖{rmax(t)}‖∞ = maxt≥0 maxi∈[n] ri(t). To see this, let us assume that node i updates its
radius from ri(t) to ri(t + 1) ≥ ri(t). Therefore, for some k ∈ [n] we must have one of the
following three cases:
• If k = i, then ri(t + 1) ≥ ri(t). This holds because of the dynamics rule. In other
words, node i updates its radius from ri(t) to ri(t+ 1) if and only if ri(t+ 1) ≥ ri(t).
• If rk(t) < ri(t+1), then rk(t+1) ≥ rk(t). To see this, note that if rk(t) < ri(t+1), then
Pk(t) 6= o2. Moreover, either Pk(t) = o1, where in this case by updating Pi(t) from
Pi(t) = o1 to Pi(t + 1) = o2, the radius of node k does not decrease, i.e., rk(t + 1) ≥
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rk(t), or Pk(t) 6= o1, where in this case the radius of node k remains the same, i.e.,
rk(t+ 1) = rk(t).
• If rk(t) ≥ ri(t+1), then ri(t+1) ≤ rk(t+1). To show this, first note that if Pk 6= o1, o2,
then the radius of node k does not change after node i updates, i.e., rk(t+1) = rk(t) ≥
ri(t+ 1). Otherwise, either Pk(t) = o1, in which case rk(t+ 1) ≥ rk(t) ≥ ri(t+ 1) due
to the fact that after update we have fewer number of o1-resources, or pk(t) = o2 in
which case the radius of player k cannot decrease to less than the graphical distance
between k and i, thus again leading to rk(t+ 1) ≥ rk(t) ≥ ri(t+ 1).




























































Figure 6.8: Illustration of updating node i in Lemma 6.3. Note that there are no other
resources of type o2 in BG(i, ri(t+ 1)).
117
where in the second to last inequality, and without any loss of generality, we can consider
|{k : rk(t) ≥ ri(t+ 1)}| ≤ n− 2. In fact, we argue that at most for D instances we can have
|{k : rk(t) ≥ ri(t+ 1)}| ≥ n− 2, which does not really change the quasi-polynomial order of
the termination time. Note that player i does not belong to the set {k : rk(t) ≥ ri(t + 1)},
thus |{k : rk(t) ≥ ri(t+1)}| ≤ n−1. Moreover |{k : rk(t) ≥ ri(t+1)}| cannot be equal to n−1
for more than D steps, since by Theorem 6.2 every time that |{k : rk(t) ≥ ri(t+1)}| = n−1,
after updating node i at the next time step the minimum index of the positive entries in
n(t+ 1) will increase by at least 1, which cannot happen for more than D steps.
Finally, sinceR(·) is upper bounded by n, R(·) cannot decrease by more than n2‖{rmax(t)}‖log n∞




steps. Moreover, since for all t = 0, 1, . . ., and i ∈ [n], ri(t) cannot exceed the diameter D






Next we introduce a useful definition.
Definition 24. Given an undirected network G = ([n], E), and an allocation profile P , the
resource-radius of any node i is the smallest positive integer γi such that all the resources
appear at least once in B(i, γi) for that given profile P .
In what follows, we introduce an algorithm, called -best response algorithm, which in at
most quasi-polynomial time can find an allocation profile which lies within a constant factor
of the optimal allocation profile in the CSR game over general networks.
-Best Response Algorithm 2: Given a network G = ([n], E), a real number  > 1,
a set of available resources O, and an arbitrary initial allocation profile P (0), at every time
instance we select an agent i who can increase its radius ri(t) by a factor of at least , and
let her play her best response (ties are broken arbitrarily). The algorithm terminates when
no more changes are possible.
The following example illustrates how the -best response algorithm works.
Example 5. Let  = 2, and consider a network of 10 nodes and 4 available resources
O = {o1, o2, o3, o4}. The initial profile of allocated resources has been illustrated in Figure
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6.9. Let us assume that at the first time instant node i has been selected by the algorithm.
Since the radius of node i in the initial profile is 1, i.e., ri(0) = 1, among the resources
whose distances to node i are at least ri(0) = 2× 1(in this example {o3, o4}), she will play
her best response, i.e., o3. Therefore, Pi(1) = o3. Now at the second time instant, and given
that node j is selected, since rj(1) = 1, among the resources whose distances to j are at least
rj(1) = 2× 1 (in this example only {o4}), she will play her best response, i.e., Pj(2) = o4.
Note that if the set of available resources where an agent is supposed to choose her best
resource from is empty at some time instant, then she will not update.
Figure 6.9: Illustration of the resource allocation in the -best response algorithm
(Example 5) for  = 2 and |O| = 4.
In the following theorem we prove that the allocation profile reached after executing
Algorithm 2 is a constant approximation of the optimal allocation in the CSR game, which
can be reached in at most quasi-polynomial time.
Theorem 6.7. The -best response algorithm provides a (2 + 1)-approximation of the op-










steps. Let us denote the allocation profile at the end of the algorithm by
P . Therefore, we only need to show that the final profile P is indeed within a constant factor
of the optimal allocation. For any arbitrary i ∈ [n], suppose that γi is the resource-radius of
node i at the final profile P . We now claim that BG(i,
γi−1
2+1
) contains only different resources.
To see this, let us assume that to the contrary there are two nodes j, j′ ∈ BG(i, γi−12+1)
which share the same resource, i.e., P j = P j′ . Since j, j
′ ∈ BG(i, γi−12+1), dG(j, j′) ≤ 2(γi−1)2+1 .
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This shows that rj ≤ 2(γi−1)2+1 , and hence, rj ≤ 2(γi−1)2+1 . In particular, since dG(j, i) ≤
γi−1
2+1
, BG(j, rj) ⊆ BG(i, 2(γi−1)2+1 + γi−12+1) = BG(i, γi − 1). Since we assumed that P is the
final allocation of the algorithm, every resource must appear at least once in BG(j, rj),
as otherwise node j can update its resource to another one which is outside of BG(j, rj).
But, by definition of resource-radius γi, we know that for the profile P there exists at
least one resource which is missing in BG(i, γi−1). This is in contradiction with BG(j, rj) ⊆
BG(i, γi−1), which immediately implies that all the resources in BG(i, γi−12+1) must be different.
Finally, we show that the cost of every node in profile P is within a constant factor of
that in an optimal allocation. As we have shown above, for every agent i, the final profile








dG(i, j) + γi
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where the inequality holds because by definition of γi all the resources appear at least once
in BG(i, γi), which means that node i does not need to travel farther than γi to get access




















dG(i, j) for the first |BG(i, γi−12+1)| closest resources, and to pay an integer
cost strictly larger than γi−1
2+1
(at least ( γi
2+1
)), for the remaining (|O| − 1 − |BG(i, γi−12+1)|)
resources. By comparing relations (6.6) and (6.7), it is not hard to see that for all i ∈ [n],
we have Ci(P ) ≤ (2 + 1)Ci(P o). Summing up all of these inequalities for i ∈ [n], we
get C(P ) ≤ (2 + 1)C(P o). This shows that the allocation profile obtained at the end of
the -best response algorithm is within a constant of the optimal allocation, which can be
obtained in at most quasi-polynomial time. Q.E.D.
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Corollary 6.2. Replacing  = e, where e := exp(1) in the result of Theorem 6.7, one can
easily see that Algorithm 2 gives us an allocation profile within a constant factor 1 + 2e of
the optimal allocation after at most O (n2DlnD) = O (n2+lnD) steps.
Remark 15. By choosing  = 1 + 1
D
in the -best response algorithm, one can see that the






ri(t)+1 is the same as all the resources which node i possibly would want to update. In other
words, by choosing  = 1 + 1
D
, the dynamics of the -best response algorithm coincide with
that of the best response dynamics. However, shrinking  to 1 + 1
D
can increase the exponent
log(n) in the termination time up to D log(n), which will ruin the quasi-polynomial running
time property of the algorithm.
In fact the -best response algorithm can be implemented in an easy but somehow intuitive
manner. Looking at the players of the CSR game as service providers, assume that each of
them has to pay − 1 fraction of his current saving as tax to the government if he wants to
change his strategy by allocating a different resource (the current saving of each player can
be interpreted as the radius of that player, because each player saves as much as his current
radius due to the available resource in his cache). Now given that at time step t player i
changes his resource from Pi(t) to Pi(t+ 1), his total income, i.e., Ci(P (t))−Ci(P (t+1))−
(− 1)ri(t) equals to
dG
(









i, σi(P (t), Pi(t+ 1))
)
− ri(t).
Since player i will deviate only if his total income is positive, he will not deviate unless
he can increase his radius to dG(i, σi(P (t), Pi(t+1))) > ri(t). This is exactly what -best
response algorithm expects from each player.
Remark 16. Using Theorem 6.6, all the equilibrium points of the CSR game are within
a constant factor of the optimal allocation. Moreover, by Theorem 6.7, the final allocation
profile, which is obtained from Algorithm 2, is within a constant factor of the optimal allo-
cation. These together show that Algorithm 2 provides an allocation profile which is within
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a constant factor of any NE of the CSR game.
6.7 ILP Formulation of Optimal Allocation and Nash Equilibrium
In this section we first formulate the optimal allocation problem as a solution of an integer
linear program (ILP). This is important since relaxing such optimization problem to a linear
program allows us to approximate the optimal allocation in polynomial time, or to compute
the optimal allocation and NE points using computer programs. Toward this goal, let us
introduce a vector xi ∈ {0, 1}|O| for every player i ∈ [n] such that its kth coordinate equals
1 if and only if player i allocates resource k. Therefore, each xi is a binary vector which
has exactly one entry equal to 1, and the rest are zeros. Moreover, for every i ∈ [n], let
yi ∈ {0, 1}n be a vector such that its kth coordinate is 1 if and only if player i gets a resource
from node k, i.e.,
yik =
1 if player i gets a resource from player k0 else.
(Note that since each player i gets one resource from himself, we have yii = 1,∀i ∈ [n]).
Finally for a given network G, and every two players i and j, let dij = dG(i, j) and di =
(di1, di2, . . . , din)
′. Now we have the following theorem.














zijk ≤ xij, zijk ≤ yki, xij + yki − zijk ≤ 1,
yik, xij, zijk ∈ {0, 1}, yii = 1, ∀i, k ∈ [n], j ∈ [|O|].
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Proof. For every i ∈ [n], we note that since every xi has exactly one 1 in its coordinates,
1′xi = 1. Stacking all the xi, i ∈ [n] as columns of a matrix X, we get 1′X = 1′. Furthermore,
every yi has exactly |O| coordinates equal to 1 and the rest are zeros. Since yik = 1 means that
player i gets a resource from player k and in total i needs exactly |O| resources, the 1-entries
in vectors xk such that yik = 1 must lie in different coordinates, that is
∑n
k=1 yikxk = 1, and
hence, Xyi = 1. Finally, it is not hard to see that if player i gets its needed resources from
the players whose corresponding coordinates in yi equal to 1, then the total cost for player
i will be Ci = d
′




iyi. Therefore, we can formulate





1′X = 1′, Xyi = 1,
yi ∈ {0, 1}n, yii = 1, X ∈ {0, 1}|O|×n. (6.8)
In what remains, our goal is to only replace the nonlinear constraints with linear constraints.
For every i, k ∈ [n], and j ∈ [|O|], let us define a new binary variable zijk ∈ {0, 1} to be
zijk = xijyki. Since all of these variables are binary variables, it is not hard to see that
zijk = xijyki is equivalent to the following three linear inequalities:
zijk ≤ xij, zijk ≤ yki, xij + yki − zijk ≤ 1. (6.9)
Substituting variables xijyki with zijk in the integer program (6.8) and adding the inequalities
given in (6.9) we obtain the desired result. Q.E.D.
In the following theorem we use a probabilistic argument to upper bound the minimum
social cost formulated in Theorem 6.8.
Theorem 6.9. For a network G with vertex degrees di, i ∈ [n], the optimal allocation cost
for the CSR game is bounded above by n(2|O| − 1) + |O|(|O| − 1)∑ni=1 (1− 1|O|)di.
Proof. Let us assign with probability 1|O| and independently a resource to any of the vertices
of G. Now for an arbitrary but fixed node i, dG(i, σi(P, o)) is a random variable denoting the
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graphical distance between player i and the player closest to him who has resource o under
such a random resource allocation P . For any nonnegative integer r and any arbitrary but
fixed resource o ∈ O, we have
P
{







if 0 ≤ r ≤ D+1
0 else.
Note that for r = 0 we have BG(i, r − 1) = ∅, and hence, |BG(i, r − 1)| = 0. Therefore,
using the tail formula for expectation of discrete random variables, the expected distance of
player i from resource o is
∑∞
r=1 P(dG(i, σi(o, P )) ≥ r). Therefore, the total expected cost of














































This shows that there exists at least one resource assignment where the total cost is at most
n(2|O| − 1) + |O|(|O| − 1)∑ni=1 (1− 1|O|)di . Q.E.D.
Remark 17. One can easily check that for the line graph, the bound given in Theorem 6.9
is tight up to a constant factor.
Next we turn our attention to formulate NE points of the CSR game using an ILP. For
this purpose, we benefit from the following lemma which characterizes Nash equilibria of the
CSR game as maximizers of a function f(·).
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Lemma 6.4. Let ri be the radius of agent i in an allocation profile P , and define Mi(P )
to be number of different resources in BG(i, ri). Then the function f(·) : P → R defined by
f(P ) =
∑n
i=1Mi(P ) achieves its maximum if and only if P is an NE of the CSR game.
Proof. First let us assume that P is an equilibrium point of the CSR game. As we have
seen earlier, this implies that for every player i all the resources must appear at least once in
BG(i, ri), and hence Mi(P ) = |O|,∀i ∈ [n]. Therefore, f(P ) = n|O|, which is the maximum
possible value that could be taken by f(·) (note that in general we have Mi(·) ≤ |O|,∀i). On
the other hand, by Theorem 6.2 we know that the CSR game always admits a pure NE, and
thus maxP∈P f(P ) = n|O|. Therefore, if for some allocation profile we have f(P ) = n|O|,
this implies that Mi(P ) = |O|,∀i ∈ [n], i.e., for every i ∈ [n], all the resources appear at least
once in BG(i, ri), which means that P must be an equilibrium since no agent can increase
its radius even further. Q.E.D.
Theorem 6.10. Every NE of the CSR game over a network G of n nodes, diameter D, and











wijk ≤ yik ≤
∑
j
wijk, dijzij ≤ ri < Dzij + dij ,
uijk ≤ xik, uijk ≤ xjk, xik + xjk − uijk ≤ 1,
wijk ≤ zij , wijk ≤ xjk, zij + xjk − wijk ≤ 1,
ri ∈ [D], xij , yik, zik, uijk, wijk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j, k. (6.10)
Proof. In order to use the result of Lemma 6.4, we first formulate the radius of an agent i
for a given allocation profile P = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). Let us choose an arbitrary player i and
fix it. We claim that the radius ri of agent i equals to
ri = min
j
D + (dij −D)x′ixj. (6.11)
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In fact, it is not hard to see that x′ixj = 1 if and only if player j allocates the same resource
as player i, and x′ixj = 0, otherwise. Therefore, D + (dij −D)x′ixj equals to D whenever j
does not have the same resource as i, and equals to dij whenever j has the same resource
as i. Since D ≥ dij, minj D + (dij −D)x′ixj is equal to minj:xj=xi dij, which by definition is
equal to the radius ri of node i.
Next we count the number of different resources in ri-neighborhood of node i. For this
purpose, we define a new variable yik to be 1 whenever the kth resource ok appears at
least once in BG(i, ri), and equals to 0, otherwise. Using this definition we can write yik =








Moreover, we note that zij = 1{dij≤ri} can be replaced by the following two inequalities:
dijzij ≤ ri < Dzij + dij. (6.13)
On the other hand, one can easily see that the number of different resources in BG(i, ri),
i.e., Mi(x1, x2, . . . , xn), is equal to
∑|O|





k=1 yik. Hence by Lemma 6.4, maximizing this function subject to the
constraints given in (6.11), (6.12) and (6.13), one can formulate the problem of obtaining













dijzij ≤ ri < Dzij + dij
ri ∈ [D], xij , yij , zij ∈ {0, 1}. (6.14)
In the rest of the proof, our goal is to replace the non-smooth or nonlinear constraints in
(6.14) using linear constraints.
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• In order to remove the min-equality constraint ri = minj D+ (dij−D)x′ixj, we replace
it by ri ≤ D + (dij − D)x′ixj, ∀j, and call the new integer program IPrelaxed. This
guarantees that ri ≤ minj D + (dij −D)x′ixj. Hence, every feasible solution of (6.14)
will be a feasible solution of IPrelaxed, which in turn shows that the optimal value
in (6.14) is upper bounded by that in IPrelaxed. Next we argue that every optimal
solution of (6.14) is indeed an optimal solution of IPrelaxed. Let us assume x
∗ = {x∗ij}







r∗i = minj D+ (dij−D)(x∗i )′x∗j ,∀i, then x∗ is also a solution of (6.14) and we are done.
But if for some i we have r∗i < minj D+(dij−D)(x∗i )′x∗j , we can see that by increasing
r∗i to minj D + (dij − D)(x∗i )′x∗j , x∗ remains a feasible solution for IPrelaxed. But r∗i
and y∗ij are positively correlated, i.e., increasing r
∗
i for some i does not decrease y
∗
ij
due to the constraints dijzij ≤ ri < Dzij + dij and yik = maxj zijxjk. This shows that
for fixed x∗ by increasing r∗i to minj D + (dij −D)(x∗i )′x∗j , the total objective value in
IPrelaxed will not decrease. Therefore, x
∗ and minj D + (dij − D)(x∗i )′x∗j constitute a
feasible solution for (6.14) where its objective value is at least as large as the optimal
value in IPrelaxed, which we know is an upper bound for the optimal value of (6.14).
This shows that x∗ must be an optimal solution of (6.14) with the corresponding radii
being minj D + (dij −D)(x∗i )′x∗j .
• We define new variables uijk = xikxjk and wijk = zijxjk by adding equivalent in-
equalities uijk ≤ xik, uijk ≤ xjk, xik + xjk − uijk ≤ 1, and wijk ≤ zij, uijk ≤
xjk, zij + xjk −wijk ≤ 1. This will remove the terms of the form of variable products.
• In order to replace max-equality constraints by linear constraints, we replace yik =
maxj zijxjk = maxj wijk by wijk ≤ yik, ∀j and yik ≤
∑
j wijk. Note that wijk ≤ yik,∀j
guarantees that maxj wijk ≤ yik. Now since all the variables yik, wijk ∈ {0, 1} are
binary, maxj wijk ≤ yik is always equivalent to maxj wijk = yik, unless we have wijk =
0,∀j. However, in this case the constraint yik ≤
∑
j wijk becomes active and forces
yik = 0.
Finally, incorporating all of the above changes into (6.14), we obtain (6.10). Q.E.D.
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Corollary 6.3. Since by Lemma 6.4 we know that the optimal solution in Theorem 6.10
equals n|O|, we have yik = 1,∀i, k. This reduces the optimization problem for finding an NE
given in (6.10) to the following feasibility problem:







wijk, dijzij ≤ ri < Dzij + dij ,
uijk ≤ xik, uijk ≤ xjk, xik + xjk − uijk ≤ 1,
wijk ≤ zij , wijk ≤ xjk, zij + xjk − wijk ≤ 1,
ri ∈ [D], xij , zij , uijk, wijk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j, k.
6.8 Local Capacitated Selfish Replication (LCSR) Game
By taking a closer look at the structure of the CSR game, one can see that one of the
drawbacks of such a model is the lack of local interactions among the players. In other words,
based on the structure of the network and the number of resources, a player may have to
travel a long distance in order to access some specific resource. This requires the players to
have a global knowledge of the structure of the entire network, which can be impractical in
real situations. This motivates us to consider in this section a slightly different version of the
CSR game where the actions of the players are restricted to only their local neighborhoods.
We refer to such a model as local capacitated selfish replication game, or simply LCSR game.
To start with, let ` be a constant which determines the depth of search for each player.
We will consider a local version of the CSR game where for each player i ∈ [n], the search
area of the ith player for finding new resources is restricted to those players who are at most
`-hops away from him. Therefore, given an allocation profile P , the best action of each
player can be totally determined by resources of his neighbors who are at most `-hops from
him. As an example for ` = 1, each player takes into his account the resources of only his
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immediate neighbors. Now very similar to (6.1), we define the cost of player i to be
C
(`)














where σi(P, o) is i
′s nearest node holding object o in allocation profile P , and θ` is a constant
greater than ` which denotes the cost of having access to any resource farther than `-hops
from player i. From the above definition, it should be clear that the LCSR game coincides
with the original CSR game when ` = D.
Theorem 6.11. Any sequence of best response dynamics will lead to a pure NE of the LCSR
game in only polynomial time O(n`), where ` is the search depth constant of the game.
Proof. For an arbitrary but fixed player i, one can see that due to the cost function given
in (6.15), all the resources which do not appear in BG(i, `) incur the same cost of θ` for
the player i. Therefore, there is no preference for player i to choose one over the other.
As a result, the best response of any player in the LCSR game of depth search ` is totally
characterized by the `th-hop neighborhood of that player. Note that as before we assume
that each player has access to the set of all the resources but can only hold one resource in
his cache. Therefore, the total set of resources accessible to a node does not change with the
stage in the iteration and is always equal to O.
Next we note that any best response of the LCSR game is a strictly better response of the
original CSR game. This is because if a player in the LCSR game can decrease his cost by
playing his best response, using (6.15) and Remark 14 it means that he can strictly increase
his radius. Therefore, by Theorem 6.2 every best response in the LCSR game will decrease
the radius vector n(t), lexicographically. Finally, employing the discussion at the beginning
of the proof we can see that any best response update in the LCSR game must increase the
radius of an agent whose radius before update was less than `. This is because, if the radius
of an agent in the LCSR game is more than `, then by (6.15) that agent is already playing
his best response and has no incentive to deviate. Therefore, every best response in the
LCSR game must affect the first ` coordinates of the radius vector n(t) and will decrease
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the entire vector n(t), lexicographically. Since the total number of such events is at most n`,
the LCSR game will reach a pure-strategy NE in no longer than n` steps. Q.E.D.
It would be interesting to consider the LCSR game when ` = 1, i.e., when each player
minimizes its cost with respect to only its immediate neighbors. In this case, the cost
function of player i can be written as

















Since θ1 > 1, to minimize C
1
i (P ), player i must maximize
∣∣⋃
j∈N(i)Pj
∣∣. In other words, he
must choose a resource which is different from resources of his neighbors.
Now let us call an edge of G monochromatic if both of its endpoint players have the
same resources, and let E
(1)
i (P ) denote the number of monochromatic edges emanating from





i (P ) be the total number of monochromatic edges in the
network. One can see that E(1)(P ) serves as potential function for the LCSR game with ` = 1,
meaning that after every best response of the player the value of E(1)(P ) decreases by at least
1. Since in general E(1)(P ) is bounded above by the total number of edges in the network,
i.e., O(n2), thus the best response dynamics for LCSR ends with an NE after at most O(n2)
steps. Nevertheless, using the result of Theorem 6.11 one can see that the best response
dynamics lead to an equilibrium in at most O(n) steps. Although minimizing the potential
function E(1)(P ) does not yield faster convergence to an equilibrium, the equilibrium points
obtained by minimizing E(1)(P ) have an advantage that resources are better distributed
around the players. For example let us consider a star network of n nodes and two resources
o1 and o2, such that n−2 of the leaves have resource o1 and the last leaf has resource o2 (note
that we have assumed ` = 1). Then in this case minimizing E(1)(P ) forces the center node
to choose resource o2, while the natural best response allows the central player to choose
either o1 or o2.
In fact, this duality between minimizing the monochromatic edges and minimizing the
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costs by playing a better response (one can think as maximizing the utilities) is not a
coincidence. By extending the definition of monochromatic edges to monochromatic pairs
one can define E
(r)
i (P ) = |{(i, j) : dG(i, j) = r, Pj = Pi}| to be the number of monochromatic





i (P ) to be the total
number of such monochromatic pairs of distance r from each other. Then one can see by a
similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 6.2 that after every strictly better response of
any player the sorted vector E(t) = (E(r)(P (t)) : r ∈ [D]) decreases lexicographically.
Finally, as we close this section, we want stress the tradeoff between localization in the
LCSR game and the multiplicity of the equilibrium points. In fact, although reducing the
depth of search in the LCSR game will reduce the complexity of the search for an equilibrium,
it will increase multiplicity of the equilibrium points as well as the price of anarchy. As an
example, for the line graph of n nodes, |O| ≥ 3, and depth of search ` = 1, one can see that
every allocation profile without any chromatic edge is an NE.
6.9 CSR Game vs Graph Coloring
In this section we discuss some of the similarities between coloring of graphs and equilibrium
seeking in binary CSR games.
Let us assume that there is a polynomial time algorithm which can deliver a pure Nash
equilibrium of the CSR game, which we denote by P ∗ = (P ∗1 , P
∗
2 , . . . P
∗
n) where Pi = {o} for
some o ∈ O. Let us define r∗i = dG(i, σi(P ∗, P ∗i ))− 1 and r∗ = mini=1,...,n r∗i .
Based on these definitions, we define a new graph G(r∗) to have the same set of vertices
as G, and such that two nodes are connected in G(r∗) if and only if the graphical distance
between them in the original graph G is at most r∗. If we consider the set of resources as
the colors with |O| = k, based on our construction it is not hard to see that P ∗ is a k-proper
coloring for G(r∗). Since G = G(1) and E(G(1)) ⊆ E(G(2)) ⊆ . . . ⊆ E(G(r∗)), P ∗ is a k-proper
coloring for G when r∗ > 0. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6.12. If there exists a largest integer h such that G(h) has a k-proper coloring,
then there exists an equilibrium P ∗ for the CSR game such that h = r∗. Moreover, if the
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k-proper coloring in G(h) is unique, then it is an equilibrium for the CSR game.
Proof. Suppose that there is a k-proper coloring for G(h). We use this allocation as an initial
profile of the CSR game and start to update the agents’ resources based on the least best
response dynamics. Since we know that the game is potential and by Theorem 6.2 the radius
of the smallest ball will not decrease during the least best response process, an equilibrium
can be reached such that the radius of its smallest ball is at least as large as h. Furthermore,
the radius of the smallest ball at the equilibrium must be less than h+ 1, as otherwise, the
new equilibrium would be a k-proper coloring for G(h+1), which is a contradiction. Therefore
we must have h = r∗. Also, note that if Q is the unique k-coloring for G(h), setting the initial
profile to be Q in the least best response dynamics will lead to an equilibrium for the CSR
game. This equilibrium, based on the above discussion, is a k-proper coloring for G(h) which
by assumption we know is unique. Therefore, Q is an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Let us denote the set of pure Nash equilibria of the CSR game on the network G by
NE(G) and the set of k-proper colorings of the graph G by C(G). Using the same line of
argument as in the proof of Proposition 6.12 we can see that if C(G) 6= ∅, then starting
from a coloring in C(G) and applying the best response dynamics, it can be extended to an
equilibrium which is still a valid k-proper coloring of G. Therefore, if C(G) 6= ∅, we must
have C(G) ∩NE(G) 6= ∅, and hence, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 6.4. Assume that G has a unique k-proper coloring up to relabeling of the colors.
Then, it must be an equilibrium for the CSR game. Moreover, if the CSR game has a unique
equilibrium, then we can decide whether G is k-colorable or not.
6.10 CSR Game With Different Capacities
Heretofore we have assumed that the capacity of each agent is exactly 1. In the following
we generalize our results when this capacity is allowed to be possibly different for different
agents. To be more precise, let us assume that agent i’s capacity is Li ∈ N where 1 ≤ Li ≤
|O|. Similarly, for a particular allocation profile P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn), with |Pi| = Li, i ∈ [n],
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dG(i, σi(P, o)), (6.17)
where σi(P, o) is i
′s nearest node holding o in P . We next show that as before the resulting
game is a potential game and as an instance we examine the convergence speed of the least
best response dynamics of that game.
Theorem 6.13. The CSR game with variable capacities is a potential game. Moreover,
if L =
∑n
i=1 Li and T denote, respectively, the maximum capacity of the agents and the
convergence time of the least best response dynamics, then
T ≤
L
3 min{D, |O| − 1}, if |O| ≤ Lmindmin
Lmin{D, |O| − 1}, if |O| < 5,
(6.18)
where Lmin = mini=1...n Li.
Proof. We replace each agent i with capacity Li with Li new nodes each with capacity 1.
We treat all of these Li new nodes as node i and very naturally we connect them to all the
other nodes where i was connected before as well as all the other nodes in Li. Figure 6.10
depicts such a scenario. Now, if an agent i with Pi(t) = {o1, o2, . . . , ok} wants to update to
Pi(t+ 1) = {oi1 , oi2 , . . . , oik} based on her better response, then we must have
k∑
j=1
dG(i, σi(P (t), o`j)) <
k∑
j=1
dG(i, σi(P (t), oj)).
This shows that there exists at least one agent j∗ such that
dG(i, σi(P (t), o`j∗ )) < dG(i, σi(P (t), o
∗
j)).
In other words, if agent i wants to deviate, there is at least one resource oj∗ in her cache
such that by evicting this resource and inserting o`j∗ she can increase her payoff. This means
that at least one of the new nodes representing i wants to deviate. Therefore, finding an
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equilibrium on this new network is equivalent to finding an equilibrium for the unit size cache
CSR game on the new network. Thus applying the least best response dynamics on the new
network with unit size cache will result in an equilibrium for this game. Finally, collecting
all the resources of the Li new agents as the allocation set of agent i we will arrive at an
equilibrium for general capacitated CSR game with different capacities. Therefore, all the
previous results can be carried over to the new network. The only difference is that instead
of n nodes we will now have L nodes. Also, note that the minimum degree in the new graph
will be at least dminLmin. Thus substituting L for n and dminLmin for dmin in Theorems 6.3
and 6.4 will lead to the desired result in (6.18).
Figure 6.10: An example of the original CSR game and its equivalent CSR game with unit
capacity per node.
Q.E.D.
As a corollary to Theorem 6.13 and by increasing the cache capacity of the agents, the least
best response dynamics will converge to equilibrium faster. In other words, by increasing the
agents’ capacities from 1 to |O|
dmin
, we note that the least best response dynamics will converge
after a polynomial number of steps. In fact, to obtain a fast convergence, we do not have
to increase the capacity of all the nodes; just increasing the capacity of the nodes that have
degree di < |O| to |O|di will guarantee polynomial convergence of the algorithm. Based on
this argument, the faster convergence in the least best response dynamics will be achieved
by increasing the capacity of those nodes in the network that have the least degrees.
Now, as a network designer we can ask the following question: Given a network G, what
are the best nodes one can select so that by increasing their capacities one can guarantee
that the least best response dynamics converge in polynomial time? In the following we
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formulate this problem as an integer programming problem. Relaxing this integer program
to a linear program and rounding off real-valued solutions to the upper integer values, we
find an almost tight expression for the minimum extra capacities and their corresponding
locations in the network for fast convergence to an equilibrium. Let us denote the capacity of
node i by a variable xi where xi ∈ N, and let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)′. As discussed in the proof
of Theorem 6.13, by expanding the network and replacing node i with xi identical nodes
each of unit capacity, the degree of each of these new nodes would be
∑
j∈N(i) xj, where N(i)
is the set of neighbors of node i in G. Moreover, in order to have fast convergence to a Nash
equilibrium in the least best response dynamics, and using Theorem 6.4, we need to have
∑
j∈N(i)
xj ≥ |O|, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (6.19)
Rewriting all the inequalities in (6.19) in a matrix form, we get AGx ≥ |O|1 where AG is
the adjacency matrix of G and the inequality is entrywise. Since we would like to assign the





s.t AGx ≥ |O|1
xi ∈ N. (6.20)
In the above formulation, the capacities of the agents are restricted to be integer valued.
However, we can relax the integer program (6.20) by assuming xi ∈ [1,∞). Substituting





s.t AGy ≥ |O|1− d
yi ≥ 0, (6.21)
where d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn)
′ is the vector of the degrees of the graph G. In fact, the entries
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of y denote the extra capacity needed to be added to each node in the network. Given a
solution y∗ of (6.21), let dy∗e be a vector which is obtained by rounding off the entries of y∗
to the closest integers greater than or equal to them. Note that since all the entries of A are
non-negative, dy∗e is a feasible solution for (6.21) and hence we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6.14. Consider an arbitrary network G of n nodes with adjacency matrix AG and
a corresponding degree vector d. Then, the least best response dynamics will converge to an
equilibrium of the CSR game in polynomial time O(n3|O|4) by adding dy∗i e extra cache for
agent i, where y∗i is a solution of the linear program (6.21).
Proof. The proof simply follows from the discussion preceding the theorem. Since the max-
imum cache size for each agent is |O|, using Theorem 6.13 we get L ≤ n|O|, and hence,
T ≤ (n|O|)3 min{D, |O| − 1} ≤ n3|O|4. Q.E.D.
6.10.1 A Numerical Example
In the following, we provide some numerical results of locating effective nodes in the network
and adding extra capacities such that the least best response dynamics have faster conver-
gence to an equilibrium. In Figure 6.11 we show four different networks G1,G2,G3 and G4
in an increasing order of edge density. We consider the CSR game on these networks with
|O| = 5. In order to accelerate convergence to an equilibrium in each of these networks, we
solve the linear program (6.21) for each of them to find the extra capacity yi needed for each
agent. The numerical results are given in Table 6.1. Each column of the table corresponds
to a different network and each pair (y∗i , dy∗i e) denotes the optimal extra capacity and the
up-rounded integer extra capacity for agent i. Also, the last two rows of Table 6.1 are related
to the largest eigenvalue of each network and the total extra capacity needed, normalized
by the number of agents in the network. It can be seen that as long as the densities of the
networks are allowed to increase, the need for extra cache will tend to zero.
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Figure 6.11: Configuration of four networks G1,G2,G3 and G4.
Table 6.1: Solution of Linear Program (6.21) with |O| = 5 and for Networks G1,G2,G3 and
G4.
Solutions G1 G2 G3 G4
(y∗1, dy∗1e) (0,0) (0,0) (0.38,1) (0.32,1)
(y∗2, dy∗2e) (0,0) (1.13,2) (0.82,1) (1.18,2)
(y∗3, dy∗3e) (3,3) (1.87,2) (0,0) (0,0)
(y∗4, dy∗4e) (0,0) (0,0) (0.19,1) (0,0)
(y∗5, dy∗5e) (4,4) (4,4) (0.78,1) (0.5,1)
(y∗6, dy∗6e) (0,0) (0,0) (0.30,1) (0,0)
(y∗7, dy∗7e) (4,4) (4,4) (1.49,2) (0.5,1)
(y∗8, dy∗8e) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
(y∗9, dy∗9e) (4,4) (3,3) (3,3) (0.5,1)
(y∗10, dy∗10e) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0.5,1)
(y∗11, dy∗11e) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
————-
λmax 3.049 3.660 4.129 4.496∑n
i=1 yi
n
1.3636 1.272 0.636 0.409
6.11 Discussion
In this section we discuss some future research directions related to the CSR (or LCSR)
game as well as some new tools which can be leveraged to study properties of games under
more general settings.
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One question of interest is whether there exists a deterministic polynomial time approx-
imation algorithm (instead of quasi-polynomial) which can approximate (or find) an NE
of the CSR game within a constant factor, over general networks and arbitrary number of
resources. In fact, in Appendix B we provide a dual approximation algorithm which runs
in polynomial time over symmetric networks. In Section 6.5 we have shown that for any
NE P ∗, any optimal allocation P o and any player i, we have Ci(P ∗) < 13Ci(P
o). One may
raise a similar question, as to whether there exists a constant α such that for any individual
player i, any optimal allocation P o, and any NE P ∗, we have Ci(P o) ≤ αCi(P ∗). In fact,
as a result of Theorems 6.6 and 6.1, one can see that this is the case when the underlying
network has the tree structure. As another avenue for future research, a possibility is to
study the dynamic version of the CSR game, in the spirit of what has been discussed in
[134] and [135]. Specifically, one can consider the CSR game when the network structure
between the players may change, or the actual (geographic) locations of the players that
define the communication network among them may change, e.g., see [136].
Related to Section 6.8, one extension would be to explore duality under more general
settings. Given a game which admits an ordinal potential function F , one can define a
partial ordering over the set P of all the states of the game such that for any two states
P, Pˆ ∈ P we have P ≤ Pˆ if and only if starting from P , there exists a sequence of best
responses which can change P to Pˆ . By this definition, it must be clear that the maximal
elements of such a partially ordered set (or simply poset) P , are the NE points of the game.
Adopting the same notions of chain and antichain from order theory (a chain in the poset
(P ,≤) is a subset of its elements such that every two of them are comparable; an antichain is
a subset of elements such that none of them are comparable), and using Dilworth’s theorem
[137], and its dual, Mirsky’s theorem [138], one can see that the size of the longest chain (in
our setting the most number of steps to reach an equilibrium using best response updates)
equals to the minimum number of antichains which partition the poset P . Therefore, the
better the estimate we have about the size of the antichains in (P ,≤), the better we can
bound the required number of updates to reach an equilibrium. As an example, in the CSR
game we have |P| = |O|n, and all the allocation profiles which are missing one resource form
an antichain of size at least (|O| − 1)n (since every better response of any player will bring
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the missing resource back to the profile). Therefore, such estimation of the size of the largest
antichain will give us the existence of a chain of size at most (1 + 1|O|−1)
n, i.e., the existence
of a sequence of best response updates of length at most (1 + 1|O|−1)
n to an NE.
Finally, we want to point out that depending on the specific application, the best response
dynamics are not always the best way to find an equilibrium. To handle such situations,
one way is to define a function which can characterize the equilibrium points (it can be
thought of as a weaker version of a potential function which is not always monotone along
the trajectories of the better responses) and use some probabilistic techniques to prove the
existence of some favorable states for such a function. As an example, let us reconsider the
function f(·) which was defined in Lemma 6.4. In order to reach an NE, one could set f to
be a function that needs to be maximized. Now the question is whether at every state of
the game there exists at least one player whose update to some resource will result in an
increase of the function f . Note that here f is not a potential function of the game, but it
can be used to drive to equilibrium. In fact, a simple probabilistic argument shows that as
long as the neighborhood of some player i is not saturated by more than
√|O| resources,
then there exists a resource such that if player i updates to that specific resource, the value
of function f strictly increases. This can be done by simply considering a node i such that
Mi(t) ≤
√|O|, and let it uniformly and independently update to one of the possible |O|
resources, each with probability 1|O| . One can easily show that as long as Mi(t) ≤
√|O|,
we have E[f(t + 1) − f(t)] > 0. However, such a function f performs well when players’
neighborhoods are not saturated by more than
√|O| resources. In fact, for Mi(t) > √|O|
one can construct examples where f reaches some local maximum such that no individual’s
update can increase f even further. Therefore, exploring “weak potential” functions rather
than potential functions for different types of problems would be another interesting research
area.
6.12 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied the capacitated selfish replication (CSR) game with binary
preferences over undirected networks. We have shown that optimal solutions of the CSR
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game constitute a subclass of its equilibrium points when the underlying network is a tree,
and there exists a linear time algorithm to obtain one of these solutions. We introduced a
class of dynamics known as the least best response dynamics which can find a pure Nash
equilibrium when the number of resources is low or the underlying network is dense. We have





any NE of the system as well as the optimal allocation profile within a constant factor. We
have shown that lack of coordination among the players in the CSR game does not affect
global optimality much. In other words, such games benefit from having a low price of
anarchy, and can be utilized to model chaotic allocation systems where the players act in
a completely selfish manner. Furthermore, we have formulated the equilibrium points and
optimal solutions of the CSR game using integer linear programs, and provided an upper
bound for the minimum social cost. We have introduced the LCSR game, a localized version
of the CSR game, and elaborated on some of its properties. Using a network transformation,
we have argued that all of the above results can be extended to cases where the players have
different cache sizes. Finally, we have shown that increasing the capacity of the agents can
improve the speed of convergence of the least best response dynamics to an equilibrium,




DIFFUSION GAMES OVER SOCIAL NETWORKS
In this chapter we study the competitive diffusion game as was introduced earlier in [89]
and obtain several results regarding its Nash equilibria. For sake of simplicity, and without
much loss of conceptual generality, we state the model when there are only two players in
the game; however, the model and analysis can readily be extended to the case when there
are more than two players.
7.1 The Diffusion Game Model
Following the formulation in [89], we consider here a network G of n nodes and two players
(types) A and B. Initially at time t = 0, each player decides to choose a subset of nodes in
the network and place his own seeds. After that, a discrete time diffusion process unfolds
among uninfected nodes as follows:
• If at some time step t an uninfected node is neighbor to infected nodes of only one
type (A or B), it will adopt that type at the next time step t+ 1.
• If an uninfected node is connected to nodes of both types at some time step t, it
will change to a gray node at the next time step t + 1 and does not adopt any type
afterward.
This process continues until no new adoption happens. Finally, the utility of each player will
be the total number of infected nodes of its own type at the end of the process. Moreover, if
both players place their seeds on the same node, that node will change to gray. We want to
emphasize the fact that when a node changes to gray, not only will it not adopt any type at
the next time step, but also it may block the streams of diffusion to other uninfected nodes.
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We will see later that the existence of gray nodes in the evolution of the process can make
any prediction process about the outcome of the diffusion process much more complicated.
Remark 18. The diffusion process as defined above is a particular case of progressive dif-
fusion processes, where the state of the nodes does not change after adoption. This is in
contrast to other types of processes known as non-progressive processes [92].
Remark 19. For the case of k > 2 players, one can define the same process as above such
that an uninfected node will adopt type i at time t+1 if and only if type i is the only existing
type among its neighbors at time step t.
As mentioned earlier, it has been shown in [89], [96] and [90] that the competitive diffusion
game may or may not admit pure-strategy Nash equilibria depending on the topology of the
network G, and the number of players. Moreover, it has been shown in [95] that if the
underlying graph G has a tree structure, the diffusion game with two players admits a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium. In fact, for the case of three or more players even the tree
structure may not lead to a pure Nash equilibrium. In the next sections we will study some
of the properties of the diffusion process over some specific as well as general networks, and
in particular obtain some conditions which are necessary for the existence of at least one
equilibrium.
7.2 The Diffusion Game Over Specific Networks
In this section, we consider the 2-player diffusion game with a single seed placement and
study the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for two special but well-studied
classes of networks, namely the lattice and the hypercube. Such an analysis sheds light on
the problem under more general settings, which is the topic of the next section.
Definition 25. An m×n lattice is a graph Lm×n with vertex set V = {(x, y) ∈ Z2 : 0 ≤ x ≤
m, 0 ≤ y ≤ n} such that each node is adjacent to those whose Euclidean distanced is 1 from
it. A k dimensional hypercube is a graph Qk with vertex set {0, 1}k such that two k-tuples
are adjacent if and only if they differ in exactly one position.
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Proposition 7.1. For the 2-player diffusion game over the lattice Lm×n,m, n ∈ Z+, a profile
(a∗, b∗) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if a∗ and b∗ are adjacent nodes in the most centric
square or edges of the Lm×n.
Proof. Let us assume that a∗ = (x1, y1) and b∗ = (x2, y2) are two nonadjacent nodes in
Lm×n which form a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Without any loss of generality, and if
necessary by rotating the lattice Lm×n and relabeling the types, we can assume that x1 > x2
and y1 ≥ y2. This situation has been shown in the Figure 7.1. Now, it is not hard to see
that at least one of the following cases will happen:
• Player B can strictly increase her utility by deviating to either (x1−1, y1) or (x1, y1−1).
• Player A can strictly increase her utility by deviating to either (x2+1, y2) or (x2, y2+1).
Therefore, in any of these cases, it means that (a∗, b∗) cannot be an equilibrium. Moreover,
if two adjacent nodes are not in the most centric part of the lattice, it can be seen that one
of the players can always increase her utility by deviating to another neighbor of the other
player while moving closer to the center of the lattice. This shows that if a profile is a Nash
equilibrium it must be two adjacent nodes in the most centric square of the lattice Lm×n.
Finally, using the same line of argument as above, it is not hard to see that in every such
profile each of the players will obtain the maximum utility that she can get, given that the
position of the other player is fixed. This shows that indeed any adjacent profile in the most
centric square is a Nash equilibrium.
Figure 7.1: Illustration of lattice in Proposition 7.1.
Q.E.D.
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Proposition 7.2. A profile (a∗, b∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the 2-player diffusion game over
the hypercube Qk if and only if the graphical distance between a
∗ and b∗ is an odd number,
or equivalently (a∗ ⊕ b∗)′1k = 1 mod 2.
Proof. First, we note that if (a∗ ⊕ b∗)′1k = 1 mod 2, then UA(a∗, b∗) = UB(a∗, b∗) = 2k−1,
where UA(a
∗, b∗) and UB(a∗, b∗) denote, respectively, the utilities of players A and B given
that their initial seeds are at a∗ and b∗. In this case, there exists no vertex v which has
equal graphical distance to both a∗ and b∗; otherwise, if d(a∗, v) = d(b∗, v), it means that
(a∗ ⊕ v)′1 = (b∗ ⊕ v)′1. Therefore, (a∗ ⊕ b∗)′1 = (a∗ ⊕ v)′1 + (b∗ ⊕ v)′1 = 0 mod2, which
is in contradiction with the assumption. Therefore, using Lemma 7.1, every node of Qk
must adopt either type A or B. Finally, for every node v such that d(a∗, v) < d(b∗, v), one
can assign a unique node u = v ⊕ (a∗ ⊕ b∗), such that d(b∗, u) < d(a∗, u). This one-to-one
bijection shows that UA(a




To show that every such profile is indeed a pure Nash equilibrium, we show that for every
arbitrary profile, the maximum utility that each player can gain is at most 2k−1. We show
it by induction on k. For k = 1, the result is trivial. Assuming that the statement is true
for k − 1, let (a∗, b∗) be an arbitrary pair of nodes in Qk. We consider two cases:
• a∗⊕b∗ = 1k. In this case a∗ and b∗ are binary complementary of each other (by a simple
translation of each node by the binary vector a∗ and without any loss of generality
we may assume a∗ = 0 and b∗ = 1k). Therefore, by symmetry of Qk, it is not hard
to see that UA(a
∗, b∗) = UB(a∗, b∗). Since the total utility is at most 2k, thus we have
UA(a
∗, b∗) = UB(a∗, b∗) ≤ 2k−1. Such a situation for the case of k = 3 is illustrated in
Figure 7.2.
• a∗ ⊕ b∗ 6= 1k. In this case, there exists at least one coordinate such that a∗ and b∗
agree on it. Without any loss of generality, let us assume a∗i = b
∗
i and let Q = {x ∈
V (Qk) : xi = a
∗
i } and Qc = V (Qk)\Q. Therefore, it is not hard to see that the induced
subgraphs by vertices Q and Qc are hypercubes of dimension k−1 which are connected
to each other through a perfect matching (a set of disjoint edges which connect all the
nodes in pairs). Furthermore, a∗ and b∗ are both located in Q. Therefore, by the
induction hypothesis, the utility of the players on Q, i.e., UQA (a
∗, b∗), UQB (a
∗, b∗) is
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at most 2k−2. Moreover, since Q and Qc are connected through a perfect matching
and there is only one step delay in the diffusion process between Q and Qc, hence
the adoption of vertices in Qc is exactly the same as those in Q. Therefore, we have
UA(a
∗, b∗) = 2UQA (a
∗, b∗) ≤ 2× 2k−2 = 2k−1, and similarly UB(a∗, b∗) ≤ 2k−1.
Overall, we have shown that a profile (a∗, b∗) in Qk is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
UA(a
∗, b∗) = UB(a∗, b∗) = 2k−1, which happens if and only if a∗ and b∗ have an odd graphical
distance from each other, or equivalently (a∗ ⊕ b∗)′1k = 1 mod 2.
Figure 7.2: A Nash equilibrium of the diffusion game over 3-dimensional hypercube. The
circled nodes denote the initial seeds and the figure illustrates the final state of the game.
Q.E.D.
7.3 Preliminary Results on the Diffusion Game Model
In this section, we first characterize the final state of the diffusion process based on relative
distances of the players’ initial seed placements on the network. In the next section and
by using this characterization we establish a hardness result for the decision process on the
existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the diffusion game.
Lemma 7.1. Let NA and NB denote the set of nodes which adopt, respectively, types A and
B at the end of the process for a particular initial selection of seeds a, b ∈ V . Moreover, let
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N be the set of gray or uninfected (white) nodes by the end of the process. Then,
N ⊆ {i : dG(a, i) = dG(b, i)},
{i : dG(a, i)<dG(b, i)}⊆NA⊆{i : dG(a, i)≤dG(b, i)},
{i : dG(b, i)<dG(a, i)}⊆NB⊆{i : dG(b, i)≤dG(a, i)}. (7.1)
Proof. The proof is by induction on the time step t = 0, 1, . . .. At time t = 0 there is no
gray node and the result follows. At time t = 1, if there exist some gray nodes, it requires
the gray nodes to be neighbors of both iA and iB, as otherwise, they will adopt B or A,
respectively. Therefore, for all gray nodes j which are born at time t = 1 we must have
dG(iA, j) = dG(iB, j) = 1. Now, assume that the statement of the Lemma is true for all the
gray nodes such that they are born at steps t ≤ k, and let Tk be the collection of all these
nodes. Consider a gray node ` which is born at time t = k+ 1. Note that if there is no such
node, there is nothing to show and we can go one step forward. Assume P1 and P2 are two
different shortest paths from iA and iB to `, respectively. We consider the following cases:
1. P1 and P2 do not have any other gray node except `.
2. P1 (or similarly P2) has at least one more gray node other than `, but P2 (or similarly
P1) does not have any other gray node except `.
3. P1 and P2 both have at least one gray node other than `.
In the first case, we note that since ` has changed to gray at time t = k + 1 and since
the shortest paths P1 and P2 have no gray nodes inside, we thus conclude that dG(iA, `) =
dG(iB, `) = k + 1, as otherwise ` will adopt either A or B. Moreover, after k time steps, all
the internal nodes of P1 and P2 will adopt A and B, respectively.
In the second case, let z be the first internal gray node in P1 which is born by running
the process from time t = 0 to time t = k. Since P1 is the shortest path between iA and
`, and also z is located on this path, we observe that P1(iA → `) is also the shortest path
between i1 and z. Since by the definition of z there is no other gray node on P1(iA → z),
we thus conclude that z is born at step t0 = |P1(iA → z)| < |P1(iA → `)| and hence z ∈ Tk.
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Moreover, since P1 is the shortest path between the initial seed iA and `, and since ` changes
to gray at step k + 1, it means that ` does not change to gray for the first |P1(iA → `)| − 1
steps. Thus, |P1(iA → `)| ≤ k+ 1. Putting these inequalities together, we get t0 ≤ k and by
the induction hypothesis we have dG(iA, z) = dG(iB, z). Now we can write
dG(iA, `) = dG(iA, z) + dG(z, `) = dG(iB, z) + dG(z, `) ≥ dG(iB, `). (7.2)
We claim that equality must hold in (7.2). Otherwise, if dG(iA, `) > dG(iB, `), then since P2
does not have any gray node other than `, it requires that after dG(iB, `) − 1 steps all the
nodes in P2 other than ` adopt B. Therefore, at time step dG(iB, `)−1 node ` has at least one
neighbor who has adopted B. On the other side, since dG(iA, `) > dG(iB, `), node ` has no
neighbor of type A. This means that at time step t = dG(iB, `) agent ` will adopt B. This is
in contradiction with the fact that ` has a gray color and thus we have dG(iA, `) = dG(iB, `).
Finally in the last case, by repeating the same argument given in the second case for the
seed nodes iA and iB, we get dG(iA, `) ≥ dG(iB, `) and dG(iB, `) ≥ dG(iA, `), which gives us
dG(iA, `) = dG(iB, `).
Now, let us assume that `′ is a node which remains uninfected (white) at the end of the
process. It means that there is no path of types either A or B which connects the seed nodes
iA or iB to `
′. Without loss of generality assume that dG(iA, `′) < dG(iB, `′) and denote one
of the shortest paths between iA and `
′ by P ′1. This path must have at least one gray node
which we denote by z′. We can write
dG(iA, `′) = dG(iA, z′) + dG(z′, `′) = dG(iB, z′) + dG(z′, `′) ≥ dG(iB, `′).
This contradiction shows that dG(iA, `′) = dG(iB, `′). Gathering all the above results, we get
N ⊆ {i : dG(iA, i) = dG(iB, i)}. (7.3)
To complete the proof, we only need to show one of the relations in (7.1), as the proof for
the other one would be the same. Assume that for some i∗ we have dG(iA, i∗) < dG(iB, i∗).
Using (7.3) we know that i∗ must adopt either A or B at the end of the process. Let P ∗1 be
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one of the shortest paths between iA and i
∗. Moreover, assume i∗ will adopt B at the end of
the process. The only reason why this happens is that there is a gray node on P ∗1 such that
it blocks the diffusion of type A from iA to i
∗ as otherwise type A will reach i∗ earlier than
type B. Let this gray node be z∗. Using (7.3) we know that dG(iA, z∗) = dG(iB, z∗). Thus,
dG(iA, i∗) = dG(iA, z∗) + dG(z∗, i∗) = dG(iB, z∗) + dG(z∗, i∗) ≥ dG(iB, i∗).
This contradiction shows that i∗ will adopt A and hence {i : dG(iA, i) < dG(iB, i)} ⊆ NA.
This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Note that in Lemma 7.1 we assumed that each player can only place one seed in the
network as its initial placement. However, the result can be easily generalized to the case
when each player (for example player A) is allowed to choose a set of nodes SA ⊂ V as its
initial seed placements. In this case we just need to replace dG(SA, x) instead of dG(a, x)
in the statement of Lemma 7.1 and all the other results carry over naturally. Moreover, a
similar result can be proved when there are more than two players in the game.
7.4 NP-Hardness of Making a Decision on the Existence of Nash
Equilibrium
Departing from the 2-player framework of Section 7.2, we are now considering a game with
m ≥ 2 players. As it was shown before in [89] and [90], one can always construct networks
with diameter greater than or equal to 2 such that the diffusion game over such networks does
not admit any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In fact, by a closer look at Lemma 7.1, one
can see that there is some similarity between Voronoi games [139] and competitive diffusion
games. Note, however, that in the competitive diffusion game a diffusion process unfolds
while there is no notion of diffusion in Voronoi games. However, since at the end of the
process both games demonstrate behavior close to each other, it seems natural to compare
the complexity of Nash equilibria in these two games. In fact, in the following we show that
the decision on the existence of Nash equilibrium in a diffusion game is NP-hard. Toward
that goal, we first prove some relevant results and modify the configuration of the diffusion
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game to make a connection with Voronoi games. Borrowing some of the existing results
from the Voronoi games literature, we prove the NP-hardness of verification of existence of
Nash equilibrium in the diffusion game. We prove it by reduction from the 3-partitioning
problem which is shown to be an NP-complete problem [140]. In the 3-partitioning problem,






for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3m,∑3m
i=1 αi = mβ and have to partition them into disjoint sets P1, . . . , Pm ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , 3m}
such that for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m we have ∑i∈Pj αi = β.
First, we briefly describe the stages that we will go through toward proving the NP-
hardness of making a decision on the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Given an arbitrary
network G, by adding extra nodes and edges properly we expand this network into a new
network G¯ such that we make sure that if there exists a Nash equilibrium in the original
network, it must lie within a confined subset of nodes in the extended network G¯ (Lemma
7.2). This allows us to confine our attention to only a specific subset of nodes in the extended
network in order to search for a Nash equilibrium. Following this, we construct a new network
(Theorem 7.3) such that any Nash equilibrium of the game is equivalent to a solution of the
3-partitioning problem which is known to be an NP-complete problem. This establishes the
NP-hardness of arriving at a decision on the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the diffusion
game. We begin a formal proof of the result by stating the following lemma.
Lemma 7.2. Let T be a subset of V (G). Then, there exists an extended graph G¯ such that
there is a bijection between the Nash equilibria in G where the seeds (actions of the players)
are restricted to T , and the unrestricted Nash equilibria in G¯.
Proof. Consider the graph G¯ depicted in Figure 7.3, which is constructed using G by adding
|T |n new nodes and n |T |(|T |+1)
2
new edges. Note that |T | denotes the number of the nodes
in T and n = 2|V (G)| + 1 is a positive integer. It is important to note here that although
n > |V (G)|, it is polynomially bounded above by |V (G)|. With each node i ∈ T we associate a
set of n new nodes Ci = {ci1, ci2, . . . , cin} and we connect all of them to node i. Furthermore,
for j = 1, . . . , n, we connect all the nodes c1j, . . . , c|T |j to each other. In other words, nodes
{c1j, . . . , c|T |j} form a clique for each j = 1, . . . , n.
Now assume that at least one player puts his node seed in k ∈ T . We refer to this player
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Figure 7.3: Extension of graph G to G¯.
as the first player and denote its type by A. We claim that all the other players must play
in T as well. To prove this, suppose that another player which we refer to as the second
player with corresponding type B chooses node ` ∈ T, ` 6= k. In this case he will earn at
least n due to winning all the nodes in C`. Now let us assume that the second player plays
in the bottom part of the graph (Figure 7.3), i.e. L = ∪|T |i=1Ci. We consider two cases:
1. He plays in Ck and without any loss of generality and by symmetry, we may assume
that he plays in ck1.
2. He plays in C` for some ` 6= k such as c`1.
In the first case and after the first step of diffusion, all the elements c11, c21, . . . , c|T |1 will
adopt type of the second player, i.e. B (because there is a direct link between them and
ck1), and all the elements ck2, ck3, . . . , ckn will adapt type of the first player, i.e. A. At the
second time step, the second player can adopt all the elements of T \ {k} in the best case.
On the other hand, all the elements of L \ {c11, c21, . . . , c|T |1} will change to A. Therefore,
in this case the second player can gain at most |T |+ |V (G)| ≤ 2|V (G)| < n.
In the second case and after the first step of diffusion, the second player can adopt only
{c11, c21, . . . , c|T |1, `}\{ck1} while the first player will adopt at least {ck2, . . . , ckn}, (note that
node ck1 will change to gray). However, at the second time step all the nodes in C` \ {c`1}
and also in L \{Ck ∪C`∪{c11, c21, . . . , c|T |1}} will change to type A. Therefore, in this case,
the second player gains at most |T |+ |V (G)| ≤ 2|V (G)| < n.
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Furthermore, if the second player places his seed at a node in V (G) \ T , then in the best
scenario it will take at least two steps for the seed to be diffused to nodes of L. On the other
hand, type A can be diffused through every node of L in no more than 2 steps. Thus all the
nodes in L either adopt A or they change to gray and hence, in this case the second player
cannot earn more than V (G)− 1 < n. From the above discussion it should be clear that in
either of the above cases, if a player is playing in L ∪ V (G) \ T he can always gain more by
deviating to the set T . Thus in each equilibrium players must put their seeds in T .
Finally suppose that Q¯ is a Nash equilibrium profile in G¯. By the above argument we
know that all the players must play in T and thus, each of these players gains exactly n from
the set L. Therefore, the utility of players is equal to the utility that they would gain by
playing on G plus n. This shows that Q¯ must be an equilibrium for G when the strategies
of players are restricted to T . Similarly, if Q is an equilibrium of G when the strategies
of players are restricted to T , it is also an equilibrium for G¯ as we know all the equilibria
seeds of players (if there is any) must be in T . This shows that the set of equilibria of G¯ is
equivalent to the set of equilibria of G with the restricted strategy set T . Q.E.D.
Theorem 7.3. Given a graph G and m ≥ 2 players, the decision process on the existence of
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the diffusion game on G is NP-hard.







every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3m, ∑3mi=1 αi = mβ. Moreover, let c = (3m3 ) and choose an integer d such that
(β−1)c
4
< d < βc
4
. Consider the graph depicted in Figure 7.4, where the set T is defined to
be the set of vertices whose induced subgraph G[T ] is illustrated in the dashed-line area. In
fact, such a graph is composed of three parts:
• The right graph: This is a graph of 9d nodes, composed of 9 stars of size d where the
centers of the stars are connected as it is shown in Figure 7.4. It has been shown in
[90] that this graph does not admit any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when there
are two agents. In fact, if there is only one player on this graph, he will gain 9d and if
there are two players on it, one of them can always deviate to gain at least 4d.
• The middle graph: This graph is simply a clique of size (3m
3
)
where the nodes are
labeled by ui,j,k for all possible triples {i, j, k}, i, j, k ∈ [3m].
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• The left graph: This graph is composed of 3m independent sets (i.e., there exists no
edge between vertices of each set) I1, . . . , I3m of sizes cα1, . . . , cα3m, respectively, such
that all the nodes in the independent sets Ii, Ij, and Ik are connected to node ui,j,k in
the middle graph.
Figure 7.4: Graph construction of Theorem 7.3.
Calling the graph in Figure 7.4 G, setting T to be the set of vertices of the middle and right
side graphs, and applying Lemma 7.2 to construct G¯, we can see that any Nash equilibrium
of G¯ is an equilibrium of G when the strategies of players are restricted to T . We claim that
Q is an equilibrium for G with the restricted strategy set T (and equivalently an equilibrium
for unrestricted G¯) if and only if there is a 3-partitioning of {αi}3mi=1.
Assume that there is a solution P1, . . . , Pm to the 3-partition. For every 1 ≤ q ≤ m, if
Pq = {i, j, k}, then player q is assigned to ui,j,k. Let us also assume that player m + 1 is
assigned to one of the nodes in the rightmost part of the graph, which makes his utility
to be 9d. If player m + 1 moves to a vertex ui,j,k his utility will be 1 < 9d, because
all the other m players already covered all the
∑3m
`=1 ca` nodes in the leftmost side of the
graph and his movement will not result in any additional payoff for him except producing
some gray nodes. Now if one of the players 1 ≤ q ≤ m moves from vertex ui,j,k to one
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of the nodes in the right part of the graph, then his gain can be at most 4d which by the
selection of d would be less than what he was getting before (βc). Finally, if player q or
equivalently node ui,j,k moves to another node ui′,j′,k′ for some {i′, j′, k′} 6= {i, j, k}, then
since Pq was part of 3-partitioning before, it means that his payoff after deviating will be at
most cmax{αi+αj, αi+αk, αj+αk} < cβ. Moreover, by Lemma 7.2 no player at equilibrium
will be out of T and hence the proposed profile using the 3-partitioning is an equilibrium.
Now let us suppose that there exists a Nash equilibrium for G¯. We show that it corresponds
to a solution of 3-partitioning. First we note that there cannot be two players in the rightmost
part of the graph; otherwise, it is not an equilibrium by [90]. Moreover, if there are 3 players
or more, one of them can gain at most 3d. Since in this case there are at most m− 2 players
in the middle part, we can find a set {i′, j′, k′} such that the corresponding set of all the
other players does not have any intersection with it. Therefore, if a player with the least
gain (at most 3d) from the right side deviates to ui′,j′,k′ in the middle part, he will gain at
least 3βc
4
which is greater than 3d. Thus the rightmost part can have either one player or
nothing. However since 9d > 3βc
2
, at least one player would want to move to the rightmost
part of the graph if there is no other player there. Therefore, the rightmost part of the graph
has exactly one player. Thus, the rest of the m players must not only play in T (because
of Lemma 7.2) but also they must form a partition. Otherwise one of them can move to an
appropriate vertex of the middle graph and increase his utility. Finally, in this partitioning,
each player must gain exactly βc, because if this is not true and one of the players, namely
ui,j,k, gets less than βc, he will gain at most (β − 1)c (note that c is a rescaling factor) and
thus, he can always move to the rightmost side of the graph and gain 4d > (β − 1)c. Thus
this partitioning must be a 3-partitioning. This proves the equivalence of the existence of
Nash equilibrium in G¯ and existence of 3-partitioning for the set {αi}3mi=1. Q.E.D.
7.5 Necessary Conditions for Nash Equilibrium in the Diffusion
Game
In this section, we consider the 2-player diffusion game with a single seed placement, present
some necessary conditions for existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and discuss its
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connection with the network structure. Here, it is worth noting that although the results of
this section provide some necessary conditions for a given profile to be a Nash equilibrium,
in general they do not guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium, that is, they are not
sufficient. We start with the following theorem which is for the case of two players; however,
it can be extended quite naturally to the case of an arbitrary (but finite) number of players.




e ≤ UB(a∗, b∗), dn−1
d(b∗)
e ≤ UA(a∗, b∗),
where UA(a
∗, b∗) and UB(a∗, b∗) denote the utilities of players A and B given the initial seed
placement at (a∗, b∗), and d(a∗) and d(b∗) denote, respectively, the degrees of nodes a∗ and
b∗ in the network G.
Proof. Assume that players A and B place their seeds at nodes a∗ and b∗ and receive payoffs
of UA(a
∗, b∗) and UB(a∗, b∗), respectively. We claim that there exists a neighbor of a∗ where
player b∗ can gain at least d n−1
d(a∗)e by deviating to it. Toward showing this, let us also denote
all the neighbors of a∗ by v1, v2, . . . , vd(a∗). Let us denote the nodes that adopt B for the
initial seed allocation (a∗, vi) by Si, i = 1, 2, . . . , d(a∗). Then, we have ∪d(a
∗)
i=1 Si = V \ {a∗}.
In fact, for every v ∈ V \{a∗}, the shortest path from v to a∗ must pass through at least one
of the neighbors of a∗ such as v`. This means that dG(v, v`) < dG(v, a∗) and using Lemma




i=1 |Si| and this
means that there exists at least one vi∗ such that |Si∗ | ≥ d |V \{a∗}|d(a∗) e = d n−1d(a∗)e. Since we
assumed that (a∗, b∗) is an equilibrium, player b∗ cannot gain more by deviating to vi∗ . This
means that d n−1
d(a∗)e ≤ UB(a∗, b∗) and using the same argument for the other player we get
d n−1
d(b)
e ≤ UA(a∗, b∗). Q.E.D.
Note that the results in Theorem 7.4 can be improved by noting that the inequality
|∪d(a∗)i=1 Si| ≤
∑d(a∗)
i=1 |Si| can be strict and there are nodes which might be counted in different
sets of Si. In fact, it is not hard to see that if a node v belongs to two of these sets such as
Sj and Sk, v must be in an even cycle emanating a
∗ and including the nodes vj and vk. In
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such a case, to every cycle of even length which includes a∗ and does not contain another
smaller cycle, one can associate a node which is counted twice in two different sets. We call
such cycles simple even cycles emanating from a∗. Therefore, we can write
n− 1 = | ∪d(a∗)i=1 Si| ≤
d(a∗)∑
i=1
|Si|−{Simple even cycles emanating from a∗}|,
and therefore the bound in Theorem 7.4 will change to




Next, we consider the following two definitions from graph theory.
Definition 26. An edge (a vertex) of a connected graph G is a cut-edge (cut-vertex) if its
removal disconnects the graph.
Definition 27. A block of a graph G is a maximal connected subgraph of G that has no
cut-vertex.
Remark 20. Two blocks in a graph share at most one vertex. Hence the blocks of a graph
partition its edge set. Furthermore, a vertex shared by two blocks must be a cut-vertex.
Theorem 7.5. Every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a 2-player diffusion game must lie
within one of the blocks of its underlying network.
Proof. Given a network G = (V, E) with block decomposition B1,B2, . . . ,Bk, let us denote
one of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the diffusion game on G by (a∗, b∗) ∈ V × V . If
a∗, b∗ ∈ Bi, for some i ∈ [k], then there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, without any loss
of generality, let us assume that a∗ ∈ B1 and b∗ ∈ B2. Starting from node a∗ and moving
along a shortest path P between a∗ and b∗, the path must exit block B1 for the first time
at some vertex v1. Clearly by Remark 20 such a vertex must be a cut vertex since it is
shared between two blocks. By a similar argument, but this time by starting from node b∗
and moving along the path P , we can see that the path P must exit block B2 through a cut
vertex v2. Next we consider two cases:
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• v1 = v2 := v. In this case, we can assume that neither a∗ = v nor b∗ = v; otherwise,
(a∗, b∗) would already be an equilibrium within one block (either B1 or B2). Now,
without any loss of generality let us assume that the vertex v does not adopt type A
for the seed placement (a∗, b∗). Then, the first player can strictly increase its utility
by removing its seed from a∗ and placing it in node v. In fact, placing the initial seeds
on (v, b∗) instead of (a∗, b∗), the first player not only can adopt all the nodes that he
was able to adopt in (a∗, b∗) (this is due to the fact that there is no edge between
vertices of two distinct blocks (Remark 20)), but also he can adopt at least one more
new node, which is node v. This is in contrast with (a∗, b∗) being a Nash equilibrium.
Hence (a∗, b∗) must lie within one block.
• v1 6= v2. In this case, by the definition of the cut vertices v1 and v2 we clearly have
dG(a∗, v1) < dG(a∗, v2), and dG(b∗, v2) < dG(b∗, v1) (Figure 7.5). Now, if v2 adopts type
A, by Lemma 7.1 it is straightforward to see that v1 adopts type A as well. But then
by the same argument as in the first case, the second player can move its seed from b∗
to v1 and strictly increase its utility. On the other hand, if v2 does not adopt type A,
then the first player can move its seed from a∗ to v2, and strictly increase its utility.
This is in contradiction with (a∗, b∗) being a Nash equilibrium, and hence (a∗, b∗) must
lie within one block.
Q.E.D.
Figure 7.5: Illustration of block diagrams in Theorem 7.5.
We note that Theorem 7.5 breaks down the complication of search for a Nash equilibrium
over the entire graph to only its blocks. We further note that there are efficient time algo-
rithms which can decompose a graph into its blocks in at most O(n2) steps, where n is the
number of the nodes in the graph [141].
156
7.6 The Diffusion Game Over Random Graphs
Social networks that are observed in the real world can be viewed as a single realization of an
underlying stochastic process. This line of thinking has generated a huge interest in modeling
real world social networks using random networks. In fact, the Erdos-Renyi graph G(n, p),
where there are n nodes and the edges emerge independently with probability p ∈ (0, 1),
is one of the standard models of random graphs as an instance of small world networks,
in which most of the social entities can be reached from every other by a small number of
hops or steps. Here, it is worth noting that although Erdos-Renyi graphs do not reflect
some of the features inherited in real world social networks, such as having a high number
of triangles, still, their simple definition makes them a popular model in studying social and
random networks. In particular, analyzing such networks is beneficial in the sense that often
the analytic results derived for Erdos-Renyi graphs can be leveraged for analysis of more
complex random structures.
In this section we consider a two player diffusion game with single seed placement over
the Erdos-Renyi graph G(n, p). It is a well-known fact [29; Theorem 1] that p(n) = lnn
n
is a threshold function for the connectivity of the random graph G(n, p), meaning that as
n → ∞, the probability of the event that G(n, c lnn
n
) is connected tends to 1, for any fixed






p(n) in [142]). In particular, for p(n) ≥ c lnn
n
, c > 1, almost surely there exists





is a threshold function for having diameter 2 in G(n, p). In particular, for any




) lie within a graphical distance
of at most 2 from each other, which results in some straightforward analysis of the diffusion
game over such graphs. Therefore, in this section we confine our attention to the more






), c > 1.
For any arbitrary but fixed node x and any realization G of G(n, p), we let SG(i) and BG(i)
be the sets of all the nodes which are, respectively, at graphical distances of exactly i, and
at most i from node x. Similarly, we define S(i) and B(i) be two random sets denoting,
respectively, the set of nodes of distances exactly i, and at most i from node x when the
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underlying graph is a random graph G(n, p). Now we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7.3. For an arbitrary λ > (n− 1)p, and any i ∈ [n] we have


















∃v : d(v) ≥ λ
)
≤ nP(d(v) ≥ λ) = nP
(





where in the first inequality we have used the fact that every node in S(i) must be connected
to at least one vertex in B(i − 1). Therefore, there exists at least one vertex in B(i − 1)
whose degree is greater than or equal to |S(i)||B(i−1)| . Finally, in the last inequality we have used
the Chernoff bound for the random variable d(v). Note that d(v) is the sum of (n − 1)
independent Bernoulli random variables with equal probability of occurrence p. Q.E.D.
Now we are ready to state the main result of this section.







n → ∞, for every random seed placement in the 2-player diffusion game over G(n, p) with




Proof. For an arbitrary but fixed node x, let I(x) be the event that in the random graph
G(n, p) with uniform seed placements at (a, b) ∈ V × V , node x adopts either of the two
types, and we denote its complement by Ic(x). Conditioning on G(n, p) = G, we can write










where the first inequality is due to the fact that if the seed nodes lie in different sets
SG(i), SG(i), i 6= j from node x, then by Lemma 7.1 node x will adopt one of the types.
Moreover, for the second inequality and using Lemma 7.1, one can see that the set of unin-
fected or gray nodes is a subset of vertices of equal distance from the seed nodes.
Now let us define the following sets of graphs:
K = {G : dG(v) > 0,∀v}, F = {G : |SG(i)| < λ|BG(i− 1)|, ∀i ∈ [n]}.
By combining the two inequalities in (7.4) and taking the average over the probability space





G P(G)P(Ic(x)|G(n, p) = G)∑























































where the second inequality holds because
∑n










































































































G ∈ F ∩ K
) , (7.7)
where in the second inequality we have used the definition of set F , and in the last inequality
we have used the definition of K to get
n∑
i=1
|SG(i)|2 ≥ 1,∀G ∈ F ∩K. On the other hand, by
Lemma 7.3 and using the union bound, we can write




P(|S(i)| ≥ λ|B(i− 1)|) ≤ n2e− (λ−(n−1)p)
2
3(n−1)p . (7.8)
By choosing λ = (1 +
√
15)np for sufficiently large n, and using (7.8), each of the prob-
abilities P(G ∈ F) and P(G ∈ K) can be made arbitrarily close to 1. Therefore, for suffi-
ciently large n, we have P(G ∈ F ∩ K) ≥ 1
2
. Hence, substituting (7.8) in (7.7) and using
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where the second inequality holds because p ≥ lnn
n
. Finally, since P(Ic(x)) = 1 − P(I(x)),






. Now due to the symmetry between players we have
E[UA] = E[UB] =
1
2





P (I(x)) ≥ n






Therefore, for sufficiently large n, we have E[UA] ≥ 15p .
Now for two arbitrary but fixed nodes a and b, let us assume that players A and B place
their seeds at a and b, respectively. We introduce a martingale by setting X0 = E[UA(a, b)],
and Xi = E[UA(a, b)|v1 = a, v2 = b, v3, v4, . . . , vi] to be the expected utility of player A after
the first i nodes of the random graph G(n, p) are exposed. In other words, to find Xi we
expose the first i vertices and all their internal edges and take the conditional expectation of
UA with that partial information. It is straightforward to check that this defines a martingale
of length at most n such that |Xi+1−Xi| ≤ 1, as adding one vertex can at most change the
utility of player A by at most 1. Therefore, using Azumas’ inequality (Lemma 2.10) we can
write P
(




≤ 2e− θ22 . In particular, since E[UA] ≥ 15p , we have
P
( ∣∣∣∣ UAE[UA] − 1












], c > 1, one can see that for any  > 0,
there exists a sufficiently large n() such that for n ≥ n(), we have P
( ∣∣∣ UAE[UA] − 1∣∣∣ ≥ ) ≤ .
By the same argument and by symmetry, we can see that for sufficiently large n, UB is
arbitrarily close to its mean. This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
As we close this section, we stress the fact that the subset of nodes which adopt either
of the two types in diffusion games can be viewed as a community whose members have
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closer interactions with each other. In other words, in the diffusion game each community
can be viewed as the final subset of nodes that adopt a specific technology, which raises
the question of efficient decomposition of the network into different communities. In such
problems, the main issue is to partition the set of nodes into different groups such that
the set of edges within each group is much larger than that between the groups. Different
approaches in order to determine the communities effectively so that they scale with the
parameters of the network under both deterministic and randomized settings have been
proposed in the literature [143], [144]. As an example, an electrical voltage-based approach
in order to determine the communities within a network such that they scale linearly with
the size of the network has been discussed in [145].
7.7 Social Welfare and Sub-Modularity in the Competitive
Diffusion Game
In this section we first study the maximum social welfare of the game which can be achieved
by two players in the competitive diffusion game with a single seed placement. The moti-
vation for such a study is that any bound which is obtained for the optimal social welfare
can be used to provide some bound on the price of anarchy of the game, which measures the
degradation in the efficiency of a system due to selfish behavior of its agents, and is defined
to be the ratio of the centralized optimal social welfare over the sum utilities of the worst
equilibrium. Following that, we study the sub-modular property in the competitive diffusion
game. It was shown in the literature that greedy algorithm optimization approaches work
quite well for the dynamics which benefit from sub-modular property [146]. In this section
we show that unlike some other diffusion processes [81], the utilities of the players in the
competitive diffusion game do not have the sub-modular property.
We start with the following definition:




1, Pij > 00, Pij = 0.
Theorem 7.7. Given a graph G = (V, E) of n nodes and diameter D, and two players A
and B, there exists an initial seed placement (a, b) for players such that the social utility






where ‖ ·‖ denotes the standard Euclidean norm, and A = I+AG where AG is the adjacency
matrix of the network G.
Proof. Let us define G(k) = (V, E (k)), where E (k) = {(i, j)|dG(i, j) = k}. We consider all the
initial placements over different pairs of nodes, and then compute the average utility gained





rows and n different columns. For
i 6= j, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . n}, we let Q({i, j}, k) = 1 if and only if node k adopts either A or B
during the diffusion process for the initial placement {i, j}, and Q({i, j}, k) = 0, otherwise
(Figure 7.6). We count the maximum number of zeros in Q. For an arbitrary but fixed node
x ∈ V = {1, 2, . . . , n}, we count the number of different initial seed placements which result
in node x turning to gray. In other words, we count the maximum number of zeros in column
x of Q. For this purpose we note that, using Lemma 7.1, if node x turns to gray, it must
be equidistant from seed nodes. On the other hand, for a given k = 1, 2, . . . , D, the number
of choosing two nodes at distance k from node x (as possible seed placements which may
turn x to gray) is the same as the number of choosing two nodes among neighbors of x in
G(k), i.e. (dG(k) (x)
2
)
, where dG(k)(x) denotes the degree of node x in G(k). Thus, the maximum






and hence the number








. This means that the average
number of ones in each row of Q is at least
163





)−∑x∈V ∑Dk=1(dG(k) (x)2 )(
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n(n− 1) , (7.9)
where the last equality follows because {E (k)}Dk=1 partitions all the edges of a complete graph
with n nodes. This yields a lower bound on the maximum social welfare for the case of two
players on the graph.
Finally, using the zero pattern definition of a matrix, we can compute the last quantity
in (7.9) in the following way. Let us take AG to be the adjacency matrix of graph G of
diameter D and A = I +AG, where I denotes the identity matrix of appropriate dimension.
It is not hard to see that σ(Ak)− σ(Ak−1) is the adjacency matrix of G(k). In other words,
AG(k) = σ(Ak) − σ(Ak−1). Therefore, if we let 1 be the column vector of all ones, the
degree of each node x in G(k) can be found easily by looking at the x coordinate of vector
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Finally, the following example which is due to Esther Galbrun shows that the sub-modular
property does not hold for the diffusion game.
Example 6. [A Counterexample by Esther Galbrun] In this example, there are two players
red (r) and blue (b). Circled nodes are initial seeds and the graph shows the color of the nodes
at the end of the diffusion. In all cases blue only picks v3. Moreover, S = ∅ ⊆ {v1} = S¯ and
x = {v4}. As can be seen in Figure 7.7, the utility function of the red player does not satisfy
sub-modular property.
Figure 7.7: A counterexample for the existence of sub-modular property in the diffusion
game.
7.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied a class of games known as diffusion games which model the
competitive behavior of a set of social actors on an undirected connected social network.
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We determined the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for two special but well-studied
classes of networks. We showed that, in general, making a decision on the existence of Nash
equilibrium for such a class of games is an NP-hard problem. Further, we have presented
some necessary conditions for a given profile to be an equilibrium in general graphs. We have
studied the behavior of the competitive diffusion game over Erdos-Renyi graphs, obtained
some concentration results, and derived lower bounds for the expected utilities of the players
over such random structures. Finally, we have provided a lower bound for the social welfare
in such games and have shown that the utility of the players are in general not sub-modular.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
8.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we have discussed four different types of popular social, communication and
distributed networks. We have grouped the problems into two main categories: distributed
control problems where the agents interact locally in order to achieve a certain goal, and
game problems where the agents act in a strategic manner in order to maximize their own
utilities. In fact, we have studied a set of problems which lie at the intersection of these two
categories. We have discussed existing relevant results from the literature, and presented
several new results. In particular, we have noted how a well-constructed function serving as a
potential function can facilitate analysis of such networks. Using such functions, we were able
to evaluate the convergence speed of the dynamics toward an ultimate goal. Furthermore, we
have leveraged such functions in order to devise more effective and faster algorithms which
drive the entire network from an initial state to a final outcome.
8.2 Directions for Future Research
Each of the problems considered in this thesis opens an avenue for future directions of
research as we will discuss in the following:
• Related to the unbiased quantized consensus problem posed in Chapter 3, an inter-
esting problem is to study the expected convergence time of such dynamics in the
absence of reversibility of the transition probabilities. In fact, our analysis in that
chapter heavily relied on the reversibility of the transition probabilities of the underly-
167
ing dynamics. Therefore, obtaining similar results for non-reversible chains will be an
interesting challenge. Furthermore, as a network designer, studying the convergence
properties and the expected convergence time of such dynamics in the presence of an
adversary would constitute an important problem. As an example, given a network G,
one can think of adding an edge (or removing an edge) so as to minimize (or maximize)
the expected convergence time.
• Related to the Metropolis quantized consensus introduced in Chapter 4, one can con-
sider to improve convergence times even further by modifying the underlying dynamics.
For example, [147] attained a linear convergence time for consensus on any fixed graph,
and it is an open question to obtain a quantized consensus protocol which replicates
this. A related problem is to extend the quadratic convergence times obtained in this
chapter to dynamic networks which are not necessarily connected at every time, but
rather only connected in a long-term sense.
• Inspired by the results given in Section 5.3, we would like to know whether for the case
of heterogeneous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics there is any way to design a proper
utility function for each player such that the resulting network formation game converts
to a team problem, such that each player’s update contributes an increase (decrease)
to a global function toward an equilibrium. This is a widely open problem which has
numerous applications on understanding the complex nature of opinion formation in
biased societies (societies with nonidentical entities). Moreover, as we have seen in
Chapter 5, the dynamics of the Hegselmann-Krause model are not robust with respect
to changes. In other words, any small change in the initial opinion of the agents can
result in substantially different outcomes. Therefore, one may think of how to enrich
the Hegselmann-Krause model in order to remove some of its current limitations.
• Related to the capacitated selfish replication game posed in Chapter 6, we are inter-
ested in precise computation of the maximum number of “bad cases” that can happen
during the execution of the least best response dynamics for an arbitrary number of
resources. Moreover, in order to find an equilibrium in the binary CSR game, one
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can increase the cache sizes and recover an equilibrium very fast using the least best
response dynamics. Therefore, one natural question is the relationship of this equi-
librium with that of the unit size cache CSR game. For example, one may be able
to construct an equilibrium for the unit size cache CSR game using an equilibrium of
a CSR game with slightly higher capacities and use some majority rules in order to
assign only one unit resource to each player. Determining the nature of the complexity
of search for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in such games would be another inter-
esting topic. Also one can consider extensions of the results given in this chapter to
more dynamic settings, as has been discussed in [134, 136, 135].
• Related to the diffusion game model introduced in Chapter 7, an interesting problem
is identifying the class of networks which admit pure-strategy Nash equilibria for the
case of two players in the competitive diffusion game. It is not hard to see that a tree
construction which is a special case of bipartite graphs always leads to a pure-strategy
equilibrium [95] for the case of two players. Moreover, we would like to study the
continuous version of such games where the players are allowed to randomize among
their possible actions, as it can relax some of the existing hardness limitations in the
current form of the diffusion game. Finally, studying a more robust model of the




COMPLEMENTARY RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 3
In this Appendix, we provide some preliminary and complementary results for the material
given in Chapter 3.
Lemma A.1. For the star graph and the double-star graph with m edges, the maximum
expected meeting time T is bounded from above by O(m2).
Proof. Let us denote the meeting time function of the original process by Mo(·, ·) : V ×V →
R. For the case of star graph with m edges, a center node z, and two leaves x and y, it is
not hard to see that T = Mo(x, y). Because of the symmetric structure of the star graph















Solving these two equations we get T = Mo(x, y) = m(m+2)
2
. For the case of the double-star
graph, we use a similar line of argument. In a general form, we consider a double-star graph
with center nodes x1 and y1 that share k neighbors, for some k ≥ 0. Moreover, we assume
that x1 and y1 have i and m+ 1− i neighbors, respectively. Such a graph has been depicted
in Figure A.1. Again, using the symmetry, one can distinguish between 13 different states
for the position of the walkers in such a graph. As an example, denoting the location of the
two walkers by x, y and looking at Figure A.1, one can observe that when x ∈ N(x1)\N(y1)
the relative position of the other walker with respect to x can fit into one of the following
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cases:
y ∈ N(y1) \N(x1), y = y1, y ∈ N(x1) ∩N(y1), y = x1, y ∈ N(x1) \N(y1).
Note that in order to write recursion expansions of the expected meeting time of the original
process, and due to symmetry, only the relative positions of the walkers matters. For example
for x 6= y, Mo(x, y) is the same for all pairs of x, y ∈ N(x1). Therefore, by recursion
expansion of the expected meeting time of the original process for such a graph, we obtain a
linear system of equations which for simplicity we write in a matrix form as has been shown
in (A.1). Solving this system of equations fully characterizes the expected meeting time of
the original process for being in different states of the double-star graph which are upper
bounded by O( i+m
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Figure A.1: Star graph and double-star graph with m edges.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. We use the upper bound of α1(LG) ≤ max{d(u) + d(v)|(u, v) ∈ E(G)}
given in [108]. Since we already assumed d(u) + d(v) ≤ m,∀(u, v) ∈ E(G), we consider two
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cases:
• max{d(u)+d(v)|(u, v) ∈ E(G)} ≤ m−1. Then, we simply get α1(LG) ≤ m−1 ≤ m− 12
• max{d(u) + d(v)|(u, v) ∈ E(G)} = m. Then, there exists (u∗, v∗) ∈ E(G) such
that d(u∗) + d(v∗) = m. In this case we used the upper bound of α1(LG) ≤ 2 +√
(m− 2)(s− 2) given in [148], where s = max{d(u) + d(v)|(u, v) ∈ E(G) \ (u∗, v∗)}.
Since d(u∗)+d(v∗) = max{d(u)+d(v)|(u, v) ∈ E(G) = m, there exists exactly one edge
in G\{u∗, v∗} such that for any (u, v) ∈ E(G)\(u∗, v∗) we must have d(u)+d(v) ≤ m−1.
This shows that s ≤ m− 1, and hence,
α1(LG) ≤ 2 +
√









Therefore, in both cases we have α1(LG) ≤ m− 12 . Q.E.D.
In the remaining of this Appendix, we develop an alternative approach in order to study
the maximum expected convergence time of unbiased quantized consensus over static graphs.
In particular, we identify the precise order of the maximum expected convergence time for
the case of simple static graphs such as line graph and cycle. Here we note that, although the
result of this appendix works well when we benefit from inherent symmetry in the underlying
graph G, in general it does not lead to an explicit tight bound based on the parameters of
the network.
Definition 29. A birth-and-death chain of length n + 1 has state space Ω = {0, 1, . . . , n}
such that in one step the state can increase or decrease by at most 1.
Lemma A.2. Assume that G is a connected graph with diameter D. Then, T is bounded
from above by the maximum hitting time of a birth-and-death chain of length D + 1 and
positive transition probabilities greater than 1
m
.
Proof. We partition all the different states of the above original coupled random walks
(Definition 7) into different classes. Here, we refer to each state as a possible pair of positions
of the walkers in the network, and denote the set of all the states by X (G). For each state
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x we define dG(x(0), x(2)) to be the length of the shortest path between walker 0 and walker
2 in state x. Let
S` = {x ∈ X (G)| dG(x(0), x(2)) = `}, ` = 0, 1, . . . , D.
It is clear that {S`}D`=1 is a partitioning of all the states. Furthermore, S0 contains just one
state. In other words, when we reach class S0, it means that the walkers have met. Now,
we introduce a new Markov chain, by letting each class to be a single state by itself, and we
denote it by S`. Finally, we assign the following transition probabilities to the new Markov
chain. For each ` = 1, 2, . . . , D, let
1. P{S` → S`−1} = min
x∈S`,y∈S`−1
P{x→ y},








Also, note that P{S` → S`+1} ≥ 0, and hence the above transition probabilities are well
defined. In fact, assigning the above transition probabilities for the new chain is based on
a worst case scenario which keeps the walkers away from each other for the longest period
of time. In other words, this new birth-and-death chain slows down the progress of moving
the walkers toward each other. As an example, given that the distance of the walkers at the
current time instant is `, i.e., dG(x(0), x(2)) = ` (and hence x ∈ S`), the probability that at
the next time instant the walkers will get closer to each other in the original process (in the
new birth-and-death chain this means that x moves from S` to S`−1) is at least as large as
that in the new birth-and-death chain. Therefore, it is not hard to see that the probability
that the walkers in the original process meet over every sample path is at least as large as the
probability that the equivalent associated sample path in the new birth-and-death process
hits the class S0. Hence, the expected time to hit the state S0 is always an upper bound
for meeting time in the original coupled process. Finally, we note that since in the original
process each edge is chosen with probability 1
m










Proof. Analyzing the birth-and-death chain described in Lemma A.2 for a cycle with n nodes,
we can bound T from above. For such a graph, the new Markov chain has the structure
shown in Figure A.2.
Figure A.2: Birth-and-death chain for a cycle with n nodes.
Therefore, T is bounded from above by H(S[n−1
2
], S0) in the birth-and-death diagram of









Corollary A.2. If G is a line graph with n nodes, then T ≤ (n−1)2(n+1)
4
.
Proof. This follows from a similar argument as in the proof of Corollary A.1, and the bound
coincides with the result given in [15]. Q.E.D.
Corollary A.3. For a line graph and cycle with n nodes, we have C1n
3 ≤ T ≤ C2n3, where
0 < C1 < C2 are two constants.
Proof. We prove the result for the line graph; for the cycle graph the proof is similar. From




[R(x↔ y)+R(y ↔ i)−R(x↔ i)] ≥ H(x, y),
where H(·, ·) is the expected hitting time function of the simple random walk. Replacing
this inequality in (3.13), and since m = n − 1, we get HZ(x, y) ≥ n+34 H(x, y). Also, using











This relation in view of Corollary A.2 completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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APPENDIX B
DUAL APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM FOR THE
CSR GAME
In this appendix, we establish results paralleling those in Section 6.6 using some duality in
the CSR game. More precisely, in the -best response algorithm each player was trying to
decrease his cost if his deviation brings a benefit of more than  fraction of his current saving.
We have already shown that such updates bring the entire system to some close neighborhood
of the equilibrium points in quasi-polynomial time. In the following we establish a similar
result which works even better over symmetric networks by considering the dual of this
problem.
In fact by Lemma 6.4, one would expect to see a “well-distributed” set of resources around
each player. This observation suggests that in order to find an equilibrium one could devise an
algorithm such that its evolution decreases the extra repetition of various resources around
each player. In what follows next, we introduce a dual algorithm for the -best response
algorithm, which in at most quasi-polynomial time can find an allocation profile within
constant factor of an optimal allocation, and hence, of any Nash equilibrium.
-Coloring Algorithm 3: Given a network G = ([n], E), a real number  > 1, a set of
nonnegative integers {ri}ni=1, and an arbitrary initial allocation profile P (0), at every time
instance we select an agent i whose ball BG(i, ri) contains at least two nodes with similar
resources, and we let any one of them (if possible) to update its resource to another one
which did not appear in BG(i, (2+ 1)ri). Ties are broken arbitrarily.







steps. Moreover, in the final profile and for any player i, either all the resources appear at
least once in BG(i, (2+ 1)ri), or every two players in BG(i, ri) have different resources.
Proof. First, let us assume that the algorithm terminates with a profile P . For any arbitrary
but fixed node i, if all the resources are different in BG(i, ri), then the statement of the
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lemma holds. Otherwise, there are at least two nodes in BG(i, ri), namely j, j′, that have
the same color (Figure B.1). Since dG(j, j′) ≤ dG(j, i) + dG(i, j′) ≤ 2ri, we have BG(j, 2ri) ⊆
BG(i, (2+1)ri). Therefore, if at least one resource, namely o2, is missing in BG(i, (2+1)ri),
then node j can play a strictly better response by updating its current resource P j to o2.
But, we assumed that P is the final profile of the algorithm, meaning that neither j nor j′
want to deviate. This contradiction shows that if there are at least two nodes with similar
resources in BG(i, ri), then all the resources must appear at least once in BG(i, (2+ 1)ri).
Next, using the same argument as in Lemma 6.3 we show that such an algorithm terminates







steps. To see this, let us define Mi(t) to be the








Note thatM(·) is a nonnegative function which is upper bounded byM(t) ≤∑k:rk>0 |O|(rk)log n ≤
n |O|
(rmin)log n
for all t. We will show that after each time of running the dynamics, the value
of the potential function given in (B.1) increases by at least 1
n(rmax)log n
. To see this, let
us assume that two nodes j, j′ ∈ BG(i, ri) have the same resources at time step t, i.e.,
Pj(t) = Pj′(t) = {o1}, and in the next time step based on the dynamics, one of them, let us
say node j, updates its resource from o1 to o2 which did not exist in BG(i, (2+ 1)ri) at time
step t. Moreover, let
S(t) = {k ∈ [n] : j ∈ BG(k, rk), ∃k0 ∈ BG(k, rk), Pk0(t) = o2}.
In other words, S(t) is the set of all agents at time step t, which has agent j and at least
one other agent with resource o2 in their balls. We note that for any agent k ∈ S(t) we
must have rk > ri. This is due to the fact that every agent with color o2 is outside of
BG(i, (2 + 1)ri). Therefore, since dG(i, j) ≤ ri, the graphical distance between j and every
other agent with resource o2 is at least 2ri. Now since for every k ∈ S(t), the ball BG(k, rk)
contains both j and another resource of color o2 whose distance to node j is at least 2ri,
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rk must be at least ri such that BG(k, rk) covers both j and one other resource of type o2.
Such a scenario has been illustrated in Figure B.1.
Figure B.1: Illustration of different nodes in the Lemma 6.3. Note that in this figure it is
assumed that node j updates its resource at time t+ 1 from Pj(t) = o1 to Pj(t+ 1) = o2.
On the other hand, for any agent k ∈ [n]\S(t), and after updating node j from color o1 to
o2 at time step t+1, the value Mk(t) is nondecreasing, i.e., Mk(t) ≤Mk(t+1),∀k ∈ [n]\S(t).
This is because at time step t the ball BG(k, rk) either does not contain a resource of type
o2 or does not contain the node j. Putting all this together and after updating the resource
of node j from o1 to o2 at time t+ 1, we have
• Mi(t+ 1) = Mi(t) + 1,
• Mk(t+ 1) ≥Mk(t), ∀k ∈ [n] \ S(t),
• Mk(t+ 1) ≥Mk(t)− 1 and rk ≥ ri, ∀k ∈ S(t).





























where in the second last inequality we have used |S(t)| ≤ n − 1, since at least i /∈ S(t).





times, which shows that the









In the following, we provide a dual algorithm for the -best response algorithm.
Theorem B.1. Given a network G, and an initial allocation profile P (0), let τ k be the same
as what has been defined in Definition 23, and consider the following two-stage process:
• Stage 1: Run the -coloring algorithm for rk = τk−12+1 .
• Stage 2: Initiating from the profile P obtained from Stage 1, run the -coloring algo-
rithm for rk = τ
k + 1.
Then, the allocation profile P˜ obtained at the end of Stage 2 constitutes a (2+1)2-approximation








Proof. Using the result of Lemma 6.3 for rk =
τk−1
2+1
we get that at the end of the Stage 1
and for any arbitrary agent k, either all the resources appear at least once in BG(k, τ k − 1),
or every two nodes in BG(k, τ
k−1
2+1
) have different resources. But by definition of τ k, all the
resources cannot appear in BG(k, τ k − 1), which means that the second case must happen,
i.e., at the termination of the stage 1 and for any k ∈ [n], all the resources in BG(k, τk−12+1 ) are
different. Now denoting the profile obtained at the end of Stage 1 by P , we start the second
stage by setting P (0) = P , and rk = τk + 1,∀k ∈ [n]. Similarly, using the result of Lemma
6.3, at the end of Stage 2 and for any arbitrary agent k, either all the resources appear
at least once in BG(k, (2 + 1)(τ k + 1)), or every two nodes in BG(k, τ k + 1) have different
resources. But by definition of τ k, all the resources in BG(k, τ k + 1) cannot be different.
Therefore, for each k the first case must happen, i.e., at the termination of the algorithm
and for any k ∈ [n], all the resources must appear at least once in BG(k, (2 + 1)(τ k + 1)).
Moreover, using Lemma 6.3 one can easily see that the termination time of both Stages 1












agent k which is inherited at the end of stage 1, will not be affected during the execution of
the second stage. We show it by induction on the iteration steps t = 0, 1, . . . of the second
stage. For the initial profile of the second stage (P ) which is set to be the final profile of




),∀k ∈ [n] contains different resources, let us assume that at time t + 1 a
178
node j which has the same resource as j′ ∈ BG(i, τ i+ 1) for some i updates its resource from
Pj(t) to another resource o2 which does not exist in BG(i, (2 + 1)(τ i + 1)). We claim that
updating j from Pj(t) to Pj(t+1) = o2 does not create any pair of nodes of the same resource
in any of the balls BG(k, τ
k−1
2+1




), then that ball must contain both j and another resource o2, which is at
least 2(τ i + 1) at a distance from j. Therefore, τ
k0−1
2+1




dG(k0, i) + (τ i + 1) ≤ dG(k0, j) + dG(j, i) + (τ i + 1) ≤ τ
k0 − 1
2+ 1
+ 2(τ i + 1)








< τ k0 − 1.
This shows that BG(i, τ i + 1) ⊆ BG(k0, τ k0 − 1). Since by definition of τ i we know that
BG(i, τ i + 1) must contain at least |O| vertices, BG(k0, τ k0 − 1) also contains at least |O|
vertices. But this is in contradiction with the definition of τ k0 . Therefore, in step t + 1
no pair of vertices with the same resource will be created in BG(k, τ
k−1
2+1
),∀k ∈ [n], which
completes the induction process.
The rest of the proof follows in precisely the same way as in that of Theorem 6.7, so we
only sketch the steps here to avoid duplication. In fact we have shown that for any agent
k, the final profile at the termination of Algorithm, i.e., P˜ , has this property that all the
vertices in BG(k, τ
k−1
2+1
) have different resources, while all the resources appear at least once




dG(k, j) + (2+ 1)(τ k + 1)
(










dG(k, j) + (










Comparing the above relations, one can easily see that for all k ∈ [n], we have Ck(P˜ ) ≤
(2+ 1)2Ck(P
o), and hence C(P˜ ) ≤ (2+ 1)2C(P o). Q.E.D.







Proof. Set  = exp(1). Since τmin is the minimum over the set of all positive integers,
τmin ≥ 1. Moreover, by definition we always have τmax ≤ D. The result then follows by
substituting these relations into the statement of Theorem 6.7. Q.E.D.
Remark 21. A closer look at the result of Theorem B.1 shows that when the network is
symmetric, then τmax = τmin, and hence, the running time of the algorithm shrinks to
only O(n2|O|). The same situation happens when the distribution of nodes in the network is
somehow uniform, meaning that every node in the network observes almost the same number




In this appendix, we formulate the competitive diffusion game as a zero-sum game, and from
a new point of view. In particular, we interpret the diffusion process on the network as a
evolution of a Markov chain. Using some analogy between electric circuits and reversible
Markov chains, we formulate the utility of the players using the effective resistances of an
appropriate electric circuit.
In the 2-player diffusion game introduced in Section 5.1, assuming that players A and B
place their seeds at a and b, respectively, a diffusion process unfolds on the network such
that each node adopts either of the two types or remains uninfected or changes to gray. In
particular, an uninfected node will adopt one type rather than the other (let us say type A),
if the diffusion process initiated from a reaches earlier to that particular uninfected node
than the diffusion process initiated from node b. Inspired from this observation, we look at
the adoption process from another angle. In other words, we look at each uninfected node
as a node that is searching to adopt one of the types, and a natural question is: What is the
likelihood that an uninfected node adopts type A rather than type B, and vice versa? To
address this question, we use a Markov chain interpretation of the diffusion process. Note
that in this new formulation we eliminate the situations where the nodes can change to gray
or remain uninfected. As an example, one can think of the cell phone market where every
individual will eventually choose to buy one of the brands instead of not having access to
cell phone at all.
Let us assume that the two players A and B place their seeds at nodes a and b, respectively.
For a given arbitrary node x in the network, we may assume that node x runs a simple
random walk in order to search one of the types around him. In this fashion, the probability
that node x adopts type A is equal to the probability that node x finds type A before type
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B, which can be seen as the probability that the simple random walk initiated at node
x hits node a before b. We denote this probability by P{τxa < τxb }. Therefore, assuming
that each uninfected node has total benefit of 1 for the players, the share of player A from
winning node x is P{τxa < τxb }, and similarly the share of player B from node x will be
P{τxb < τxa } = 1 − P{τxa < τxb }. Therefore, the utility of Players A and B for initial seed








P{τxb < τxa }. (C.1)
Next, in order to formulate the utility functions defined in (C.1) based on effective resis-
tances of an appropriate network, we consider the following result from the theory of Markov
chains.
Lemma C.1. For a random walk on a network and for every three vertices a, b and x, we
have
P{τxa < τxb } =
R(a↔ b) +R(b↔ x)−R(x↔ a)
2R(a↔ b) .
Proof. See [104](Chapter 10). Q.E.D.
Now, combining Lemma C.1 with equation (C.1), one can formulate the utility of the first




















2R(a↔ b) , (C.2)
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where in the last equality R denotes the effective resistance matrix of the network, i.e.,






2R(a↔ b) . (C.3)
From (C.2) and (C.3), it is not hard to see that UA(a, b)+UB(a, b) = n, which means that the
above utility functions define a constant-sum game (strategically equivalent to a zero-sum
game) over the network G. In fact, defining the utility functions as above captures some of
the hidden correlations between the players due to the complex structure of the network.
Furthermore, such formulations allow us to generalize the competitive diffusion game to
networks where edges have some positive (not-unity) weights. In this case, the resistance
of the edges can be defined to be some positive constant other than 1. More information
on the connection between random walks over weighted graphs and electric circuits can be
found in [104].
Extension of Resistance-Based Diffusion Game
By taking a closer look at the utility functions given in (C.2) and (C.3), one can readily
foresee extensions to the case where the players are allowed to choose a subset of nodes
instead of only one node as their initial seed placement. In such a case, assuming that
players choose SA ⊂ V (G) and SB ⊂ V (G) as their initial seeds, one can consider the hitting
time of an uninfected node x to these subsets, i.e., τxSA and τ
x
SB
. For this purpose, one can
construct a new network Gnew by contracting all the nodes in SA and SB into two new nodes
a and b, respectively, such that a node x ∈ V (G) \ {SA ∪ SB} in the new network Gnew is
connected to a or b, respectively, if and only if x was connected to at least one of the nodes
in the sets SA or SB in the original network G. Therefore, it is not hard to see that τxSA




b in the new network, respectively. In
particular, forming the resistance matrix Rnew for the new network Gnew, it is possible to
come up with expressions similar to (C.2) and (C.3) as the utility functions of the players
based on the effective resistances of the new network Gnew. At this point, we note that
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the utilities as above allow the players to compute their payoffs quickly in practice. In fact,
knowing the structure of the network, each player can construct an electric circuit equivalent
to such a network and form the effective resistance matrix in order to compute his or her
utility based on (C.2) or (C.3).
Finally, we note that the resistance-based diffusion game can be extended to games with
more than two players. Denoting the set of players and initial seed sets by i and Si, i =




P{τxSi < τx∪S−i}, (C.4)
where ∪S−i = ∪k 6=iSk.
Sub-Modularity of Resistance-Based Diffusion Game
Unlike the diffusion game model introduced in Chapter 7, here we show the sub-modular
property of the players’ utility functions in the resistance-based diffusion game.
Theorem C.1. The utility of players in the resistance-based diffusion game is a sub-modular
function of their initial seed placement sets.







} − 1{τxA<τxB} ≥ 1{τxA′∪{v}<τxB} − 1{τxA′<τxB}. (C.5)
To see this, we note that both sides of the above inequality are either 0 or 1. Moreover,
if the right-hand side is equal to 1, then regardless of the value in the left-hand side, the
right-hand side will always be greater than or equal to the left-hand side. Therefore, we






} = 1{τxA<τxB} = 1. This means that for a specific sample path of the simple
random walk originating from x, the walk hits the set A before the set B. Since
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A ⊆ A′ ⊆ A′ ∪ {v}, therefore, such a sample path must hit the sets A′ and A′ ∪ {v}





} = 1{τxA′<τxB} = 1. Therefore, in this case






} = 1{τxA<τxB} = 0. This situation occurs when the simple random walk
initiated at node x hits the set B before the set A∪{v}. In particular, such a random





} = 0, then






} = 1, and since we already know that the random walk does not hit the
node v before the set B, thus it must hit the set A′ before the set B, i.e., 1{τxA′<τxB} = 1.
Therefore, in this case the right-hand side of (C.5) will be equal to zero and hence the
inequality holds.






}− P {τxA < τxB} ≥ P{τxA′∪{v} < τxB}− P {τxA′ < τxB} . (C.6)
Finally, given an initial strategy profile (Si, S−i) an arbitrary but fixed v ∈ V , and every
set S ′i ⊇ Si of V , by replacing, respectively, Si, S ′i and ∪S−i instead of A,A′ and B in (C.6),
summing over all x ∈ V and in view of the definition of utility functions given in (C.4), we
obtain Ui(Si ∪ {v}, S−i)− Ui(Si, S−i) ≥ Ui(S ′i ∪ {v}, S−i)− Ui(S ′i, S−i). Q.E.D.
In fact, Theorem C.1 tells us that by applying a simple greedy algorithm, each player can
find its optimum seed placement up to a constant factor of 1− 1
e
. This simply follows from
applying the result of greedy algorithm for sub-modular cost functions [146].
185
REFERENCES
[1] J. N. Tsitsiklis, D. P. Bertsekas, and M. Athans, “Distributed asynchronous determinis-
tic and stochastic gradient optimization algorithms,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 803–812, 1986.
[2] A. Nedic and A. Ozdaglar, “Distributed subgradient methods in multi-agent optimiza-
tion,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 48–61, 2009.
[3] C. Gao, J. Cortes, and F. Bullo, “Notes on averaging over acyclic digraphs and discrete
coverage control,” Automatica, vol. 44, no. 8, pp. 2120–2127, 2008.
[4] W. Ren and R. W. Beard, Distributed Consensus in Multi-Vehicle Cooperative Control.
London: Springer, 2008.
[5] A. Olshevsky, “Efficient information aggregation strategies for distributed control and
signal processing,” Ph. D. thesis, arXiv:1009.6036, 2010.
[6] M. Rabbat and R. D. Nowak, “Distributed optimization in sensor networks,” in Infor-
mation Processing and Sensor Networks. IEEE, 2004, pp. 29–27.
[7] L. Xiao, S. Boyd, and S.-J. Kim, “Distributed average consensus with least-mean-
square deviation,” Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, vol. 67, no. 1, pp.
33–46, 2007.
[8] S. Ram, V. Veeravalli, and A. Nedic, “Distributed non-autonomous power control
through distributed convex optimization,” in INFOCOM. IEEE, 2008, pp. 3001–
3005.
[9] B. Ghosh and S. Muthukrishnan, “Dynamic load balancing in parallel and distributed
networks by random matchings,” in Proceedings of the Sixth Annual ACM Symposium
on Parallel Algorithms and Architectures. ACM, 1994, pp. 226–235.
[10] G. Neglia, G. Reina, and S. Alouf, “Distributed gradient optimization for epidemic
routing: a preliminar evaluation,” in Wireless Days, 2nd IFIP. IEEE, 2009, pp. 1–6.
[11] D. P. Bertsekas and J. N. Tsitsiklis, Parallel and Distributed Computation. Old
Tappan, NJ (USA); Prentice Hall Inc, 1989.
[12] L. Xiao and S. Boyd, “Fast linear iterations for distributed averaging,” Systems and
Control Letters, p. 6517, 2004.
186
[13] S. Boyd, A. Ghosh, B. Prabhakar, and D. Shah, “Gossip algorithms: Design, analysis
and applications,” in Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2005. 24th Annual Joint Confer-
ence of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, vol. 3. IEEE, 2005, pp.
1653–1664.
[14] M. Draief and M. Vojnovic, “Convergence speed of binary interval consensus,” SIAM
Journal on Control and Optimization, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 1087–1109, 2012.
[15] A. Kashyap, T. Bas¸ar, and R. Srikant, “Quantized consensus,” Automatica, vol. 43,
no. 7, pp. 1192–1203, 2007.
[16] S. Etesami and T. Bas¸ar, “Convergence time for unbiased quantized consensus,” Proc.
52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. CDC’13, Dec 10-13, 2013; Florence,
Italy, pp. 6190–6195, 2013.
[17] R. Carli, F. Fagnani, P. Frasca, and S. Zampieri, “Gossip consensus algorithms via
quantized communication,” Automatica, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 70–80, 2010.
[18] M. Zhu and S. Martinez, “On the convergence time of asynchronous distributed quan-
tized averaging algorithms,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 56, no. 2,
pp. 386–390, 2011.
[19] K. Cai and H. Ishii, “Quantized consensus and averaging on gossip digraphs,” IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 56, no. 9, pp. 2087–2100, 2011.
[20] F. Be´ne´zit, P. Thiran, and M. Vetterli, “Interval consensus: from quantized gossip to
voting,” in IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing,
2009. ICASSP 2009. IEEE, 2009, pp. 3661–3664.
[21] R. Olfati-Saber and R. M. Murray, “Consensus problems in networks of agents
with switching topology and time-delays,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 49, no. 9, pp. 1520–1533, 2004.
[22] S. Shang, P. Cuff, P. Hui, and S. Kulkarni, “An upper bound on the convergence time
for quantized consensus,” in 2013 Proceedings INFOCOM. IEEE, 2013, pp. 600–604.
[23] K. Cai and H. Ishii, “Convergence time analysis of quantized gossip consensus on
digraphs,” Automatica, vol. 48, pp. 2344–2351, 2012.
[24] R. Carli, F. Bullo, and S. Zampieri, “Quantized average consensus via dynamic
coding/decoding schemes,” International Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control,
vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 156–175, 2010.
[25] T. Li and L. Xie, “Distributed coordination of multi-agent systems with quantized-
observer based encoding-decoding,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 57,
no. 12, pp. 3023–3027, 2012.
[26] M. Guo and D. Dimarogonas, “Consensus with quantized relative state measure-
ments,” Automatica, vol. 49, no. 8, pp. 2531–2537, 2013.
187
[27] J. Lavaei and R. M. Murray, “Quantized consensus by means of gossip algorithm,”
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 19–32, 2012.
[28] A. Olshevsky, “Consensus with ternary messages,” SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 987–1009, 2014.
[29] M. El Chamie, J. Liu, and T. Bas¸ar, “Design and analysis of distributed averaging
with quantized communication,” Proc. 53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
(CDC’14, Dec 15-17, 2014; Los Angeles, CA), pp. 3860–3865, 2014.
[30] J. M. Hendrickx, A. Olshevsky, and J. N. Tsitsiklis, “Distributed anonymous discrete
function computation,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 56, no. 10, pp.
2276–2289, 2011.
[31] S. R. Etesami and T. Bas¸ar, “Convergence time for unbiased quantized consensus over
static and dynamic networks,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 61(4) (to
appear), 2016.
[32] T. C. Aysal, A. D. Sarwate, and A. G. Dimakis, “Reaching consensus in wireless net-
works with probabilistic broadcast,” Proceedings of the 47th annual Allerton conference
on communication, control, and computing, pp. 732–739, 2009.
[33] S. Sundaran and C. N. Hadjicostis, “Finite-time distributed consensus in graphs with
time-invariant topologies,” Proc. American Control Conference, pp. 711–716, 2007.
[34] M. H. DeGroot, “Reaching a consensus,” Journal of the American Statistical Associ-
ation, vol. 69, no. 345, pp. 118–121, 1974.
[35] A. Olshevsky and J. Tsitsiklis, “On the nonexistence of quadratic Lyapunov functions
for consensus algorithms,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 53, pp. 2642–
2645, 2008.
[36] J. C. Delvenne, R. Carli, and S. Zampieri, “Optimal strategies in the average consensus
problem,” Wavelet Analysis and Multiresolution Methods, vol. 56, pp. 759–765, 2009.
[37] L.Wang and F. Xiao, “Finite-time consensus problems for networks of dynamic
agents,” IEEE Transaction On Automatic Control, vol. 55, no. 5, 2010.
[38] N. E. Friedkin and E. C. Johnsen, “Social influence networks and opinion change,”
Advances in Group Processes, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 1–29, 1999.
[39] R. Hegselmann and U. Krause, “Opinion dynamics and bounded confidence models,
analysis, and simulation,” Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 5, pp. 1–33,
2002.
[40] J. B. Stiff and P. A. Mongeau, Persuasive Communication. Guilford Press, 2003.
[41] N. E. Friedkin and E. C. Johnsen, Social Influence Network Theory. Cambridge
University Press, New York, 2011.
188
[42] F. Bullo, J. Cortes, and S. Martinez, Distributed Control of Robotic Networks. Prince-
ton University Press, 2009.
[43] J. Lorenz, Repeated averaging and bounded-confidence, modeling, analysis and simu-
lation of continuous opinion dynamics. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Bremen,
2007.
[44] ——, “Heterogeneous bounds of confidence: Meet, discuss and find consensus!” Com-
plexity, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 43–52, 2010.
[45] A. Mirtabatabaei and F. Bullo, “Opinion dynamics in heterogeneous networks: Con-
vergence conjectures and theorems,” SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization,
vol. 50, no. 5, pp. 2763–2785, 2012.
[46] S. R. Etesami, T. Bas¸ar, A. Nedic´, and B. Touri, “Termination time of multidimen-
sional Hegselmann-Krause opinion dynamics,” in Proc. American Control Conference
(ACC). IEEE, 2013, pp. 1255–1260.
[47] A. Bhattacharyya, M. Braverman, B. Chazelle, and H. L. Nguyen, “On the conver-
gence of the Hegselmann-Krause system,” in Proceedings of the 4th Conference on
Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science. ACM, 2013, pp. 61–66.
[48] B. Chazelle, “The total s-energy of a multiagent system,” SIAM Journal on Control
and Optimization, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 1680–1706, 2011.
[49] S. Boyd, A. Ghosh, B. Prabhakar, and D. Shah, “Gossip algorithms: Design, analysis,
and applications,” IEEE Infocom, vol. 3, pp. 1653–1664, 2005.
[50] S. Mohajer and B. Touri, “On convergence rate of scalar Hegselmann-Krause dynam-
ics,” in Proc. American Control Conference (ACC). IEEE, 2013, pp. 206–210.
[51] A. Nedic´ and B. Touri, “Multi-dimensional Hegselmann-Krause dynamics,” in Proc.
2012 IEEE 51st Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2012,
pp. 68–73.
[52] B. Touri and C. Langbort, “On endogenous random consensus and averaging dynam-
ics,” Proc. 52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pp. 6208–6212,
2013.
[53] J. R. Marden, G. Arslan, and J. S. Shamma, “Cooperative control and potential
games,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics,
vol. 39, no. 6, pp. 1393–1407, 2009.
[54] A. Rantzer, “Using game theory for distributed control engineering,” Language, vol.
280, no. 53, p. 16, 2008.
[55] H. Zhang, F. L. Lewis, and Z. Qu, “Lyapunov, adaptive, and optimal design techniques
for cooperative systems on directed communication graphs,” IEEE Transactions on
Industrial Electronics, vol. 59, no. 7, pp. 3026–3041, 2012.
189
[56] J. M. Hendrickx, Graphs and networks for the analysis of autonomous agent systems.
Ph.D. dissertation, Universite´ Catholique de Louvain, 2011.
[57] V. Pacifici and G. Dan, “Convergence in player-specific graphical resource allocation
games,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 30, no. 11, pp.
2190–2199, 2012.
[58] A. M. Masucci and A. Silva, “Strategic resource allocation for competitive influence
in social networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1402.5388, 2014.
[59] I. Milchtaich, “Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions,” Games and
Economic Behavior, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 111–124, 1996.
[60] H. Ackermann, H. Ro¨glin, and B. Vo¨cking, “On the impact of combinatorial structure
on congestion games,” Journal of the ACM (JACM), vol. 55, no. 6, p. 25, 2008.
[61] A. Fabrikant, C. Papadimitriou, and K. Talwar, “The complexity of pure Nash equilib-
ria,” in Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Com-
puting. ACM, 2004, pp. 604–612.
[62] V. Anantharam, “On the Nash dynamics of congestion games with player-specific
utility,” in Proc. 43rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2004. CDC, vol. 5.
IEEE, 2004, pp. 4673–4678.
[63] I. Caragiannis, M. Flammini, C. Kaklamanis, P. Kanellopoulos, and L. Moscardelli,
“Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing,” in Automata, Languages and
Programming. Springer, 2006, pp. 311–322.
[64] G. G. Pollatos, O. A. Telelis, and V. Zissimopoulos, “On the social cost of distributed
selfish content replication,” in NETWORKING 2008 Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks,
Wireless Networks, Next Generation Internet. Springer, 2008, pp. 195–206.
[65] E. J. Friedman, J. Y. Halpern, and I. Kash, “Efficiency and Nash equilibria in a scrip
system for P2P networks,” in Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce. ACM, 2006, pp. 140–149.
[66] N. Laoutaris, O. Telelis, V. Zissimopoulos, and I. Stavrakakis, “Distributed selfish
replication,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 17, no. 12,
pp. 1401–1413, 2006.
[67] R. Gopalakrishnan, D. Kanoulas, N. N. Karuturi, C. P. Rangan, R. Rajaraman, and
R. Sundaram, “Cache me if you can: capacitated selfish replication games,” in LATIN
2012: Theoretical Informatics. Springer, 2012, pp. 420–432.
[68] R. T. Maheswaran and T. Bas¸ar, “Nash equilibrium and decentralized negotiation in
auctioning divisible resources,” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 12, no. 5, pp.
361–395, 2003.
190
[69] ——, “Decentralized network resource allocation as a repeated noncooperative market
game,” in Proceedings of the 40th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, vol. 5.
IEEE, 2001, pp. 4565–4570.
[70] M. X. Goemans, L. Li, V. S. Mirrokni, and M. Thottan, “Market sharing games
applied to content distribution in ad hoc networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas
in Communications, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 1020–1033, 2006.
[71] B.-G. Chun, K. Chaudhuri, H. Wee, M. Barreno, C. H. Papadimitriou, and J. Kubi-
atowicz, “Selfish caching in distributed systems: a game-theoretic analysis,” in Pro-
ceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed
Computing. ACM, 2004, pp. 21–30.
[72] S. Goyal and F. Vega-Redondo, “Learning, network formation and coordination,” Tin-
bergen Institute, Tech. Rep., 2000.
[73] R. Johari, S. Mannor, and J. N. Tsitsiklis, “Efficiency loss in a network resource
allocation game: the case of elastic supply,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 50, no. 11, pp. 1712–1724, 2005.
[74] J. R. Marden and T. Roughgarden, “Generalized efficiency bounds in distributed re-
source allocation,” in Proc. 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC).
IEEE, 2010, pp. 2233–2238.
[75] E. Koutsoupias and C. Papadimitriou, “Worst-case equilibria,” in STACS 99.
Springer, 1999, pp. 404–413.
[76] A. Vetta, “Nash equilibria in competitive societies, with applications to facility loca-
tion, traffic routing and auctions,” in Proceedings. 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science. IEEE, 2002, pp. 416–425.
[77] J. R. Correa, A. S. Schulz, and N. E. Stier-Moses, “Selfish routing in capacitated
networks,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 961–976, 2004.
[78] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. V. Vazirani, Algorithmic Game Theory.
Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 2007, vol. 1.
[79] S. Goyal and M. Kearns, “Competitive contagion in networks,” in Proceedings of the
44th Symposium on Theory of Computing. ACM, 2012, pp. 759–774.
[80] H. P. Young, “The diffusion of innovations in social networks,” Economy as an Evolving
Complex System. Proceedings volume in the Santa Fe Institute studies in the sciences
of complexity, vol. 3, pp. 267–282, 2002.
[81] D. Kempe, J. Kleinberg, and E´. Tardos, “Maximizing the spread of influence through a
social network,” in Proceedings of the Ninth ACM SIGKDD International Conference
on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. ACM, 2003, pp. 137–146.
191
[82] D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar, and E. Yildiz, “Diffusion of innovations in social networks,”
in Proc. 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Con-
ference (CDC-ECC). IEEE, 2011, pp. 2329–2334.
[83] A. Khanafer, T. Bas¸ar, and B. Gharesifard, “Stability properties of infected networks
with low curing rates,” in Proc. 2014 American Control Conference (ACC 2014),
Portland, OR. IEEE, 2014, pp. 3591–3596.
[84] A. Khanafer and T. Bas¸ar, “Information spread in networks: control, games, and
equilibria,” in Proc. Information Theory and Applications Workshop (ITA’14), San
Diego, California, 2014.
[85] S. Bharathi, D. Kempe, and M. Salek, “Competitive influence maximization in social
networks,” in Internet and Network Economics. Springer, 2007, pp. 306–311.
[86] S. Braˆnzei and K. Larson, “Social distance games,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-
Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence-Volume One. AAAI
Press, 2011, pp. 91–96.
[87] M. Richardson and P. Domingos, “Mining knowledge-sharing sites for viral marketing,”
in Proceedings of the Eighth ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining. ACM, 2002, pp. 61–70.
[88] Y. Singer, “How to win friends and influence people, truthfully: influence maximiza-
tion mechanisms for social networks,” in Proceedings of the Fifth ACM International
Conference on Web Search and Data Mining. ACM, 2012, pp. 733–742.
[89] N. Alon, M. Feldman, A. D. Procaccia, and M. Tennenholtz, “A note on competitive
diffusion through social networks,” Information Processing Letters, vol. 110, no. 6, pp.
221–225, 2010.
[90] R. Takehara, M. Hachimori, and M. Shigeno, “A comment on pure-strategy Nash
equilibria in competitive diffusion games,” Information Processing Letters, vol. 112,
no. 3, pp. 59–60, 2012.
[91] E. Yildiz, D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar, A. Saberi, and A. Scaglione, “Discrete opinion
dynamics with stubborn agents,” Available at SSRN 1744113, 2011.
[92] M. Fazli, M. Ghodsi, J. Habibi, P. J. Khalilabadi, V. Mirrokni, and S. S. Sadeghabad,
“On the non-progressive spread of influence through social networks,” in LATIN 2012:
Theoretical Informatics. Springer, 2012, pp. 315–326.
[93] E. Ackerman, O. Ben-Zwi, and G. Wolfovitz, “Combinatorial model and bounds for
target set selection,” Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 411, no. 44, pp. 4017–4022,
2010.
[94] A. Gionis, E. Terzi, and P. Tsaparas, “Opinion maximization in social networks,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1301.7455, 2013.
192
[95] L. Small and O. Mason, “Nash equilibria for competitive information diffusion on
trees,” Information Processing Letters, vol. 113, no. 7, pp. 217–219, 2013.
[96] ——, “Information diffusion on the iterated local transitivity model of online social
networks,” Discrete Applied Mathematics, 2012.
[97] D. Acemoglu, G. Como, F. Fagnani, and A. Ozdaglar, “Opinion fluctuations and
disagreement in social networks,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 38, no. 1,
pp. 1–27, 2013.
[98] ——, “Message passing optimization of harmonic influence centrality,” ACM SIG-
METRICS Performance Evaluation Review, vol. 42(3), 2014.
[99] L. Vassio, F. Fagnani, P. Frasca, and A. Ozdaglar, “Harmonic influence in large-scale
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, vol. 1(1), 2014.
[100] P. Tetali, “Random walks and the effective resistance of networks,” Journal of Theo-
retical Probability, vol. 4, pp. 101–109, 1991.
[101] L. Lova´sz, “Random walks on graphs: A survey,” Combinatorics, Paul Erdos is eighty,
vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1–46, 1993.
[102] M. Catral, S. J. Kirkland, M. Neumann, and N.-S. Sze, “The Kemeny constant for
finite homogeneous ergodic Markov chains,” Journal of Scientific Computing, vol. 45,
no. 1-3, pp. 151–166, 2010.
[103] D. Aldous and J. Fill, Reversible Markov chains and random walks on graphs. Book
in preparation - preprint available at http://www.stat.Berkeley.EDU/users/aldous.,
2002.
[104] D. A. Levin, Y. Peres, and E. L. Wilmer, Markov Chains and Mixing Times. American
Mathematical Society, 2009.
[105] L. Saloff-Coste, “Lectures on finite Markov chains,” in Lectures on Probability Theory
and Statistics. Springer, 1997, pp. 301–413.
[106] C. D. Godsil, G. Royle, and C. Godsil, Algebraic Graph Theory. Springer, New York,
2001.
[107] R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson, Matrix Analysis. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
[108] W. N. Anderson Jr and T. D. Morley, “Eigenvalues of the Laplacian of a graph*,”
Linear and Multilinear Algebra, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 141–145, 1985.
[109] J. Shen, “A geometric approach to ergodic non-homogeneous Markov chains,” Wavelet
Analysis and Multiresolution Methods, pp. 341–366, 2000.
[110] T. Bas¸ar and G. J. Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory. SIAM, 1999,
vol. 23.
193
[111] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley, “Potential games,” Games and Economic Behavior,
vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 124–143, 1996.
[112] N. Alon and J. H. Spencer, The Probabilistic Method. John Wiley & Sons, 2004.
[113] D. Coppersmith, P. Tetali, and P. Winkler, “Collisions among random walks on a
graph,” SIAM J. on Discrete Mathematics, vol. 6, pp. 363–374, 1993.
[114] M. Abdullah, C. Cooper, and T. Radzik, “The cover time of Cartesian product graphs,”
arXiv preprint arXiv,1202.5569, 2012.
[115] R. Elsssera and T. Sauerwald, “Tight bounds for the cover time of multiple random
walks,” Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 412, pp. 2623–2641, 2011.
[116] C. Avin, M. Kouck17, and Z. Lotker, “How to explore a fast-changing world (cover time
of a simple random walk on evolving graphs),” Proceedings of the 35th international
colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I, pp. 121–132, 2008.
[117] T. Bas¸ar, S. R. Etesami, and A. Olshevsky, “Fast convergence of quantized con-
sensus using Metropolis chains over static and dynamic networks,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1504.01438, 2015.
[118] Y. Nonaka, H. Ono, K. Sadakane, and M. Yamashita, “The hitting and cover times
of Metropolis walks,” Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 411, no. 16, pp. 1889–1894,
2010.
[119] D. Fremlin, Measure Theory. ISBN 978-0-9538129-7-4, 2010, vol. 2.
[120] E. Seneta, Non-negative Matrices and Markov Chains. Springer, 2006.
[121] C. Avin, “Random geometric graphs: an algorithmic perspective,” Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California Los Angeles, 2006.
[122] M. Pineda, R. Toral, and E. Herna´ndez-Garc´ıa, “The noisy Hegselmann-Krause model
for opinion dynamics,” The European Physical Journal B, vol. 86, no. 12, pp. 1–10,
2013.
[123] S. Kurz and J. Rambau, “On the Hegselmann-Krause conjecture in opinion dynamics,”
Journal of Difference Equations and Applications, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 859–876, 2011.
[124] J. M. Hendrickx and A. Olshevsky, “On symmetric continuum opinion dynamics,”
Proc. 52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pp. 1989–1994, 2013.
[125] V. D. Blondel, J. M. Hendrickx, and J. N. Tsitsiklis, “On the 2r conjecture for multi-
agent systems,” in Proceedings of the European Control Conference 2007 (ECC1707).
Citeseer, 2007, pp. 874–881.
[126] J. Lorenz, “Continuous opinion dynamics under bounded confidence: A survey,” In-
ternational Journal of Modern Physics C, vol. 18, no. 12, pp. 1819–1838, 2007.
194
[127] B. Touri and A. Nedic´, On existence of a quadratic comparison function for random
weighted averaging dynamics and its implications. Proceedings of the 50th IEEE
Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference, CDC-ECC
2011, Orlando, FL, USA, December 12-15, 2011, 2009.
[128] M. Roozbehani, A. Megretski, and E. Frazzoli, “Lyapunov analysis of quadratically
symmetric neighborhood consensus algorithms,” in Proc. 47th IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2008, pp. 2252–2257.
[129] S. Li and T. Bas¸ar, “Asymptotic agreement and convergence of asynchronous stochas-
tic algorithms,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 32, no. 7, pp. 612–618,
1987.
[130] D. P. Bertsekas, “Distributed asynchronous computation of fixed points,” Mathemat-
ical Programming, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 107–120, 1983.
[131] J. N. Tsitsiklis and M. Athans, “Convergence and asymptotic agreement in distributed
decision problems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 42–
50, 1984.
[132] S. R. Etesami and T. Bas¸ar, “Pure Nash equilibrium in capacitated selfish replication
(CSR) game,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1404.3442, 2014.
[133] B. Bolloba´s, Random Graphs. Cambridge University Press, 2001, vol. 73.
[134] A. Fabrikant, A. Luthra, E. Maneva, C. H. Papadimitriou, and S. Shenker, “On a
network creation game,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Symposium on
Principles of Distributed Computing. ACM, 2003, pp. 347–351.
[135] B. Kawald and P. Lenzner, “On dynamics in selfish network creation,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1212.4797, 2012.
[136] S. R. Etesami and T. Bas¸ar, “Game-theoretic analysis of the Hegselmann-Krause model
for opinion dynamics in finite dimensions,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
60(7):1886-1897, July 2015.
[137] R. P. Dilworth, “A decomposition theorem for partially ordered sets,” Annals of Math-
ematics, pp. 161–166, 1950.
[138] L. Mirsky, “A dual of Dilworth’s decomposition theorem,” American Mathematical
Monthly, pp. 876–877, 1971.
[139] C. Du¨rr and N. K. Thang, “Nash equilibria in Voronoi games on graphs,” in
Algorithms–ESA 2007. Springer, 2007, pp. 17–28.
[140] M. R. Garey and D. S. Johnson, “Complexity results for multiprocessor scheduling
under resource constraints,” SIAM Journal on Computing, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 397–411,
1975.
195
[141] K. Paton, “An algorithm for the blocks and cutnodes of a graph,” Communications of
the ACM, vol. 14, no. 7, pp. 468–475, 1971.
[142] P. Erdos and A. Renyi, “On random graphs I,” in Publ. Math. Debrecen, vol. 6, 1959,
pp. 290–297.
[143] B. Hajek, Y. Wu, and J. Xu, “Computational lower bounds for community detection
on random graphs,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.6625, 2014.
[144] M. E. J. Newman, “Detecting community structure in networks,” Eur. Phys. J. B,
vol. 38, pp. 321–330, 2004.
[145] F. Wu and B. A. Huberman, “Finding communities in linear time: A physics ap-
proach,” in http://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0310600, 2003.
[146] E. Mossel and S. Roch, “Submodularity of influence in social networks: From local to
global,” SIAM Journal on Computing, vol. 39, no. 6, pp. 2176–2188, 2010.
[147] A. Olshevsky. (2014) Linear time average consensus on fixed graphs and
implications for decentralized optimization and multi-agent control. [Online].
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1411.4186
[148] L. Jiong-Sheng and Z. Xiao-Dong, “A new upper bound for eigenvalues of the Laplacian
matrix of a graph,” Linear Algebra and Its Applications, vol. 265, no. 1, pp. 93–100,
1997.
196
